The evolution of the US ballistic missile defence debate 1989-2010: institutional rivalry, party politics and the quest towards political and strategic acceptance by Futter, Andrew James
 The Evolution of the US 
Ballistic Missile Defence Debate 
1989-2010 
 
Institutional Rivalry, Party Politics, and the Progression 
Towards Political and Strategic Acceptance 
 
By 
 
Andrew James Futter 
 
 
A thesis submitted to The University of Birmingham for the 
degree of  
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY 
 
 
Department of Political Science and International Studies,  
College of Social Sciences,  
The University of Birmingham, 
September 2011
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
University of Birmingham Research Archive 
 
e-theses repository 
 
 
This unpublished thesis/dissertation is copyright of the author and/or third 
parties. The intellectual property rights of the author or third parties in respect 
of this work are as defined by The Copyright Designs and Patents Act 1988 or 
as modified by any successor legislation.   
 
Any use made of information contained in this thesis/dissertation must be in 
accordance with that legislation and must be properly acknowledged.  Further 
distribution or reproduction in any format is prohibited without the permission 
of the copyright holder.  
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
This thesis explains the complex evolution of US ballistic missile defence (BMD) policy between 
1989 and 2010, and moves beyond the political rhetoric and intellectual obfuscation that surrounds 
the policy in much of the literature.  By developing an explanatory framework to rigorously and 
systematically analyse the impact of different dynamics on policy, it explains the rhythms of day-to-
day policy in particular context; explains the medium-term shifts in the domestic political space 
within which the day-to-day policy debate occurred, and explains the long-term move towards 
acceptance and the gradual normalisation of BMD in American security policy.  The primary 
argument of the thesis is that the particular configuration of domestic political institutions and party 
political pressures at any given time has been far more important in shaping BMD policy during 
each presidential administration since the end of the Cold War than has previously been 
acknowledged.  Secondly, it argues that developments in the international system and technology 
have gradually altered the context within which this domestic political debate has occurred.  
Finally, it shows that domestic political influences, and the gradual shift in the contours of the 
domestic debate are the key reasons why BMD has gone from being one of the most divisive, zero-
sum political issues in American national security thinking, to something that has largely become 
normalised, with debate now only occurring at the margins. 
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Aegis BMD      Sea-based missile defence system. 
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 (BMDO)     programme (1993 - 2002).    
Brilliant Pebbles     Space-based component of the GPALS system. 
Exoatmospheric Reentry-vehicle Interception  The ground-based component of the SDI and
 System (ERIS)    GPALS system.  
Global Protection Against Limited Strikes   BMD architecture unveiled by George H. W. 
 (GPALS)      Bush in January 1991.   
Ground-based Interceptor (GBI) missile  The successor to the ERIS missile, designed to 
       intercept long-range missiles in space. 
Ground-based Midcourse Defense (GMD)  System to shoot down ICBM’s while travelling 
       through space. 
Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM)   A missile capable of travelling a distance of 
       3,500m or greater, which can be armed with  
       nuclear warheads.    
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) International organisation for the peaceful use 
of nuclear energy. 
Missile Defense Agency (MDA)  Agency responsible for the US missile defence 
 programme (2002 -).     
National/ Strategic Missile Defense (NMD)  A missile defence system designed to protect 
       the US homeland. 
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New START Treaty     Treaty between the United States and Russia 
       (February 2011 -). 
Patriot BMD      Battlefield BMD system for use against short-
       range missiles. 
Phased Adaptive Approach (PAA)   Missile defence plan for Europe announced by 
       Barack Obama in 2009.  
Phase I Strategic Defense System (SDS)  BMD deployment plan outlined by Ronald 
 Reagan in 1987. 
Standard Missile 3 (SM-3)  Interceptor missile used by the Aegis BMD 
 for short-intermediate range interception. 
Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty I (START I) Treaty between the United States and Russia, 
       (1991 - 2009). 
Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty II (START II) Treaty between the United States and Russia 
       (2000 - 2002). 
Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI)   Programme to develop missile defences,  
       announced by President Ronald Reagan in  
       1983. 
Strategic Defense Initiative Organization (SDIO) Organisation responsible for the US missile  
       defence programme (1983 - 1993). 
Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (SORT) Treaty between the United States and Russia 
       (2003 - 2011). 
Tactical/ Theatre/Battlefield missile   BMD systems designed to defend against  
 defence (TMD)    short to intermediate range missiles. 
Terminal (Theatre) High Altitude Area Defense Ground-based BMD system designed to 
 (Thaad)     intercept missiles interminal phase of flight.  
The Third Site plan   Bush administration’s plan to deploy missile 
  defence assets in Europe (2006 - 2009). 
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Introduction 
 
The idea of constructing a missile shield capable of defending the United States, its troops overseas, 
and its allies from the threat of ballistic missile attack has been part of the US national security 
debate since the 1940s.
1
  It has also, until recently, been a distinctively American phenomenon.
2
 
Successive US administrations have now spent several hundred billion dollars in the pursuit of 
technologies designed to provide a leak-proof missile shield over the United States and return the 
nation to the seeming invulnerability enjoyed before World War Two.  It has only been recently – 
in the words of the US Missile Defense Agency’s Lawrence Kaplan – “that the US appears to have 
crossed the threshold between technological capability and the BMD concept, more than 60 years 
after it was first introduced”.3 
Unlike many other national security programmes, missile defence has been mired in 
political, technological and strategic controversy, and has been the subject of fierce debate over the 
years, which has often been described as “theological”.  In fact, as one commentator points out: 
America’s on-again, off-again argument with itself – and with the rest of the world – over 
 whether to build a defense against intercontinental-range ballistic missiles (ICBMs) is in a 
 class by itself.  No other proposed weapon system has fuelled such intense debate.
4
 
Although the debate, technology and rationale has shifted considerably since the idea was first 
conceived, the programme remains in the words of John Isaacs – Director of the Washington, DC-
                                                          
1
 For a historical overview of US missile defence policy see Donald Baucom, “The origins of SDI: 1944-1983”, 
(Kansas, Kansas University Press: 1992); Richard Burns & Lester Brune, “The quest for missile defenses 1944-2003”, 
(California, Regina Books: 2003); Ernest Yanarella, “The missile defense controversy: technology in search of a 
mission”, (Kentucky, University Press of Kentucky: 2002).  For an overview of ballistic missile defence as a 
component of nuclear strategy see Lawrence Freedman, “The evolution of nuclear strategy”, (Basingstoke, Palgrave 
Macmillan: 2003) or Sanford Lakoff, “Strategic defense in the nuclear age”, (London, Praeger Security International: 
2007). 
2
 As Bradley Graham points out: “The human yearning for invulnerability is as old as Greek mythology and the aegis 
cloak of Zeus.  But the particular ambition to shield a nation against ballistic missile attack has been a distinctly 
American experience”. Bradley Graham, “Hit to kill: the new battle over shielding America from missile attack”, (New 
York, Public Affairs: 2003) xxvi 
3
 Interview with Lawrence Kaplan (14
th
 June 2010) 
4
 Ibid 
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 7 
based Council for a Livable World – “inherently and fundamentally political”5, and continues to be 
used as a tool in party political power struggles 
For the best part of six decades, the desirability, feasibility and affordability of constructing 
ballistic missile defences has fundamentally split domestic opinion in the United States, and has 
resulted in the programme becoming one of the most politically divisive issues in US national 
security thinking.  Very few other government programmes have had such ability to unite 
politicians and commentators according to political creed and to produce such politically and 
ideologically charged arguments.  There have essentially been two main areas of disagreement.  
First, and especially since the late 1960s, opinion has been split over the role of BMD in nuclear 
deterrence.  On one side of the debate, there are those who view BMD as inherently destabilising in 
international nuclear relationships, and who have therefore favoured a policy of restraint, whereby 
US security is based on the acceptance of vulnerability rather than defence, a doctrine known as 
Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD).  On the other side, there have been those who believe missile 
defences are integral to US security, are convinced that relying on vulnerability is morally wrong 
and strategically dangerous, and that the US should pursue all means possible to protect American 
citizens.  Second, the debate has been split over technology and the question of what it might be 
feasible to expect a ballistic missile defence system to do.  This has been divided between 
technological optimists who view any deployment as good, and believe all that is lacking is political 
commitment, and technological pessimists who neither believe the technology works nor feel that 
the price of pursuing its development is worthwhile.  It is also split between those who believe that 
missile defences must be 100% effective and those that believe any capability is worth having.  As 
Stephen Cambone would later point out: “there has been overestimation on both sides about the 
                                                          
5
 Interview with John Isaacs (19
th
 July 2010) 
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technology, and these were often subjected to Cold War orthodoxies about Mutual Assured 
Destruction”.6 
At least since the early 1980s, and in particular Ronald Reagan’s 1983 announcement of the 
Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), this split has been formulated largely along party political lines. 
Republican lawmakers and a small group of conservative think tanks have generally supported 
more funding and an expanded role for missile defences and can be thought of as “missile defence 
supporters”, whereas Democrats and “arms controllers” have been more sceptical of the programme 
and can be thought of as “missile defence sceptics”.  This dynamic has largely held true on both 
presidential and Congressional levels since the unveiling of the Strategic Defense Initiative in 1983.  
Missile defence supporters have tended to place less faith in ensuring US security through Mutual 
Assured Destruction (MAD) – such as through the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty – and 
instead have seen programmes such as missile defence as a moral obligation.  Sceptics on the other 
hand have tended to see national security as best assured through the mutual vulnerability codified 
by MAD, and have therefore been far keener to limit missile defences and rely primarily on nuclear 
deterrence as the bedrock of US security.  The result of this split is that Republicans have tended to 
be more disposed towards “strategic” or national missile defences (NMD) prohibited by the ABM 
Treaty (even though the Treaty was signed by a Republican president)
7
, while Democrats have 
tended to prefer theatre, tactical or battlefield missile defences (TMD), which do not represent a 
challenge to the perceived logic of Mutual Assured Destruction.  During the second half of the Cold 
War – for a mixture of political, technological and strategic reasons – the idea that US security was 
best assured through a policy of Mutual Assured Destruction and by limiting US missile defences 
was the dominant and accepted discourse.  
                                                          
6
 Interview with Stephen Cambone (5
th
 August 2010) 
7
 Republican President Richard Nixon and Soviet General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev signed the ABM Treaty on 26
th
 
May 1972.  The Treaty essentially codified the condition of Mutually Assured Destruction by ensuring that neither side 
could deploy nationwide “strategic” defences.  For more on this see Matthew Bunn, “Foundation for the future: the 
ABM Treaty and national security”, (Washington DC, Arms Control Association: 1990).  
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 What makes the period looked at in this thesis of particular interest were the fundamental 
changes that occurred in the US missile defence debate.  The years 1989-2010 saw a gradual 
transformation from the disagreements that dominated strategic planning during the Cold War – 
whereby MAD was preferred to missile defences, which were limited within the ABM Treaty – to a 
position whereby various systems had been deployed, the ABM Treaty had been abrogated, and 
both tactical and national missile defences had become an accepted component of US national 
security planning.  Although the debate remained political during this period, by 2010 lawmakers 
and commentators previously sceptical of deploying missile defences had largely converged with 
BMD supporters and formed a large body of opinion that is broadly favourable to the idea – if not 
necessarily the specifics – of both national and theatre ballistic missile defence.  This happened 
largely because with the end of the Cold War, and the rise of rogue states seemingly intent on 
acquiring WMD, a stronger strategic and technological rationale for ballistic missile defences had 
emerged.  
  The evolution of the ballistic missile defence debate after the Cold War has nevertheless 
been complex, complicated and punctuated.  As this thesis shows, the debate and subsequent policy 
choices would often appear to reflect neither the particular requirements of the international system 
for US security at any given time, nor indeed the current capabilities of BMD technology.  In the 
words of former Washington Post correspondent Bradley Graham: 
The story of how missile defense re-emerged is complex and contentious.  It is a tale of 
 disputed intelligence assessments and reactive political decisions, of hurried technical 
 development and embarrassing misfires, of dated old world treaties and ill defined new 
 world orders.
8
 
This thesis seeks to place these debates surrounding ballistic missile defence, and their evolution, 
within historical context.  In doing so, it seeks to demonstrate the centrality of domestic political 
actors and dynamics in this evolution, in order to unearth how and why the debate shifted during 
this period. 
                                                          
8
 Graham (2003) xxiv 
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This thesis is driven primarily by a desire to understand how and why policy has evolved in the 
manner that it did.  In offering an analysis that highlights the crucial role of domestic political 
dynamics in the missile defence story, the thesis seeks to explain why policy so often appeared out 
of sync with developments in the international system, and likewise did not mirror the prevailing 
state of scientific opinion regarding technology.  In other words, why renewed emphasis on BMD 
often came at times when the international environment appeared relatively benign, or when 
scientists and engineers questioned the technological feasibility of such a strategy.  In doing so, the 
thesis develops an explanatory framework allowing for systematic analysis of the impact of 
different dynamics on different levels of analysis on policy over time, and to examine why the 
debate changed.   
The thesis makes two important contributions to our understanding of the evolution of US 
BMD policy after the Cold War.  First, it is argued that the particular balance between domestic 
political institutions and party political pressures have been far more important in shaping BMD 
policy during each presidential administration since the end of the Cold War than has previously 
been acknowledged.  Specifically, the work highlights the central importance of the balance 
between president and Congress, and shows how particular presidents were enabled or constrained 
in what they did – relative to what they wanted to do – by a sometimes compliant and at other times 
hostile Congress.  By doing this, the thesis demonstrates that in general, Democrats tended to 
favour restraint, while Republicans favoured pushing ahead with missile defence development and 
deployment.  Second, it argues that developments in the international system and advances in 
technology gradually altered the context within which this domestic political debate occurred.  The 
thesis shows how a convergence of advancing technological capability and the changing 
requirements of US security in light of changes in the international system made BMD 
progressively less contentious and divisive during this period.  The debate evolved from a position 
where, in 1989, the technology did not exist to counteract the large missile threat from the Soviet 
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Union, to a position in 2010 where the technology to provide a credible defence against Iran, North 
Korea and other more limited missile threats did appear to exist.   
By doing this, the thesis argues that domestic political actors, often – but not always – 
acting for domestic political reasons, and the interaction of domestic political variables with 
gradual changes in the international system and developments in technology, are the key reasons 
why the US BMD debate went from being fundamentally zero-sum and divisive in 1989, to 
something that had largely become normalised, with debates really only being conducted at the 
margins, in 2010.  In this sense, the thesis explains the rhythms of day-to-day policy in particular 
context, explains the medium term shifts in the domestic political space within which day-to-day 
policy debate occurred, and explains the long-term move towards a greater role and the gradual 
normalisation of BMD in American security policy. 
   
This thesis begins in Chapter 1 with a description of the conceptual framework, methods and 
methodology employed in this study.  To this end, the chapter fully explains the rationale for the 
project and the limitations of both professional and academic literatures in trying to explain the 
evolution of the BMD debate between 1989 and 2010, before outlining the central questions that 
this thesis seeks to address.  It then goes on to introduce and explain the conceptual framework 
developed and used in this study, before finally reflecting on the central contributions of the thesis, 
and its positioning alongside other works that emphasise the importance of domestic dynamics to 
national security policy. 
The thesis’ historical account begins in Chapter 2 with the presidency of George H. W. 
Bush, a period which saw the demise of the Soviet Union and with it Ronald Reagan’s Strategic 
Defense Initiative.  The chapter explains how Bush sought to adapt missile defence to rapidly 
fluctuating pressures from the international system, while at the same time seeking to balance this 
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policy with perceived domestic political requirements.  In terms of policy, this period saw the Phase 
I Strategic Defense System outlined by the Reagan administration in 1987 transform into the Global 
Protection Against Limited Strikes (GPALS) system in early 1991.  Bush’s presidency would also 
include the signing of the 1991 Missile Defense Act in the wake of the perceived success of the 
Patriot missile defence system during the Persian Gulf War, and why this represented a political 
compromise that never looked likely to hold.  Finally, the chapter explains the importance of the 
different conceptions of BMD held by Bush and Congress and how this led to a gradual 
rationalisation of the Strategic Defense Initiative between 1989 and 1993. 
The next chapter, Chapter 3, focuses on Bill Clinton’s first administration between 1993 and 
1997.  This period began with the new president’s determination to “end the star wars era” and to 
fundamentally restructure and downsize the US BMD effort.  To an extent, during the first two 
years Clinton managed this, and successfully placed the ABM Treaty back at the heart of US 
national security policy and the relationship with Russia.  The chapter also highlights the 
importance of the “Republican Revolution” in late 1994, and how the political pressure generated 
after this event led Clinton to outline a national missile defence deployment programme in early 
1996 that had little basis in technology or current levels of threat.  Essentially, this chapter explains 
how the missile defence programme was resurrected after its apparent death with the end of the 
Cold War, and why Clinton had decided to alter his administration’s initial plans by the time he 
sought re-election in 1996.  
Chapter 4 addresses Clinton’s second term, and charts the fierce political battles between 
president and Congress that would gradually see the NMD programme move towards the verge of 
enactment by 2000.  This chapter also shows how consistent Republican political pressure, coupled 
with developments such as the “Rumsfeld Report” and North Korean missile launches of 1998, 
would see Clinton sign the 1999 Missile Defense Act and reluctantly move gradually closer to 
ordering deployment.  This period is equally interesting because of the apparent lack of 
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synchronicity between politics and technology.  In particular, although the debate had swung in 
favour of NMD deployment by 1999, many independent scientists, Democratic lawmakers, and 
members of the Clinton Administration, continued to believe that the technology to achieve such a 
feat remained many years away.  Despite this fact, it would be during Clinton’s second term that the 
political debate would move away from zero-sum disputes over deployment towards a loose 
agreement over the need for a national missile defence system. 
Chapter 5 covers the first four years of the presidency of George W Bush, arguably the most 
important transitional period looked at in this thesis.  Under Bush’s stewardship, the US missile 
defence programme went from rhetoric to reality, as Bush abrogated the Anti-Ballistic Missile 
Treaty in 2002 and by 2004 began deploying long-range interceptor missiles in Alaska and 
California.  The chapter seeks to address the questions of why Bush was able to push ahead with the 
programme despite entering office faced with a determined Democratically controlled Congress, 
and why the subsequent rush for deployment appeared to have only a limited technological or 
systemic rationale.  The chapter also addresses the political and strategic importance of the 9-11 
terrorist attacks, and how this event bolstered the drive towards deployment by nullifying both 
international and Congressional opposition, which in turn fundamentally shifted the BMD debate. 
The examination of BMD under Bush continues in Chapter 6, where attention is paid to the 
alacrity with which Bush set about entrenching BMD as a key component of US security, and in 
particular to the decision to expand the BMD system to Europe.  This chapter looks at why Bush 
was able to push ahead with a variety of different missile defence systems, retain high levels of 
funding and continue deploying assets, despite continuing problems with technology; more 
optimistic intelligence estimates of the Iranian and North Korean WMD programmes; mounting 
concerns about US BMD plans in Russia, and at the same time as fighting wars in Afghanistan and 
Iraq.  In addition to this, the chapter explains why Democratic control of Congress during 2007 and 
2008 was a major reason why Bush was unable to fully realise his expansive missile defence 
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agenda, as lawmakers strove to enforce greater oversight and scrutiny of the programme during 
Bush’s last two years in office. 
Chapter 8 looks at the first two years of Barack Obama’s presidency, a period which saw 
considerable continuity in policy, despite the president’s pre-election pledges to scale the 
programme back and rebalance US national security and non-proliferation strategies.  The chapter 
explains why Obama decided not to cancel missile defence in Europe, why US BMD plans were not 
used as a bargaining chip in negotiations with Russia over the New START Treaty, and why the 
Phased Adaptive Approach to Europe and the Ballistic Missile Defence Review appeared to 
represent a significant commitment to BMD from a president apparently determined not to let the 
programme get in the way of his wider policy agenda.  The chapter also explains how – despite 
being in the minority in Congress – Republican lawmakers were able to exert considerable pressure 
on Obama’s BMD thinking, but also how Obama was able to neuter this pressure by combining 
missile defence deployments in Europe with nuclear reductions with Russia. 
 The final chapter draws the overarching argument of the thesis to a conclusion, highlighting 
the fundamental role of domestic political influences in understanding the evolution of US missile 
defence policy.  As well as demonstrating the centrality of the domestic political debate to policy, 
and explaining how and why the confines of this debate gradually shifted over time, this chapter 
also reflects more broadly on some of the key themes and arguments developed in the thesis.  
Consequently, it shows how and why the US ballistic missile defence debate evolved from the zero-
sum disputes that characterised the end of the Cold War, into an issue which had essentially become 
a normalised component of US national security thinking and policy by the midway point of Barack 
Obama’s first term in office.   
Conceptual framework 
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Conceptual Framework 
 
The central aim of this thesis is to understand the complex and often messy evolution of US ballistic 
missile defence policy between 1989 and 2010, in order to analyse the core driving factors that have 
shaped the policy following the end of the Cold War.  The main objective of the thesis is therefore 
to systematically uncover key causal factors in order to provide a deeper and more holistic analysis 
of a phenomenon that has escaped parsimonious explanation.  To do this an explanatory framework 
was developed that allowed for the rigorous investigation of various factors at different levels of 
analysis in order to identify the dynamics driving and shaping policy.  This framework was then 
applied in turn to each of the six terms in office of the four presidents since the end of the Cold 
War. 
By undertaking this task, the thesis adds value to the current literature by demonstrating that 
the “day-to-day” dynamics and intrigues of domestic politics have been far more important in the 
conduct of BMD policy than has currently been acknowledged.  Moreover, the thesis shows how 
the degree of latitude for presidential independence in decision-making on BMD has varied, and has 
been shaped by the actions of a sometimes compliant, but at other times hostile, Congress.  In 
addition to this, the thesis provides an explanation of how developments in the international system 
and technology have gradually altered the context within which the domestic political debate has 
occurred over the last two decades, but have not themselves necessarily driven the policy debate.  
This redresses a gap in the current BMD literature, which has neglected the role of domestic 
political influences, or simply paid lip service to it without developing a systematic explanation of 
its impact on policy.  It also explains the transformation in the US missile defence debate during 
this period. 
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 This chapter proceeds in three sections; (1) the first explains the rationale of the thesis by 
highlighting the problematic and complex nature of US ballistic missile defence policy between 
1989 and 2010, as well as the limited explanatory power of the literature that has attempted to 
understand this; (2) the second section introduces the framework of analysis that has been 
developed and utilised in this thesis, and explains how it has been applied to the evolution of the US 
missile defence debate; (3) lastly, the third section reflects on some of the key findings of the thesis, 
its central contributions, and consequently where it fits within the broader literature on the domestic 
sources of national security policy. 
 
Rationale 
Although the current literature on BMD policy is vast, it largely fails to explain the transition in the 
debate surrounding US BMD policy between 1989 and 2010.  The authorship of the literature is 
currently bifurcated; some is written by security policy professionals, and some by academics, but 
taken as a whole, neither group has been able to adequately explain the fact that policy has often 
seemed out of sync with developments in the international system, whereby renewed presidential 
emphasis on BMD has often come at times when the international environment appeared relatively 
benign from the US perspective, and at times appeared to go against a particular administration’s 
own stated plans.  Examples of this include; George H. W. Bush’s decision to push ahead with his 
comprehensive GPALS BMD plan despite the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991; Bill Clinton’s 
decision to unveil a BMD deployment plan in early 1996 and move gradually towards a deployment 
decision in 2000, even though he wanted to reverse large parts of the programme that he had 
inherited upon entering office in 1993, and despite the fact that he viewed the ABM Treaty as the 
cornerstone of international stability.  Further examples are George W. Bush’s haste to push ahead 
with BMD upon entering office in 2001, and then abrogate the ABM Treaty following the attacks of 
11
th
 September 2001, despite those attacks seeming to point to terrorism not ballistic missiles as 
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being the main threat; and Barack Obama’s decision to continue, and in some respects expand the 
BMD system inherited from his predecessor, despite a pre-election pledge to rebalance US foreign 
and security policy and focus more time on other issues.   
Neither has the literature adequately explained why policy has not necessarily mirrored the 
prevailing state of scientific opinion regarding technology, with renewed presidential emphasis on 
BMD often coming at times when scientific reports have questioned the feasibility of the strategy. 
George H. W. Bush’s prioritisation of Brilliant Pebbles technology during the early 1990s;1 Bill 
Clinton’s decision to begin a deployment plan in 1996 and to sign the 1999 Missile Defense Act 
without having any credible technology anywhere near ready to be deployed,
2
 are examples of this, 
as was George W. Bush’s decision to begin deploying ground-based interceptor missiles in Alaska 
and California in 2004, and begin negotiations about deploying more interceptors in Europe in 2006 
despite the fact that neither system had undergone full testing.
3
  Barack Obama’s decision in 2009 
to reorient US BMD plans in Europe around some technologies that were yet to be designed, let 
alone tested, is a further example of this disjuncture.
4
   
What this suggests is that there is much more to BMD than simply recording whether 
presidents have been personally convinced by the wisdom of the policy; whether the technology to 
pursue such systems has existed; or the perceived requirements for US security of the particular 
context of the international environment within which each president was acting.  It also implies 
that there are important questions that need to be asked about the domestic political conditions 
within which each president since Ronald Reagan has been formulating and executing policy.  
These dynamics would appear to present five main questions, which the existing literature has been 
notably silent about: 
                                                          
1
 See,“Strategic Defense Initiative: estimates of Brilliant Pebbles effectiveness are based on many unproven 
assumptions”, US General Accounting Office, (March 1992) 
2
 See, “Director of operational test and evaluation report in support of national missile defense deployment readiness 
review”, (10th August 2000) 
3
 See Lisbeth Gronlund, David Wright, George Lewis & Phillip Coyle, “Technical realities: an analysis of the 2004 
deployment of a national missile defense system”, The Union of Concerned Scientists, (May 2004) 
4
 “Fact Sheet on US Missile Defense Policy: A Phased Adaptive Approach for Missile Defense in Europe”, (17 th 
September 2009) 
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1) Why has the BMD debate so often failed to fully represent external or systemic 
developments? 
2) Why has the BMD debate so often failed to fully represent independent scientific 
opinion on missile defence technology?  
3) What factors have caused particular presidents to pursue BMD policies that appear 
contradictory to stated policy?   
4) Why did the domestic BMD debate shift from zero-sum disagreement to general 
acceptance between 1989 and 2010? 
5) Can the evolution of policy within the six presidential administrations examined during 
this period (from George H. W. Bush to Barack Obama) be systematically explained?  
 
Although the quantity of the professional and policy-orientated literature on the subject is 
considerable, its explanatory power is limited by the tendency to be overly context specific and/ or 
based purely on a single level of analysis.  Consequently, the literature often appears to bypass the 
larger issue of attempting to understand policy more broadly and in historical context.  In this mode, 
James Lindsay & Michael O’Hanlon’s “Defending America”5 and Craig Eisendrath, Melvin 
Goodman & Gerald Marsh’s “The Phantom Defense”6 both discuss the prudence of the Bush 
administration’s plan to push ahead with BMD deployment in early 2001, but offer little to situate 
this in the broader evolution of policy; Joseph Cirincione’s “Why the Right Lost the Missile Defence 
Debate”7, and “Assessing the Assessment”8, both analyse a single static case; as does Dennis 
Gormley’s “Enriching Expectations”9 and Dean Wilkening’s “Amending the ABM Treaty”.10  
                                                          
5
 James Lindsay & Michael O’Hanlon, “Defending America: the case for limited national missile defence”, 
(Washington DC, Brookings Institution Press: 2001) 
6
 Craig Eisendrath, Melvin Goodman & Gerald Marsh, “The phantom defense: America’s Pursuit of the Star Wars 
illusion”, (Connecticut, Praeger Publishers: 2001) 
7
 Joseph Cirincione, “Why the right lost the missile defense debate”, Foreign Policy, 106 (1997) pp38-70 
8
 Joseph Cirincione, “Assessing the assessment: the 1999 National Intelligence Estimate of the ballistic missile threat”, 
The Non-proliferation Review, (Spring 2000) pp125-136 
9
 Dennis Gormley, “Enriching expectations: 11th September lessons for missile defence”, Survival, 45:4 (2002) pp61-86  
10
 Dean Wilkening, “Amending the ABM Treaty”, Survival, 42:1 (2000) pp29-45 
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Examples of BMD literature being mono-causal include Major Garret’s “The Enduring 
Revolution”11, which points to the centrality of Republican Party politics in the resurrection of 
BMD during the 1990s, but fails to connect this with broader strategic and technological dynamics; 
Wyn Bowen’s “Missile Defence and the Transatlantic Security Relationship”,12 which looks at the 
diplomatic aspects of BMD at a specific time; or Richard Garwin’s “A Defense That Will Not 
Defend”13, which looks primarily at the inadequacies of BMD technology during 2000. 
 The explanatory power of the more theoretically orientated academic literature – which is 
far more limited in quantity – is restricted by a tendency towards mono-causality and explanations 
based on a single-level of analysis.  Natalie Bormann’s poststructuralist critique of US BMD policy 
in Missile Defence and the Politics of US Identity
14
 ignores a wide range of important causal factors 
in order to show how the constitutive power of discourse and the construction of threat through US 
identity have driven BMD policy.  While Bormann may be right to suggest that such factors are 
important, by treating the state as a unitary actor – and largely ignoring the importance of the 
international system – her work fails to look at the myriad influences both above and below state 
level, or to account for fluctuations in BMD policy over time.  In a similar vein, Columba Peoples’ 
work focuses almost exclusively on technology as the key driver of BMD policy in Justifying 
Ballistic Missile Defence.
15
  Peoples is right to point to the importance of technology, but by 
ignoring other political and strategic factors neglects the wider picture, and thus can explain only 
part of the whole story about developments in and drivers of BMD policy. 
 Lastly, and while no official history of US ballistic missile defence has yet been written, the 
historical analyses that have been written on the subject tend to prioritise factual narrative rather 
than explanatory analysis.  As a result, work such as The Quest for Ballistic Missile Defenses 1944-
                                                          
11
 Major Garret, “The enduring revolution: how the contract with America continues to shape the nation”, (New York, 
Random House: 2005) 
12
 Wyn Bowen, “National missile defence and the transatlantic security relationship”, International Affairs, 77:3 (2001) 
pp485-507 
13
 Richard Garwin, “A defense that will not defend”, The Washington Quarterly, 23:3 (2001) pp109-123  
14
 Natalie Bormann, “National missile defence and the politics of US identity”, (Manchester, Manchester University 
Press: 2008) 
15
 Columba Peoples, “Justifying ballistic missile defence”, (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press: 2010) 
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2003 by Lester Brune and Richard Burns
16
 and Hit to Kill by Bradley Graham
17
, essentially fail to 
provide deep and systematic analysis of the dynamics driving policy, and of how these factors 
interact.  Although these works are very useful as a basis from which to build a deeper and more 
explanatory analysis that can add value to and go beyond the current literature, they do not 
specifically address the question of what has been shaping policy since the end of the Cold War, 
how and why.  
 
Framework for analysis 
In order to move beyond existing accounts, and to address the research questions highlighted above, 
it is necessary to adopt an explanatory structure that sets the question of the politics of BMD within 
a potentially interdisciplinary framework.  To do this, the thesis turns to the field of Foreign Policy 
Analysis (FPA).  The core refrain of FPA is to seek to understand foreign policy by focusing on the 
process of how such decisions come about, and by drawing upon a range of causal factors situated 
at different levels of analysis.  At the heart of this approach is an acceptance that parsimony should 
be eschewed in favour of “detail, richness, nuance and agency” and general explanatory power.18  
As a result, Foreign Policy Analysis appeared to offer the perfect basis from which to construct a 
specific analytical framework and methodology with which to systematically analyse the complex 
nature of BMD.  Adopting this approach would allow for the development of a framework capable 
of capturing the interaction between domestic, technological and international influences over the 
sustained period covered by this thesis. 
 Foreign Policy Analysis is a broad approach with a rich and diverse history that incorporates 
many different types of methodological approaches.  Yet what unites FPA as a discipline is that for 
the most part, the plethora of methodologies focuses on the motives and sources of state behaviour, 
                                                          
16
 Burns & Brune (2003) 
17
 Graham (2003) 
18
 Valerie Hudson, “Foreign policy analysis: classical and contemporary theory”, (Plymouth, Rowman & Littlefield 
Publishers Inc: 2007) 188 
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and seeks to understand this behaviour by focusing on decision-makers and the processes by which 
state policy is created and shaped.  As a result, it consists of middle-range theories, which 
ultimately seek to examine, systematically analyse and better understand the messy nature of reality 
rather than attempt to provide a single theory of foreign policy behaviour.
19
  Laura Neack sums this 
up well: 
Foreign policy is neither fish nor fowl in the study of politics, but an empirical subject 
matter straddling the boundary between the internal and the external spheres of a state.  
Such policy is conducted in complex internal and international environments; it results from 
coalitions of active actors and groups situated both inside and outside state boundaries; its 
substance emanates from issues of both domestic and international politics; and it involves 
the process of bargaining and compromise affecting the interests of both domestic and 
international groupings.
20
 
In this regard, as Christopher Hill points out, “Foreign Policy Analysis can and should be open, 
comparative, conceptual, interdisciplinary and range across the domestic-foreign frontier.”21 
The subfield of FPA has its origins in three seminal works; (1) James Rosenau’s Pre-
theories and Theories of Foreign Policy
22
; (2) Richard Snyder, Richard Bruck and Burton Sapin’s 
Decision Making as an Approach to the Study of International Politics
23
; and (3) Harold and 
Margaret Sprout’s Man-milieu Relationship Hypothesis in the Context of International Politics”.24  
According to Valarie Hudson and Christopher Vore, each of these works played a major role in 
launching a different aspect of Foreign Policy Analysis.  Rosenau’s work sought to encourage 
“cross-nationally applicable generalizations about the foreign policy behaviour of states in a 
systematic and scientific fashion”; Synder’s to “look at the nation state level of analysis and to 
emphasise the players involved in foreign policy”; and Harold and Margaret Sprout’s to 
                                                          
19
 Christopher Hill, “The changing politics of foreign policy”, (Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan: 2003) 10 
20
 Walter Carlsnaes, “Actors, structures, and foreign policy analysis”, chapter in Steve Smith, Amelia Hadfield & Tim 
Dunne, “Foreign policy: theories, actors, cases”, (Oxford, Oxford University Press: 2010) 86 
21
 Hill (2003) 10 
22
 James Rosenau, "Pre-theories and theories of foreign policy", R. Barry Farrell, “Approaches in comparative and 
international politics”, (Evanston: Northwestern University Press: 1966) 
23
 Richard Snyder, Richard Bruck, and Burton Sapin, “Decision-making as an approach to the study of international 
politics”, Foreign Policy Analysis Project Series No. 3, (Princeton: Princeton University Press: 1954) 
24
 Harold Sprout & Margaret Sprout, “Man-milieu relationship hypotheses in the context of international politics”, 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press: 1956) 
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contextualise the analysis of foreign policy by pointing to the importance of multi-causal 
explanations drawn from a variety of fields.
25
   
 From this initial basis, a set of propositions have been developed to which most Foreign 
Policy Analysis approaches adhere: 
(1) That the concept of national interest is perhaps more productively viewed as the interests 
of various players, or entities, which may not coincide, and which many not relate to 
anything resembling an objective national interest.  Consequently, that the source of 
much of “states” behaviour is the result primarily of human beings not states. 
(2) A desire to open up the “black box” of foreign policy in order to seek explanations of 
state behaviour through the people and units that comprise or influence the state, thus 
taking into account multiple levels of analysis, ranging from the micro to the macro, as 
well as a commitment to pursue multi-causal explanations spanning multiple levels of 
analysis.
26
 
(3) A belief that foreign policy inputs are as, if not more important than foreign policy 
outputs – and a need to focus on the process through which policy is formed.  
As this list of propositions makes clear, the aim of any Foreign Policy Analysis study is to integrate 
and assess the interrelationship among factors that influence foreign policy decision-making and 
decision-makers at different levels of analysis.
27
  Studies in Foreign Policy Analysis “draw on 
multiple theories, employ a range of methodologies; focus on the complex interactions between 
foreign policy factors, and link scholarly research to practical policy concerns.”28   
However, while this allows the scholar great freedom to design their particular project 
around the specifics of the subject and questions that they are seeking to answer, it also means that a 
                                                          
25
 Valerie Hudson & Christopher Vore, "Foreign policy analysis: yesterday, today, tomorrow”, Mershon International 
Studies Review, 39:2 (1995) pp209-238: 212-214 
26
 This list draws on Hudson & Vore (1995) 210-22 
27
 Hudson (2007) 5 & 165 
28
 Jean Garrison, “Foreign policy analysis in 20/20: a symposium – Introduction”, International Studies Review, 5 
(2003), pp155-202: 155  
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analytical and conceptual framework must be designed in order that the information collected can 
be systematically analysed.  As Walter Carlsnaes points out: 
… Given the existence of a number of national and international actors involved in the 
 pursuit of any given state’s foreign policies, as well as the vital role which a multitude of 
 structural factors play in such processes, it is essential for the scholar to have some form of 
 analytical framework or approach as a starting point.
29
 
Therefore, the actual framework adopted in this thesis needed to be driven by the types of question 
it sought to address, and by a particular mixture of the tools available within Foreign Policy 
Analysis.  Therefore, the logical starting point was to look at which factors were important in the 
conduct of BMD policy, as well as how the change in relative importance of these factors could be 
analysed over time.   
Considering the problems highlighted earlier in this chapter, the most relevant parts of FPA 
for the investigation of US BMD policy appeared to be the “foreign policy decision making” 
developed by Richard Synder et al and the “foreign policy context” developed by Harold and 
Margaret Sprout.  However, these two works have formed the basis of a wide and diverse body of 
literature, and it was therefore important to look deeper into how other authors have configured 
their studies.  In this regard, one of the key influences for this work is the conceptual model first 
outlined by Graham Allison in “Essence of Decision”30.  In this seminal work, Allison outlines an 
approach to the study of the Cuban missile crisis whereby events are analysed through three 
separate conceptual lenses: rational actor, organisational process and bureaucratic politics models.  
In the words of Allison, “By comparing and contrasting the three frameworks, we see what 
magnifies, highlights, and reveals as well as what each blurs or neglects”.31  By doing this, Allison 
was able to show how different perspectives on an event naturally provide different answers and 
explanations of its cause.   
                                                          
29
 Ibid 87 
30
 Graham Allison, “Essence of decision: explaining the Cuban missile crisis”, (London, Scott, Foresman and 
Company: 1971) 
31
 Allison (1971) v 
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However, and while Allison’s original ideas are key to the conceptual framework applied in 
this thesis – specifically the desire to look inside the black box of the state, and show that different 
interpretations can be placed upon events if looked at from different angles – the particular 
approach developed here seeks to move beyond some of the limitations inherent in his original 
framework.  First, whereas Allison’s approach sought to separate factors – and essentially tell the 
same story three times – the conceptual framework developed in this thesis has been designed in 
order to compare, contrast and integrate the impact of these key factors on policy.  Second, while 
Allison’s account is a detailed study of a single crisis event over a very short contained period, the 
approach taken here seeks to survey a period that is sprawling by comparison, and attempts to 
weave different strands of causation together into one narrative rather than offering several different 
ones in parallel.  Consequently, the aim is not so much to view BMD through different conceptual 
lenses, but instead to construct a conceptual framework able to analyse how these factors have 
interacted, and how important they have/ haven’t been at specific times.  
The result is an explanatory framework designed to engage three distinct types of causal 
variable:  
(i) Strategic/ systemic factors (primarily the pressures on presidential policy arising 
from developments in the ballistic missile threat, the views of allies, and the 
international legal context). 
(ii) Technological factors (notably the evolution of capabilities to build a functioning 
BMD system and independent scientific opinion about the feasibility of any 
proposed system). 
(iii) Party political factors (in particular the impact of institutional rivalry and 
partisanship on Congressional support as a facilitator of or constraint on 
presidential preferences regarding BMD).   
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This framework is then used to analyse each successive presidential administration in turn, where 
each administration forms the basis of a chapter.  Each chapter is then split into three sections.  The 
first section providing an overview of developments in each of the three main factors (with party 
political factors split between “presidential policy agenda” and “Congressional pressure on 
policy”), the second outlining the major policy developments during the period, while the third 
seeks to compare the various pressures on policymaking with policy outcomes in order to 
demonstrate the relative importance of domestic political factors, and also how the dynamics 
interacted.  By doing this, the thesis is able to look at and analyse the importance of a set range of 
factors within each administration, and thus to draw wider conclusions by tracing the evolution of 
these factors over the period under study.  It was therefore logical for the thesis to be written 
predominantly in chronological order, both to allow the clear tracing of change over time and, 
importantly, to allow for the development of comparative analysis. 
 In order to fully utilise this explanatory framework, and move beyond the limitations of 
much of the literature, it was essential that this investigation be based on primary materials and 
evidence.  23 semi-structured interviews were carried out with a variety of policy-makers, 
commentators and government officials from both sides of the political divide in Washington DC 
during summer 2010.
32
  A wide range of secondary and archival documents, including presidential 
speeches, government policy documents, Congressional hearings and newspaper articles, were also 
consulted, in addition to the vast available tertiary BMD literature.  As a result, the research was 
able to look much deeper into the BMD phenomenon and use this primary information both directly 
in terms of quotes and factual detail, and indirectly by using the views expressed by interviewees or 
in primary documents as indicative of wider ideological/ political thinking on BMD during this 
period. 
Finally, it is important to be clear what this thesis does not intend to do or to argue.  Perhaps 
most significantly this work does not intend to make a strategic assessment on the relative merits of 
                                                          
32
 For a full list of these interviews, see Bibliography 
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deciding to pursue missile defences.  In this sense, it does not seek to directly address the debate 
over whether deployment is a good or bad idea, or about what type of system should be deployed.  
Equally, this thesis does not seek to offer a scientific critique of missile defence technologies; this 
task is left to the many physicists and engineers currently working on the issue.  As such, this 
research remains firmly within the realm of political science and contemporary history.   
 
Contributions and positioning 
This thesis fits within the broader landscape of thinking about the affects of domestic dynamics and 
the domestic political process on shaping national security policy.  This type of research spreads the 
breadth of the social sciences and has a particularly long and established tradition of use in 
analysing US national security thinking
33
, US nuclear weapons policy
34
, and to a lesser extent US 
missile defence policy
35
.  However, by developing a systematic analysis of domestic political 
influences, and how they have interacted with other factors to shape BMD policy over time, this 
thesis moves beyond the relatively simplistic understandings of “domestic politics” in much of this 
literature, and applies this framework to an issue that hitherto has not been fully analysed. 
While the literature on the domestic determinants of security policy is rich and varied, this 
thesis is able to move beyond and add to it in two main ways.  First it extends this analysis to the 
contemporary US ballistic missile defence debate, bringing the story up to 2010 – the point 
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whereby missile defence had arguably emerged from decades of partisan political disagreement – 
and become accepted as a central component of US national security thinking.  In this sense, it is 
able to look at why the domestic debate changed and gradually became normalised.  Second, it 
moves beyond the rather vague and catchall tendencies of studies that emphasise domestic political 
dynamics, whereby the use of the term “domestic politics” refers simply to anything that occurs 
within the domestic realm, by applying a systematic domestic political analysis to the issue of 
BMD, but also by being far more precise in what “domestic politics” actually means.  
This research therefore both extends the tradition of examining the domestic political 
determinants of security policy to an important contemporary issue, and at the same time provides a 
more rigorous assessment of what this actually means.  Clearly, both the president and members of 
Congress are office holders under the US constitution and are located in the United States, so they 
are therefore by definition domestic actors.  This is therefore one understanding of the importance 
of domestic politics – and the one that dominates much of the literature.  A second understanding of 
domestic political influences on policy is when something is done for domestic political reasons: 
(1) when something is not based upon the actors true beliefs but is done because of the need to 
position oneself with regard to opinion elsewhere in the political system; (2) it is not based on the 
actor’s genuine assessment of the international situation/ threat but upon some other vested political 
interest.  Consequently, while both of these are examples of domestic politics, it is important to 
distinguish between domestic political actors and actions that are taken for domestic political 
reasons.  The thesis therefore provides a systematic analysis of domestic political influences on the 
US ballistic missile defence debate, but also shows how these influences has often been 
underpinned by primarily domestic political reasons.  
 
By applying this framework chronologically to the four presidential administrations since the end of 
the Cold War, the thesis is able to draw the following conclusions.  First, technological capability 
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has only rarely been an important instigator of BMD policy, with many scholars and commentators 
continuing to question the viability of the systems being deployed even now.
36
  Second, although 
policy was sometimes broadly correlated with developments in the international system – especially 
the growing nuclear and missile threat from Iran and North Korea – the particular rhythms of 
whether to push ahead with ballistic missile defences were significantly conditioned by domestic 
variables.  Third, the institutional balance between president and Congress has been, and will 
continue to be, fundamental to BMD policy, especially in times of partisan divided government. 
As a result, the thesis shows that the day-to-day dynamics and intrigues of US domestic 
politics have been far more important in the conduct of policy than the literature has thus far 
acknowledged.  External influences related to the ability of the US to sustain its place in 
international affairs, and the ability of modern technology to sustain an operative BMD system, 
have certainly shaped the way in which policy was debated and fought over within the domestic 
realm at any moment in time.  However, the most important factor explaining the historical ebb and 
flow of presidential policy remained the precise degree of latitude for presidential independence 
provided by a sometimes compliant but other times hostile Congress.  
 The thesis shows that domestic party politics and ideological differences between president 
and Congress – as well as between Democrats and Republicans – ensured that BMD policy only 
infrequently reflected strategic necessity or independent scientific reports regarding the operational 
feasibility of proposed systems.  At a deeper level, the thesis shows that for a mixture of ideological 
and party political reasons, Republican lawmakers tended to support further BMD spending and 
development, while Democrats generally favoured restraint (though not necessarily reversal of 
policy).  The work also shows that policy was far more likely to forge ahead under Republican 
rather than Democratic presidents, and that Democratic Congresses were able to exert less influence 
on presidential policy than Republican Congresses – primarily because of the changing confines of 
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the debate.  The result was a policy which fluctuated considerably after it was resurrected by 
Ronald Reagan in 1983, but one that overall displayed a cumulative logic which appears likely to 
lead towards an even greater role for BMD in the future.  Changes in the international environment 
in the intervening period are an important reason why this has been so, with changes to the 
perception of who might threaten the US, and in what way, making it progressively more 
straightforward for Republican presidents in particular to present BMD as a common sense choice.  
 In doing this, the thesis also provides an explanation of how developments in the 
international system and technology have gradually altered the context within which the domestic 
political debate has occurred.  Fundamentally, the thesis shows how the convergence caused by the 
meeting of technological capability and the changing requirements of US security within the 
international system made BMD less contentious and divisive during this period.  For example in 
1989 the technology did not exist to counteract the large missile threat from the Soviet Union, but 
in 2010 the technology did exist to offer a credible defence against Iran, North Korea and other 
limited missile threats.  The result was a gradual move towards political acceptance during this 
period.  As such, the thesis shows how and why BMD went from being one of the most zero-sum 
divisive political issues in American national security thinking, to something that had largely 
become normalised, with debates really only being conducted at the margins during this period.  
This was why in 2010 a Democratic president was spending $10b per year on an advanced 
integrated missile defence system, after Democratic lawmakers had tried to eliminate funding for 
the Strategic Defense Initiative in 1989.  In summary, the thesis engages with short-term day-to-day 
political debates, medium term shifts in context, and the longer term moves towards political 
acceptance and the strategic normalisation of BMD.  
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Summary 
The approach employed in this thesis is driven by a desire to understand why the US ballistic 
missile defence debate – which in 1989 had fundamentally split political opinion – evolved towards 
a position by 2010 where it appeared to be politically normalised, and by the apparent inability of 
the BMD literature to adequately explain this transition.  In seeking to answer this question fully, it 
seemed necessary to adopt an approach that would allow the investigation to look at a wide range of 
causal factors on different levels of analysis over a sustained period.  It was therefore natural to turn 
to the field of Foreign Policy Analysis to provide a conceptual basis for a framework able to tackle 
an issue that appeared to be influenced by different factors on multiple levels of analysis.  Once 
armed with this framework, the investigation was then able to critically analyse how and why 
policy developed during the six administrations covered by this study.  By doing this, the thesis 
demonstrates the centrality of domestic actors and dynamics to understanding US ballistic missile 
defence policy; how a mixture of ideology and party politics was integral in shaping presidential 
BMD strategies, and explains the consequent evolution of the US BMD debate during this period.  
As a result, the thesis makes a worthwhile and original addition to the growing body of literature on 
the importance of domestic politics in shaping national security policy, while situating these 
pressures within a wider political context shaped by changes in technological capabilities and 
developments in international system.
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The Missile Defence Pragmatist – George H. W. Bush, 
(1989-1993) 
 
As Ronald Reagan left office in January 1989, the future of the Strategic Defence Initiative looked 
uncertain.  Many of the futuristic technologies that the SDI had advanced were considered 
technologically unworkable, while Democrats in Congress – who had never been much enamoured 
of President Reagan’s plans – were keen to limit a programme that they thought made little 
strategic, diplomatic or technological sense.  On top of this, it was not clear what Reagan’s 
successor; his former Vice President George H. W. Bush had planned for programme.  Bush was 
known to have been far less supportive of SDI than the president during his time in the Reagan 
administration, and was also considered something of a political pragmatist, keen to conduct policy 
on a day-to-day basis depending on the particular context at that time.  Although it was assumed 
that Bush would retain the programme, it was far less clear what shape it would take over the four 
years of his presidency. 
 In fact, the evolution of US ballistic missile defence policy under George H. W. Bush is 
perhaps the most complex and complicated of all the presidencies looked at in this thesis.  In early 
1989 it seemed that BMD was regarded by the president merely as a bargaining chip for 
negotiations with the Soviet Union, but Bush subsequently became far more supportive after 
becoming convinced about the prospects of a BMD technology that later proved not to work.  Two 
years into his presidency, Bush signed the National Missile Defense Act of 1991, making it the 
policy of the United States to deploy a ballistic missile defence system at the earliest possible date, 
even though this really reflected neither Bush’s priorities, external pressures, nor current 
technological capabilities.
1
  On top of this is the fact that policy was being formulated against the 
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backdrop of a fundamental change in the international system caused by the collapse of the Soviet 
Union, and the realisation that the US had emerged as the world’s pre-eminent power, with no 
military peer in sight.  It was in this context that US BMD policy went from the grandiose Phase I 
Strategic Defense System devised by Ronald Reagan to the more limited, but equally exigent 
Global Protection Against Limited Strikes (GPALS) system, favoured by Bush.  Despite this 
change, by the end of Bush’s presidency, little support remained in Congress or amongst the US 
public for any large scale missile defence plan, and Bush’s successor, Bill Clinton, would make it a 
key priority for his administration to relegate and downgrade the missile defence programme. 
 This period then raises a number of interesting questions.  First, why did Bush continue to 
favour a large-scale BMD system consisting of hundreds of interceptors and space-based assets, 
despite the collapse of the Soviet Union, and regardless of the fact that the relevant technological 
capability to do so did not exist?  Second, why did a Democratically controlled Congress unite 
behind legislation mandating deployment of a national missile defence system in 1991, despite 
being strongly opposed to such a plan in 1989, 1990 and again in 1992, and regardless of the 
inherent limitations of technology?  Third, why did Bush and Congress have such different and 
competing notions of what type of BMD programme should be pursued?  In order to understand 
these questions the chapter examines the interplay between international, technological and 
domestic influences, and at how these combined to produce the complex and sometimes 
counterintuitive policy outcomes described above.   
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(1) Competing pressures on BMD policy, 1989-1993 
 
International pressures on policymaking 
In 1989 the US remained locked in the Cold War confrontation with the Soviet Union that had 
lasted for over four decades, and was therefore still subject to the threat of the vast Soviet nuclear 
ballistic missile arsenal.  However, by 1993 the Soviet Union had disappeared, the US stood alone 
as the world’s preeminent power, and the threat to Americans from missile attack – notwithstanding 
the possibility of an accidental Russian or Chinese launch – was arguably at its lowest since the 
dawn of the missile age.
2
  Three key international dynamics stand out during this period; (1) the end 
of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union; (2) the emergence of a new short-range 
missile threat; (3) the centrality of the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty and US allies’ views of 
its continued importance. 
 The first key international pressure on policymaking during this period was the US 
relationship with the Soviet Union/ Russia.  For the first two years of Bush’s presidency, US 
ballistic missile defence policy was inextricably linked with managing the Cold War relationship 
with the Soviet Union, and was heavily contingent on how US policymakers choose to approach 
relations with Moscow.  Because Russian leaders had never liked SDI, and had continually 
attempted to link any further strategic arms cuts to limitations in US missile defence plans, Bush’s 
approach to arms control with the Soviet Union would have significant implications for US BMD 
plans.  Although after 1991, as the Soviet Union collapsed, the relationship became less important 
as Russia came to be seen as less of a threat, the safe transition of the former Soviet Union from 
Cold War foe to strategic partner, and agreement on further arms reductions, remained linked to 
limitations in US missile defence plans.  Nevertheless, after 1991, the US stood alone as the world’s 
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preeminent power, with no obvious challenger or missile threat in sight; a situation described by 
one scholar at the time as “the unipolar moment”.3 
 The second important international dynamic during this period was growing awareness of 
the threat from short-range ballistic missiles.  Although concerns about a new type of short-range 
missile threat from smaller rogue states had gained traction during the Iran-Iraq war of the 1980s, 
the use of Scud missiles by Saddam Hussein during the 1991 Gulf War – in addition to Iraq’s 
possession of WMD’s – firmly entrenched this new threat.4  What is more, despite the fact that the 
immediate threat from such weapons disappeared with the end of the Gulf War, 1991 marked the 
beginning of serious US concern about nuclear and missile proliferation to smaller rogue states.  
Nevertheless, then Director of Central Intelligence Robert Gates suggested that it would be “at least 
another decade before a genuine missile threat to US security would emerge from other sources”.5 
 The final international pressure was the fact that the US remained legally constrained during 
this period by the Anti Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty.  Not only did this Treaty preclude deploying 
nationwide missile defence systems, but it also put limits on what might be tested and developed in 
terms of non-strategic systems by both the US and Russia.  Perhaps even more importantly, the 
ABM Treaty was internationally regarded as the cornerstone of global stability, particularly by key 
US allies and Russia, and as the bedrock upon which a secure international order and nuclear 
reductions could be based following the collapse of the Soviet Union.
6
   It was also central to US-
Russian relations at a time when the US was concerned to ensure the security of nuclear weapons in 
post-Soviet states, and to create a positive relationship with Moscow.
7
 
 Internationally therefore, this period was characterised by the end of the Cold War and the 
collapse of the Soviet Union, and with it, a significant decline in the missile threat to the United 
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States.  At the same time, the Persian Gulf War – especially the deaths of 28 US service personnel 
from a Scud missile strike on a US military base near the Saudi city of Dhahran – provided the 
catalyst for Washington to begin taking the threat from short-range missile attack far more 
seriously.  However, by 1993, the threat of a nuclear ballistic missile attack on the US homeland 
had declined considerably, and the threat from battlefield missile attack from new smaller 
adversaries remained negligible, at least in the short term.  
 
Technological pressures on policymaking 
In terms of technology there were two significant dynamics shaping policymaking during this 
period.  The first was the impact of a new technology called Brilliant Pebbles on the perceived 
feasibility of constructing a national missile defence system.  The second was the impact of the 
Patriot battlefield missile defence system during the 1991 Persian Gulf War on both the perceived 
possibility of constructing battlefield missile defences, and on the perception on BMD more 
generally.  Initially it seemed possible that both technologies might provide a significant boost to 
the BMD programme, but by the time Bush left office, the missile defence effort being conducted 
by the Strategic Defense Initiative Organization (SDIO) would be surrounded by controversy. 
 As Bush entered office, more and more of the technologies that had been examined under 
the Strategic Defense Initiative were proving to be unworkable, costly, and futuristic.  As a result, 
despite inheriting the Reagan administration’s Phase I Strategic Defense System (SDS)8, none of 
the components needed for this architecture had been proven or were ready to be deployed in 1989.
9
  
It was in this context that the possibilities of a technology called Brilliant Pebbles
10
 (combined with 
                                                          
8
 This system, unveiled in 1987 was the first national missile defence system developed by the SDIO, and consisted of 
both ground and space based sensors and weapons, as well as a central battle management system.  For more on this see 
Ronald Powaski, “Return to Armageddon: the United States and the nuclear arms race, 1981-1999”, (New York: 
Oxford University Press: 2003) 61-3 
 
9
 See Powaski (2003) 61-3 
10
 A more detailed description of Brilliant Pebbles follows later in the chapter. 
The missile defence pragmatist  
 36 
the Exoatmospheric Re-entry Interceptor System (ERIS), which the Pentagon believed could be 
deployed by 1996) would have a considerable impact on policymaking during 1989 and 1990.
11
  
The Pebbles appeared to be a cost-effective and workable way to deploy a nationwide missile 
defence without having to rely on many of the questionable systems being developed under the 
Phase I SDS system.  However, just as the promise of these technologies would have a positive 
impact BMD thinking during 1989 and 1990, their failure to materialise, along with problems in 
many other SDI technologies during 1991, and particularly 1992, would have an equally strong 
impact on the debate during the second half of this period.  As such, by 1993 the US remained 
many years away from being able to construct even a rudimentary national missile defence system.  
In fact, in 1992, Pentagon analyst Dr Daniel Chu would suggest that even a 2002 deployment date 
remained optimistic.
12
 
 The second key technological dynamic during this period was the perceived successes of the 
Patriot theatre missile defence system during the Persian Gulf War.  The initial reports that Patriot 
had successfully intercepted Iraqi scud missiles in early 1991 provided a huge boost in Washington 
for tactical missile defences.  It also, erroneously provided impetus for the concept of missile 
defence more generally.  SDIO Director Henry Cooper went as far as to say that it was “hard to 
think of a better validation” of the Bush administration’s missile defence plans than the Patriot’s 
performance during the Gulf War.
13
  However, just as this apparent success had been influential 
during early 1991, the numerous reports questioning the performance of Patriot that emerged over 
the next 18 months had an equally extensive impact on BMD thinking.
14
   
 Although Brilliant Pebbles and Patriot provided a temporary fillip in the general perception 
of the technological efficacy of BMD, the overall trend during this period was towards a growing 
acceptance that the US remained a long way from being able to deploy even the simplest of 
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effective missile defences.  As a result, as Bush left office in 1993, the US appeared many years 
away from having even a rudimentary missile defence capability that could be deployed. 
 
Presidential policy agenda 
As he took office, it was unclear what the election of George H. W. Bush would mean for the future 
of the US missile defence programme.  Bush was vague about the Strategic Defense Initiative 
during the election; was known to be far less ideologically disposed towards SDI than Ronald 
Reagan, and was thought to be more pragmatic when it came to conducting international relations.  
As a result, three dynamics in particular would shape the way that Bush approached ballistic missile 
defence during this period: his pragmatic leadership style, the perceived requirements of the 
domestic context within which he was acting, and his approach to Russia and Russian President 
Mikhail Gorbachev in particular.   
The first dynamic that would shape Bush’s approach to missile defence was his style of 
leadership.  Bush was known to be something of a pragmatist when it came to policy – preferring to 
be reactive rather than proactive – and favouring a “realist” approach to international affairs.  
Unlike his predecessor, Bush surrounded himself with a national security team with mixed views of 
ballistic missile defence: National Security Adviser Brent Scowcroft and Secretary of State James 
Baker were sceptical, while Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney, Vice President Dan Quayle
15
 and 
particularly SDIO Director Henry Cooper, were very much in favour.  This diversity on the 
principle of BMD suggested that policy decisions would be swayed less by predetermined thinking, 
                                                          
15
 In fact, Quayle had been a key driver of the need for battlefield missile defence systems, and had begun thinking 
about this problem in relation to Israel during the 1980s when he was a member of the Senate Armed Services 
Committee. Confidential interview (E). 
The missile defence pragmatist  
 38 
and more by the political and strategic requirements at any given time.
16
  Baker Spring would later 
describe this approach as “inbox diplomacy”.17  
 The second factor underpinning Bush’s thinking was the domestic political context in which 
he was acting.  Specifically, Bush wanted to be “for” missile defence because it was a key 
Republican issue.
18
  Bush recognised the importance of retaining a significant ballistic missile 
defence programme to placate many conservative “Reaganite” Republicans who had not voted for 
him during the Republican primaries because they believed he would be soft on defence.
19
  In fact, 
Bush demonstrated this propensity to play politics with missile defence during the 1988 election 
where he used the issue of BMD against his Democratic rival Michael Dukakis, after having played 
down the programme significantly while running against Jack Kemp in the Republican primaries.
20
  
Throughout his presidency Bush would continue to request high levels of BMD funding at least in 
part to meet this perceived domestic need.  Consequently, the political necessity of the programme 
ensured that Bush would try to retain some type of large-scale missile defence plan during his 
presidency.
21
 
 Lastly, the president’s views on BMD were shaped by his international strategy.  Although 
Bush intended to be far more cautious towards the Soviet Union in general than Ronald Reagan, he 
was also determined that strategic nuclear arms reductions agreements with Moscow, and later the 
safe transition of the country after the collapse of the Soviet Union, were his key priorities.
22
  In 
keeping with this air of caution, Bush was also determined to ensure against a recidivist Soviet 
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Union, particularly during 1989 and 1990 when he thought that Mikhail Gorbachev may be re-
energising the country, but also after 1991 as he continued to hedge against any future threat from 
Russia or elsewhere.  Throughout this period, securing better and more stable relations with 
Moscow would dominate Bush’s strategic thinking, as would reductions in the vast ex-Soviet 
nuclear stockpile.
23
  Consequently, while BMD would be important to Bush, it would not be a key 
priority on his international agenda.  Instead maintaining the ABM Treaty would be central to US-
Russian relations and to US foreign policy as a whole. 
  Bush supported the development and deployment of ballistic missile defences, partly 
because of the programmes’ domestic salience with Republicans, and partly because he remained 
cautious about the future, but not if pursuing the policy undermined his wider strategy.  This was 
also very much in keeping with Bush’s overall approach to the presidency, which was characterised 
by his pragmatic approach to governing, and a tendency to be cautious and reactive.  
 
Congressional pressure on policymaking 
Attitudes towards missile defence in Congress had been fundamentally split by the announcement 
of the Strategic Defense Initiative in 1983, and Democrats and Republicans would spend much of 
the 1980s locked in zero-sum arguments over the programme.  This partisan fervour remained 
strong in 1989, and as a result, the direction of Congressional pressure on policymaking between 
1989 and 1993 and funding of its components would depend heavily on which party controlled 
Congress.  
During this period, the majority of Democrats in Congress were united in the belief that the 
ABM Treaty was of central importance to US and international security.
24
  Consequently, they were 
staunchly opposed to any type of missile defence plan that would contravene the Treaty and upset 
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this balance.  Democrats not only questioned the strategic prudence of deploying national missile 
defences, but also doubted that the technological capability to build such a defence existed, and 
after the collapse of the Soviet Union, argued that there simply wasn’t any strategic need for them.  
Instead, lawmakers tended to point to other methods of ensuring US security as being more viable, 
effective, and less damaging to international stability.  Nevertheless, Democrats were not against 
missile defences per se.  In fact, some lawmakers agreed that the development and deployment of 
tactical battlefield missile defences was both prudent and necessary – especially after 1991 – and 
some even supported the idea of a limited national system as long as it remained within the confines 
of the ABM Treaty.
25
  As such, views within the party did vary, with some “arms controllers” such 
as Representative John Conyers (D-MI) being staunchly opposed to any BMD deployment, while 
others such as Senator Sam Nunn (D-GA), were more inclined to accept a limited deployment 
within the ABM Treaty.
26
 
At the same time, the Republican Party remained far more supportive of the idea of ballistic 
missile defence, and particularly towards the notion of deploying a comprehensive system such as 
that outlined by Ronald Reagan.  Overall, they agreed with their Democratic Party colleagues that 
the US should develop and deploy battlefield missile defences, but unlike the Democrats, argued 
that the US should also pursue national systems to protect the whole country against all types of 
missile threat.
27
  Underlying this was the fact that Republicans were far less concerned about the 
ABM Treaty and relations with Russia, particularly following the collapse of the Soviet Union, and 
were generally far more optimistic about the technological feasibly of deploying workable missile 
defences.
28
  Nevertheless, attitudes towards missile defence within the party were split between 
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“fiscal conservatives” who questioned the cost of such an endeavour and “hawkish conservatives”, 
such as Senator John Kyl (R-AZ), who favoured deployment no matter what.
29
 
 The fact that the Democrats controlled both Houses of Congress between 1989 and 1993 
meant that Congressional pressure on missile defence would generally favour scrutiny, restraint, 
and above all, continued adherence to the ABM Treaty.  However, because of the nuances within 
both parties, and their propensity to “play politics” with the issue, Congress would not necessarily 
be entirely opposed to the idea of missile defence, and most lawmakers agreed on the need for 
battlefield defences.
30
  In the words of Senator Malcolm Wallop (R-WY) at the time: 
A majority in Congress committed to the entire Strategic Defense Initiative does not 
 exist.  On the other hand, virtually no opposition to the concept of theatre missile defence 
 remains.
31
 
 
(2) The evolution of policy, 1989-1993 
George H. W. Bush assumed the presidency at a pivotal time in the history of US ballistic missile 
defence policy.  The threat of a nuclear confrontation with the Soviet Union appeared to be abating, 
much of the missile defence technologies that had emerged from the Strategic Defense Initiative 
were faltering, and a Democratic controlled Congress remained sceptical of large scale missile 
defence plans.  In addition to this, any US BMD effort continued to be constrained by the Anti-
Ballistic Missile Treaty, and by the quest for arms reductions and stable relations with the Soviet 
Union.  As such, one scholar thought that as Ronald Reagan left office in 1989, “SDI might … ride 
off into the sunset with him”.32  
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1989: Missile defence as a bargaining chip 
As the new administration entered office in January 1989, the SDI programme was in a 
considerable state of flux, and numerous important decisions crucial to the future of the system 
were required almost immediately.
33
  Foremost amongst these were questions over what role SDI 
would play in US defence strategy under Bush; how much SDI expenditure could be countenanced 
in a period of low and declining defence budgets; whether the Phase I Strategic Defense System 
deployment envisioned by the Reagan administration should go ahead as planned; and lastly what 
the Bush administration’s position was going to be in relation to the ABM Treaty.34  In addition to 
this, the SDI programme was coming under increasing attack from those in the defence and 
engineering community who did not consider the construction of a cost-effective, survivable and 
impenetrable defence as a current reality.
35
  Even the Joint Chiefs of Staff were quoted as being “as 
fond of SDI as they are of peace protests”36, and were concerned that SDI was taking up valuable 
resources that might be better used on other service-specific projects.
37
  On top of this, the 
programme was also running into trouble with the Democratically controlled Congress who warned 
that the Strategic Defense Initiative was blocking the way towards the more important goal of arms 
control agreements with the Soviet Union.
38
  
 With these changing dynamics in mind, the Bush administration took its time in assessing 
the international scene, and remained cautious about how to approach BMD.  Bush, and Secretary 
of State James Baker in particular, remained deeply sceptical about Mikhail Gorbachev’s reforms, 
fearing that they may be designed to reinvigorate the Soviet Union as a more powerful foe, and 
therefore expressed caution towards the new peace overtures from Moscow.
39
  This thinking and 
worldview was reflected in something of a wait-and-see SDI policy, keeping research and the 
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notion of deployment going if only as a hedge and bargaining chip for an uncertain future.  In fact, 
Bush waited five months before he first contacted the Soviet leader, undoubtedly waiting to see 
how things would unfold, and took his time to examine the role of SDI in the US-Soviet 
relationship.
40
  In keeping with this air of caution and circumspection, Bush declared that he would 
“vigorously pursue the strategic defense initiative” during his inaugural address to Congress on 9th 
February 1989.
41
    
In his first defence budget, Bush asked Congress to appropriate $4.6b for further SDI 
research and development, which although substantially less than the $5.6b proposed by the 
outgoing Reagan administration for the same period, still amounted to a sizable request in an era of 
decreasing defence spending.
42
  Of particular note, Bush requested substantial additional funding 
for a programme called Brilliant Pebbles, the latest in a long line of revolutionary BMD ideas from 
Edward Teller and Lowell Wood at the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory in California.
43
  
Many in the Bush administration, and in particular Vice President Dan Quayle, who had described 
the idea as “one of the most promising lines of SDI research”, which had the capacity to 
“revolutionize much of our thinking about strategic defense”, saw the Pebbles not only as a great 
breakthrough in terms of technology, but equally importantly perhaps in terms of cost.
44
  The 
concept would involve placing several thousand small interceptors and sensors in continuous space 
orbit in something of a “swarm”, which would then be able to locate, track and eventually intercept 
enemy ICBM’s travelling at high speed through space.  Teller and Wood envisaged a system 
containing anything up to 100,000 Pebbles, which in turn would then be backed up by additional 
ground-based elements, and estimated that the cost of deployment could be as little as £10b.
45
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 According to the then Director of the Strategic Defense Policy Office Stephen Cambone, the 
Brilliant Pebbles concept was exactly the type of project that Bush was likely to favour; not only 
did it appear more credible than many of the technologies under development at the SDIO, but it 
appeared to offer the potential of a cost-effective, efficient and comprehensive system.
46
  The new 
concept also received a wholehearted endorsement in an end of tour report submitted by SDIO 
Chief General James Abrahamson in late February 1989.  Abrahamson, who had headed the agency 
since April 1984, recommended that the SDI programme be restructured to “incorporate, elevate 
and prioritize” Brilliant Pebbles as the centrepiece of the administration’s anti-missile research 
effort.  If this was done, he suggested, the new system could potentially begin providing limited 
protection against enemy ICBM attack as early as 1994.
47
  Bush now began to entertain the 
possibility of pursuing a system based around Brilliant Pebbles that showed great promise, and 
could apparently be done at a limited cost.  Although SDI would remain secondary to other 
priorities during the first half of 1989, the new idea certainly shaped BMD thinking within the Bush 
administration, and made the president far more receptive to BMD than he had been before.
48
  
Nevertheless, BMD policy remained constrained by the ABM Treaty and by the importance of 
relations with Moscow. 
On 14
th
 June 1989, Bush’s new approach was formalised in National Security Directive 14, 
which concluded that the administration’s original SDI policy “remained sound” and “should 
continue to be a major US response to the Soviet challenge,” and stated that the SDIO research and 
development effort should intensify its focus on Brilliant Pebbles.
49
  The Directive also made it 
clear that the Bush administration accepted that the goal of the SDI was no longer to build an 
impenetrable shield, but to “enhance deterrence”; the first public break with Reagan’s desire to 
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create an impenetrable shield over the United States.
50
  Technological endorsements from the 
JASON group
51
, the US Air-Force and the SDIO all served to augment the Brilliant Pebbles 
concept in the eyes of the administration.  Despite this, Bush privately continued to regard SDI as a 
dispensable tool for use in negotiations with the Soviet Union.
52
 
 Thanks in part to this newfound confidence in SDI, Bush felt able to stand firm in his first 
meeting with Gorbachev as president in the Belgian capital, Brussels, during June 1989.
53
  After 
testing the water during this initial meeting, a couple of months later Soviet Foreign Minister 
Eduard Shevardnadze visited the US with new ideas to push ahead with an arms reduction deal.  
Upon arrival in Washington, Shevardnadze presented Bush with a nine page letter from Gorbachev 
that seemed to suggest that talks over START might finally be separated from issues over missile 
defence, and in particular from the contentious issue of space weapons.
54
  The letter, though not 
dealing in any specifics, suggested that the “conceptual argument about placing weapons in space” 
should be set aside for the moment in order that the “more important and complex debates on arms 
control not be made any harder” than they already were.55  A few days later, as Shevardnadze met 
Secretary of State James Baker for further discussions at Jackson Lake Lodge in Wyoming, the 
Soviet Foreign Minister officially announced that the Soviet Union would no longer insist that 
advances in strategic arms reduction talks be linked to agreements and limitations on SDI.  He was 
however quick to point out that any US move that breached the ABM Treaty would invalidate this 
promise.
56
  For the Soviet Union this decision was as much about practical politics as it was about 
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any major change in strategy, but for Bush the concession meant a validation of his cautious wait-
and-see policy, and having achieved its primary purpose of facilitating arms cuts, SDI lost some of 
its importance to his overall strategy.  As long as SDI wasn’t needed to force Gorbachev to the 
negotiating table, Bush did not need to prioritise it, but that did not mean that the president would 
abandon the project altogether.  In December, Bush met Gorbachev to discuss the Strategic Arms 
Reduction Treaty (START).
57
 
 Bush was intent on retaining SDI funding at a high level, in part as a hedge and bargaining 
chip with the Soviet Union, and therefore a key litmus test of the president’s commitment would be 
whether he could persuade Congress to fully fund BMD in his 1990 defence budget.
 58
  Things 
seemed to start well in the Senate as a provisional vote authorised nearly the entire SDI request, and 
despite funding being cut further to $4b during internecine summer debates, the Senate finally 
agreed to authorise $4.6b for the programme.  Sam Nunn (D-GA), Chairman of the Senate Armed 
Services Committee, made it clear that SDI “remained a valuable research programme” and that the 
Senate had no intention to “kill it entirely”.59  The passage of the budget through the House was far 
less smooth as lawmakers initially voted to cut SDI funding to just $3.1b – nearly a third less than 
had been asked for – and added strong language restricting the testing of various programmes 
currently being pursued by the SDIO, and reaffirmed the commitment to the ABM Treaty.  During 
the summer, Bush had described this as “totally unacceptable”, while the SDIO warned that such 
levels of funding would “essentially dismantle the whole programme”.60  When the budget went to 
conference, Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney threatened to instruct the president to veto any 
resolution that promised to hamstring SDI research and development.
61
  Nevertheless, Bush agreed 
to the figure of $3.6b for SDI in fiscal year 1990, a 22% reduction of the administration’s request 
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and a real terms reduction from the previous years budget, despite warnings from the SDIO that 
such a reduction in funding would necessitate a significant rethink of current BMD research and 
development strategy, and perhaps its entire rationale.
62
   
 The appropriation marked a tangible drop in support for the SDI programme, and reflected 
the changing circumstances and attitudes both internationally and domestically.  Perhaps more 
importantly it reflected Bush’s pragmatism.  In early summer as he remained cautious about the 
Soviet Union he pushed for greater SDI funding, and even spoke out against the House resolution, 
but by late autumn as Congress voted for a large reduction in funding, Bush didn’t follow through 
with a veto, neither did he come out publicly and criticise the Bill.
63
  A central reason for this was 
the delinking of START and SDI by the Soviet Union, after which missile defence lost importance 
for Bush, and consequently the president felt much less inclined to force, lend weight to, or use up 
political capital on SDI in late 1989.  In the words of Ernest Yanarella: 
 The Bush Administration’s initial efforts to distance itself from the Reagan presidency and 
 its legacy prompted some of its key players – including the president himself – to put 
 ballistic missile defense on the backburner.
64
 
 
1990: The changing rationale for missile defence 
In early 1990, Bush asked Congress for $4.5b for SDI, only marginally less than the previous year, 
and over $850m more than had been appropriated just a few months earlier.  The request reflected 
Bush’s growing enthusiasm for the potential of Brilliant Pebbles.  Consequently, a large proportion 
of the SDI budget, £392m, would be requested for the Brilliant Pebbles system, which in turn would 
make it one of the biggest programmes in the Pentagon’s research budget.65 
Although Bush had been very interested in the promise of the Brilliant Pebbles concept 
during 1989, a report by Ambassador Henry Cooper almost certainly persuaded Bush to increase 
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both its funding and centrality to the SDI project in his budget request.
66
  Cooper’s report, which 
had been mandated nearly a year earlier, contained a strong endorsement of the concept, and 
suggested that Brilliant Pebbles was not only “cost effective, affordable and survivable” but also, 
unlike many other SDIO projects, the technology was not constrained by identifiable “major road 
blocks” in development.67  Cooper also suggested that a new strategic order was developing in 
which different types of threats would emerge from a now more restive and less secure Soviet 
Union and from the proliferation of ballistic missile technology to hostile third world states.  In 
accordance with this transformation, Cooper proposed that the SDI project be reconfigured to take 
into account the new threat from accidental or unauthorised ICBM launches, primarily from the 
Soviet Union, and from deliberate attacks by rogue states.
68
   
 Accordingly, the SDIO began to put together a project and possible system architecture, and 
Bush began to speak more effusively about this new approach to SDI.  In particular, as part of a 
speech to the staff of Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory in San Francisco during February 
1990, Bush remarked that “I am told the technology looks very promising” and that “these 
technologies will strengthen deterrence” in an era where “strategic defense makes more sense than 
ever before”.  He also stressed that strategic defences continued to underpin arms control by 
diminishing the advantages of “cheating”, while also enabling a capacity against “accidental or 
unauthorized launches”.69  In March 1990, on the seventh anniversary of Ronald Reagan’s 
announcement of the SDI, Bush stated that his administration “remained committed to a robust SDI 
program” in order to defend “the US and its allies against ballistic missile attack”, which he said 
was increasingly likely to be from a “third world power”.70  This thinking was reiterated a month 
later by SDIO Chief George Monahan (February 1989 - June 1990), as he stressed to SDI Monitor 
that the role of SDI in the 1990s would remain guided by the principles of NSD 14, and that 
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Brilliant Pebbles had become the centrepiece of this plan.
71
  Shortly after the interview, Monahan 
officially substituted Brilliant Pebbles for the Phase I SDS system.
72
  Confirmation of this new 
approach was made in Bush’s 1990 National Security Strategy, which as well as talking at some 
length about how the international landscape was rapidly changing, and how a crisis in Communism 
and the spread of weapons of mass destruction was underpinning a strategic transformation, also 
spoke of how SDI offered the opportunity to “shift deterrence towards a more stable basis”.73  In 
particular, the document stated that “defense against third country threats” has become an 
“increasingly important benefit” of SDI, and that the US should entertain the possibility of BMD 
cooperation with the Soviet Union and NATO allies.
74
   
 Several things conspired during the summer and autumn of 1990 to counter Bush’s 
newfound faith in the potential of SDI.  The first was the gradual realisation that the Brilliant 
Pebbles system, which had become the central component of Bush’s BMD planning, was proving to 
be far more complicated and expensive than had originally been hoped.  In particular, the SDIO was 
beginning to realise that more reliance would need to be placed on the ERIS ground-based 
interceptor because the Pebbles had essentially become boulders.  Instead of the original estimate 
that each Pebble would weigh around 5lbs and that each could be held in the palm of the hand, 
developers now reported that each Pebble could be up to 3ft long and weigh closer to 100lbs per 
unit.  Accordingly, the price per Pebble rose from $100,000 per copy to nearer $1.5m, and the 
proposed cost of the whole system rose substantially, and with it went some of Bush’s support.75  
The Brilliant Pebbles system was tested for the first time on 25
th
 August and failed the objectives 
set due to faulty telemetry, providing only “tangential benefits”.76   
The second development was the fact that during the summer and autumn of 1990, Bush 
focused his time and attention on other priorities that he considered more important than SDI.  The 
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first of these was the conclusion of negotiations of the CFE Treaty with the Soviet Union regarding 
the reduction of conventional armed forces in Europe.
77
  This agreement was followed by additional 
promises by the Soviet Union to withdraw all short-range nuclear missiles from Europe, and by 
Bush’s announcement that the US would withdraw all land and sea-based tactical nuclear weapons 
from oversees by 1991.
78
  The second distraction was the invasion of Kuwait by Iraq in August 
1990, an event that was to dominate Bush’s time over the next six months as the president worked 
to coordinate an international response to the attack.  In fact, Bush spent much of the second half 
1990 putting together an extensive coalition to first protect against any further Iraqi aggression in 
the Gulf, and then in January 1991 to expel Iraqi forces from Kuwait.
79
 
The combination of technological problems with the SDI and Bush’s international 
diplomatic workload was reflected in the way that the president’s SDI request was handled by 
Congress.  Nothing seemed to suggest that the Congressional mood had changed much from the 
previous year, and much, such as relaxing tensions with the Soviet Union and the increasing cost of 
any proposed system, seemed to suggest that the SDI request would face an even tougher time in 
1990.  In particular, both Houses of Congress remained staunchly against any plans that went 
beyond the confines of the ABM Treaty, particularly Brilliant Pebbles.
80
  With this in mind, the 
Senate agreed $3.6b for SDI, $1b less than Bush had asked for, while the House slashed funding to 
$2.3b, and included language threatening to veto funding for Brilliant Pebbles altogether.
81
  The 
October conference agreed $2.89b for SDI, cutting over $1b from the previous year’s appropriation, 
and over a third from Bush’s request, representing the lowest SDI funding for five years.82  Despite 
strong opposition from House Republicans led by John Kyle (R-AZ), who urged Bush to veto the 
Bill, exclaiming that it would send “exactly the wrong signal to the Saddam Hussein’s of this 
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world” and pointing to the “juicy bits of SDI-related veto bait”, Bush signed the Bill into law.83  
However, Congress did vote to establish a Theatre Missile Defense Office and programme in the 
Pentagon to coordinate the development of various TMD technologies.
84
  In a fair summation, 
SDIO Director Henry Cooper later remarked that SDI did not get the presidential attention or the 
funding that it needed because Bush had “bigger fish to fry” in 1990.85   
 By the end of 1990, prospects for SDI deployment seemed low; the technology was 
faltering, the Soviet threat was decreasing, and the Democratic Congress did not want to fund it.  
Bush’s approach to SDI had remained cautious and pragmatic both before and after his election, 
and this had been reflected in the development of the programme during this period.  Although 
certainly interested in the initial promise of Brilliant Pebbles, SDI was of secondary importance to 
Bush, and was often used as a political bargaining chip, both domestically and internationally, and 
funding was retained more as a future hedge against the unknown than for any specific strategic 
purpose.  At key points Bush didn't give SDI the support it needed, particularly after strategic 
defences were delinked from START in summer 1989, but perhaps even more so as he concentrated 
on other priorities in 1990.  The gradual decline in SDI funding was an indicative and inevitable 
consequence of this. 
 
1991: GPALS and the Missile Defense Act 
Despite the significant cuts imposed by Congress on SDI funding, and the start of hostilities against 
Saddam Hussein in the Gulf, by January 1991 Bush felt confident enough to publicly release his 
proposed BMD plan.  The new plan, which had been driven largely by SDIO Director Henry 
Cooper, would be known as the Global Protection Against Limited Strikes (GPALS).
86
  The 
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GPALS system, designed primarily as a hedge against future threats and in order to bolster not 
replace nuclear deterrence, proposed a combination of around 1000 Brilliant Pebbles with 500 or 
more ERIS based ground and sea-based interceptors.  Although representing a substantial lessening 
of demands from the Phase I SDS plan, the new system would still amount to a considerable outlay 
of untested and unproven components, and more importantly, if deployed, a breach of the ABM 
Treaty.
87
  GPALS was based around, and was heavily reliant upon the space-based Brilliant 
Pebbles, which the SDIO claimed were needed because only the Pebbles could provide continuous 
protection of a significantly broad area, which in turn could be extended to friends and allies, and 
could offer additional capability to theatre BMD.
88
  In the process of recalibrating the system, Bush 
also ended any pretence that the SDI programme could destroy thousands of incoming enemy 
warheads by constructing an impenetrable missile shield above the US.  The new system would be 
designed primarily to counter the accidental and unauthorised launches of up to 200 Soviet 
warheads, as well as a possible single figure warhead attack from a nations like Iran, Iraq or North 
Korea.
89
  The system therefore offered the possibility of a comprehensive and relatively robust 
defence, and at the same time a method to enhance the president’s support within the Republican 
Party.
90
 
 When Bush announced the new programme in late January 1991 during his State of the 
Union address, he proclaimed that it was now possible to “defend against ballistic missile attacks 
aimed at innocent civilians”.  Consequently, he had: 
 Directed that the SDI program be refocused on providing protection from limited ballistic 
 missile strikes, whatever their source.  Let us pursue an SDI program that can deal with any 
 future threat to the United States, to our forces overseas, and to our friends and allies.
91
 
Bush’s new programme had little support in Congress; relatively pro-BMD Democrats were quick 
to criticise the new plan for its reliance on Brilliant Pebbles, which would violate the ABM treaty, 
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while most Republicans, and especially those who had supported Ronald Reagan, felt that Bush’s 
new plan compromised and delayed the possibility of ever constructing a genuine and more robust 
missile defence system.
92
  Bush had essentially attempted a political compromise with GPALS and 
had ended up pleasing neither side of the debate, or even those supportive of the compromise.  
According to Robert Bell, then aid to Senator Sam Nunn (D-GA), this left Bush getting “shot at 
from both sides”.93 
 However, attitudes towards BMD, particularly amongst Democrats in Congress, were 
changed substantially during 1991 by visual reports from the Gulf War apparently showing an 
American Patriot missile defence system intercepting Iraqi Scud missiles over Israel and Saudi 
Arabia.  The American public was deeply impressed by the apparent high-speed intercepts captured 
by TV reporters, as for the first time in its 50-year history a BMD system had ostensibly been 
proven to work.  Despite being an entirely different concept to the system being developed by the 
Bush administration to protect the US homeland, the affect on Congress and on the public 
perception of BMD was immediate and striking.  During a speech in mid-February, Bush exclaimed 
that the events in the Gulf were “something of a revolution that will shape the way that America 
defends itself for decades to come”, because Patriot was “proof positive that missile defense 
works”.94  Many SDI proponents immediately began proclaiming that Patriot demonstrated the 
validity of Ronald Reagan’s Star Wars vision.  Many moreover used the popularity and apparent 
success of the system to pressure Congress into backing a renewed burst of BMD funding.
95
  
 Armed with this new wave of enthusiasm Bush proposed to increase SDI funding by almost 
60% in his fiscal year 1992 budget request, asking Congress for $5.2b for the SDIO, which would 
include $659m for Brilliant Pebbles, and $158m for Patriot.
96
  The request was telling in many 
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ways, not least that Patriot was to receive such a small proportion of the funds considering its role 
as the driver of the renewed enthusiasm for BMD.
97
  The second interesting facet was the large 
amount requested for Brilliant Pebbles, a concept with very little if anything in common with 
Patriot.  Without question the Bush administration, and particularly its more right-leaning 
supporters in Congress, hoped to use the impact of Patriot to drive through the GPALS plan.
98
 
GPALS encountered significant opposition from Congressional Democrats in spring 1991, 
as lawmakers remained unconvinced about the prudence, necessity and desirability of Brilliant 
Pebbles.  Senator John Kerry (D-MA) argued that the Pebbles would “threaten the ABM treaty” 
long before they would threaten missiles such as Iraqi Scuds, and was quick to point out that 
“Patriot should not be used as a justification for the grandiose, costly and destabilizing SDI program 
which the Bush administration continues to propose”.99  On the other side of the divide, missile 
defence advocate Frank Gaffney argued that it was “politics not technology”, that was preventing 
the US from deploying a protective missile shield.
100
  Even Bush declared that he believed that the 
pace of SDI research had been “limited not by technological difficulties” but by Congresses 
unwillingness to fund the programme adequately throughout the previous few years.
101
 
 
While the debate was heating up in Congress, evidence emerged suggesting that the Patriot BMD 
system had not been as successful as had originally been claimed.  In mid-1991, Theodore Postol, 
Professor at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, presented findings to the House Armed 
Services Committee showing that Patriot’s performance had been at best overstated and at worst 
negligible.  Part of the problem, Postol argued, was that journalists reporting on the war were 
frequently reporting directly from US Army sources and were therefore often unable to access any 
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contradictory evidence.
102
  In his report, Postol claimed that US Army information on Patriot’s 
success had been “severely inflated” and that the system was not nearly as successful as the US 
public had been led to believe.  Although acknowledging the psychological importance of Patriot, 
and its importance in keeping Israel out of the Gulf War, Postol cast significant doubts on the 
efficacy of the system, and expressed his concern that SDI advocates were deliberately “learning 
the wrong lessons” from the experience.103   
 In early May the SDIO released its exact GPALS architecture, and despite concerns in 
Congress about Brilliant Pebbles, the architecture would continue to be built around the space-
based assets.  Although SDIO Director Cooper maintained that the Pebbles would not be deployed 
for many years, they remained the cornerstone of the new system.
104
  Unsurprisingly this did not go 
down well in the House, where despite the best efforts of the minority Republicans to staunchly 
defend the renewed push for SDI, and its focus on Brilliant Pebbles, Democrats remained 
unconvinced.
105
  Consequently in late May the House voted for a 32% reduction in the 
administration’s SDI request for fiscal year 1992.  Perhaps of even more concern, and despite the 
best efforts of Republican lawmakers John Kyle (R-AZ) and John Spratt (R-SC), the Bill also 
eliminated all funding for Brilliant Pebbles, fundamentally undermining Bush’s GPALS plan.106  
During the process, Representative John Conyers (D-MI) launched a scathing attack, reflecting the 
views of many Democratic representatives, arguing that the administration had been “successful in 
convincing Congress to give it billions of dollars for Star Wars” but the programme continued to 
“prove remarkably unsuccessful in producing much of anything with those funds”.  Conyers 
described the SDI plan as “pulling in effect a reverse Rumpelstiltskin [by spinning] gold into 
straw.”107  Consequently the Bush administration, and BMD supporters in Congress, were left in a 
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quandary; the political support seemed to exist to push ahead with BMD development, but not if the 
proposed system continued to be based upon assets prohibited by the ABM Treaty (e.g. Brilliant 
Pebbles), which the SDIO maintained were integral to the strategic viability and working of the 
system.  The question was therefore how to get a balance between the perceived strategic capability 
of Brilliant Pebbles and political support for an ABM Treaty compliant system. 
 As Bush turned his attention to other issues such as reaching an agreement with Moscow on 
START in early 1991, Republicans in Congress realised that Bush’s current plan would not be 
accepted.  Instead, leading Republican Senators William Cohen (R-ME), John Warner (R-VI) and 
Richard Lugar (R-IN) broke with the administration, and began trying to piece together a 
compromise BMD package that would be acceptable to both parties in Congress.  The stumbling 
block was, and was always going to be, Brilliant Pebbles, and the Senators realised that any bi-
partisan consensus on BMD deployment could only be reached by removing Bush’s preferred 
concept from the proposal.
108
  As a result, Cohen, Warner and Lugar proposed scaling back Bush’s 
GPALS plan, postponing any deployment decision on Brilliant Pebbles, and as an alternative 
moving ahead with the deployment of ground and sea-based ERIS interceptors.
109
  The proposal 
envisaged that the future system might consist of between 700-1200 interceptors that would 
eventually be deployed at up to seven sites around the US, but for the moment, plans would be 
restricted to one ABM Treaty compliant site at North Dakota.
110
  The plan, which became known as 
the “basis for consensus”, was accepted by Republicans keen to get some type of resolution on 
BMD, and also went down well with Democratic supporters of the ABM Treaty, and particularly 
with leading Senate Arms Services Committee Chairman Sam Nunn (D-GA), who himself had 
unsuccessfully proposed a similar idea named “Accidental Launch Protection System” (ALPS) in 
1988.
111
  As well as being equally impressed by Patriot and not wanting the Republican Party to 
“own” a popular issue, Democrats were conscious to comply with the new plan in order to make 
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amends for their perceived hesitation in supporting the Gulf War.
112
  Congress had also become 
concerned after several Senators who had visited Moscow reported that the Russians themselves 
were also growing increasingly anxious about a potential third world missile threat.
113
  
Fundamentally and most importantly, the Bill left ambiguous the prospect of any BMD 
deployments beyond the initial 100 interceptors at one site allowed by the ABM Treaty, although it 
did call for Bush to begin negotiations with Moscow on the necessary amendments.
114
  The 
proposal received broad bi-partisan support in Congress.
115
 
Despite it appearing to undermine GPALS, Bush remained conspicuously quiet on the 
“basis for consensus”, spending most of the summer focusing on arms control negotiations with the 
Soviet Union.  Consequently, moderate Republicans and Democrats joined in a pragmatic BMD 
compromise that made political rather than strategic sense, as they sought to push the Bill through 
Congress.
116
  The Bill received a strong endorsement in the Senate, and the Armed Service 
Committee voted in July 1991 to fund the new system in place of GPALS.
117
 
 
While Congress was debating, reworking and essentially undermining GPALS, the president 
seemed far more focused on other issues, much as he had been in 1990.  In particular, Bush had 
devoted much of his time and energy over the summer to finalising the Strategic Arms Reduction 
Treaty (START) with the Soviet Union.  The US had been working towards this agreement since 
1982, but until recently, after Gorbachev had announced their delinking in 1989, agreements on 
arms reductions had always stalled due to American insistence on the freedom to pursue SDI, and 
Soviet insistence that SDI must remain within the confines of the ABM treaty and be linked to 
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START.
118
  Finally presented with the ability to conclude these arms cuts, the last thing Bush 
wanted to do was to jeopardise them by opening up further discussions about SDI, and about 
possible amendments to the ABM Treaty.  As a result, Bush refused to discuss any issues relating to 
the Treaty with Gorbachev whilst they finalised START during July.
119
  Bush essentially prioritised 
better relations with the Soviet Union and cuts in strategic arms over pushing for GPALS. 
 The president continued to focus on the Soviet Union and arms control during the autumn, 
paying scant attention to what was happening domestically to his GPALS plan, particularly after the 
shock of the attempted coup against Gorbachev in August 1991.  The coup cemented an already 
growing concern in Bush’s mind over Moscow’s control of its nuclear weapons, and caused him to 
up the pace of his arms control initiatives, which again put pay to any potential negotiations on the 
ABM Treaty, and instead began pushing for a START II agreement to further reduce both 
superpowers nuclear stockpiles.
120
  In October, Bush announced that the US was willing to “give 
some ground” on Soviet desires to limit the Strategic Defense Initiative in order to build on and take 
maximum advantage of “the current climate of arms control negotiations”.121 
 By late autumn the “basis for consensus” plan had passed through Congress, and had 
received wide political approval, and in November, Congress passed the 1991 Missile Defense Act 
making this plan into law.  The Act made it an official goal of US policy to deploy at the “earliest 
possible date” allowed by the “appropriate technology”, an ABM Treaty compliant missile defence 
system able to provide “a highly effective defence of the US against limited attacks of ballistic 
missiles”.122  It also called for any actions in pursuit of this goal to be in coordination with the goal 
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of “maintaining strategic stability”, and alongside the provision of “highly effective theatre missile 
defenses”.123  Most importantly, it stated that: 
 Nothing in this Act may be construed to imply Congressional authorization for 
 development, testing or deployment of anti-ballistic missile systems in violation of the 
 ABM Treaty, including any amendments or protocols thereto.
124
 
This meant that the Bush administration could not deploy Brilliant Pebbles, the cornerstone of 
GPALS.
125
  In light of this, the Missile Defense Act called for the SDIO to submit a report to 
Congress on how it intended to implement the provisions in the Bill, and to rearrange GPALS to 
meet these new Congressional demands.
126
  
The political manoeuvring over the shape and architecture of the proposed BMD system was 
reflected by the Congressional amendments to Bush’s defence budget.  Although Congress agreed 
after conference to provide the SDIO with $4.15b, the highest ever appropriated and over $1b more 
than the previous year, the funding was structured to reflect the exigencies of Congressional BMD 
thinking and not those of the Bush administration.  Brilliant Pebbles was allocated $390m, about 
half the amount requested, and funds were stipulated solely for research and development and not 
deployment, while theatre missile defence programmes received $850m, reflecting the change in 
priorities mandated by the Missile Defense Act.
127
 
The 1991 Missile Defense Act, although hailed as a great step forward for BMD, was 
essentially an inefficient compromise that looked unlikely to hold.  Democratic lawmakers had 
gone along with the idea on the understanding that any deployment would not violate the ABM 
Treaty, while the Bush administration remained committed, at least in principle, to its Brilliant 
Pebbles centric GPALS architecture.
128
  There was also a definite feeling that Democrats had 
agreed to the legislation because they were concerned about the harm that had been done by not 
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appearing sufficiently robust on national security issues both before and after the Gulf War, and 
also because they did not want to let Republicans dominate an issue which seemed to have broad 
political support.
129
  
Despite what appeared to be significant breakthroughs for SDI in 1991, a closer inspection 
reveals a Congress and president working at essentially different purposes.  Fundamentally, because 
the one permitted NMD site in North Dakota had never been intended to house interceptor missiles 
capable of protecting the US population, the Act presented a significant political and strategic 
problem, namely that any credible national missile defence system would need to either be 
deployed elsewhere, or more likely, at several different sites within the US.  Both of these options 
would require ABM Treaty amendments.
130
  The Missile Defense Act therefore amounted to little 
more than a political compromise, which created more problems than it solved in practical terms, 
and always looked like a temporary rather than permanent arrangement.  
 
1992: The beginning of the end for SDI 
In December 1991, the Soviet Union collapsed, and the Cold war structure that had dominated 
international politics for over a generation ceased to exist.  The collapse ushered in a new era of 
Russian leadership as the “radical” Boris Yeltsin replaced the “reformist” Mikhail Gorbachev.  
Both developments seemed to promise much for peaceful future relations.
131
  Nevertheless, Bush 
asked Congress for $5.4b for SDI in fiscal year 1993 budget request, a 31% increase from the 
previous year’s authorisation, and the most ever requested for the programme in its eight-year 
history.
132
  The president maintained that despite recent developments, the system was necessary to 
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“confront successfully the growing dangers of instability and missile proliferation”.133  Of even 
greater significance, the SDIO seemed to be carrying on with GPALS development virtually 
irrespective of the constraints outlined in the Missile Defense Act, and the unpopular and 
contentious Brilliant Pebbles remained the centrepiece of this architecture.  When SDIO Director 
Henry Cooper testified to the Senate Armed Services Subcommittee on Strategic Forces on 9
th
 April 
1992, his outline of GPALS and SDI caused so much concern that Chairman Sam Nunn (D-GA) 
ordered a Government Accountability Office (GAO) study to be conducted into the programme.
134
 
Bush’s plans were however given new life by overtures from Boris Yeltsin that Russia 
might be willing to revive the idea previously floated by Mikhail Gorbachev of pursuing some type 
of joint BMD effort.
135
  Yeltsin proposed the creation of a “global system of protection” that would 
be based on a “revised US SDI system and advanced technologies being developed by the Russian 
military industrial complex”.136  Although the specifics of what the global protection system might 
actually contain remained undefined and vague, the idea of future BMD cooperation was welcomed 
by the Bush administration.137  The main attraction for Bush was almost certainly that cooperation 
might include a new agreement for an amended ABM Treaty that would allow him to pursue 
GPALS in the manner preferred by the SDIO, without having to endure either domestic or 
international political opposition.  It might also pave the way for greater reductions in the Russian 
nuclear stockpile.
138
  
However, enthusiasm for BMD, and even the possibility of some type of BMD cooperation, 
was dashed by a succession of damaging reports into the technological underpinnings of various 
systems being developed by the SDIO during February 1992.  The first, a report by the GAO into 
Bush’s proposed GPALS programme, found that the SDIO had “failed to develop a stable 
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architecture” with which to proceed with the system.139  The report also questioned the reliance 
upon Brilliant Pebbles, suggesting that the concept had still not been proven to work, that it was not 
at all clear that the Pebbles could be built or work as described, and that Bush’s plan would 
continue to face “tremendous challenges”.140  A few weeks later, top Pentagon scientist Aldric 
Saucier claimed that the SDIO had consistently and deliberately misled Congress on the technical 
achievements, potential costs and programme scheduling of Brilliant Pebbles in order to make the 
scheme seem more appealing.
141
  To compound problems, the ERIS interceptor failed its second 
development test in early March.
142
   
 This newfound uncertainly was reflected in Congress by Representative John Conyers (D-
MI) as he released his own report into Patriot and GPALS just prior to the House debating Bush’s 
1992 defence budget request.  Conyers suggested that  
 Over the past eight years, the administration had been successful in conning Congress to 
 give it billions of dollars for Star Wars, but the program has proved remarkably 
 unsuccessful in providing much of anything with the funds.
143
 
On 2
nd
 June 1992, Pentagon Program Analyst Dr Daniel Chu recommended that the ERIS 
interceptor not be built until it was more thoroughly tested, stating that he didn’t think that the 
system could or should be deployed before 2002 at the earliest.  In order to meet to 1996 deadline 
set by the Missile Defense Act, he said, ERIS would have to be exempted from dozens of important 
tests and laws.
144
  Chu’s report caused the SDIO to announce that it would be delaying construction 
of GPALS, and that the earliest deployment date would now be put back to 1998 to allow for more 
testing and development of the system.
145
  The credibility of GPALS had been further damaged by a 
                                                          
139
 “Strategic Defense Initiative: estimates of Brilliant Pebbles effectiveness are based on many unproven assumptions”, 
US General Accounting Office, (March 1992) 
140
 Ibid 
141
 Asker (16
th
 March 1992) 
142
 Matthew Bunn, “Star wars program under increasing attack”, Arms Control Today, (April 1992) 
143
 Quoted in Burns & Brune (2003) 143 
144
 Ibid 147 
145
 Matthew Bunn, “Pentagon critique delays Star Wars deployment”, Arms Control Today, (June 1992) 
The missile defence pragmatist  
 63 
report from the Congressional Budget Office (CBO), which recommend eliminating all funding for 
Brilliant Pebbles in May 1992.
146
 
When the House Armed Services Committee met in May 1992, it recommended that 
funding for Brilliant Pebbles be cut entirely as part of Les Aspin’s (D-WI) plans for the House to 
cut around $90b from the defence budget over the next five years.
147
  When it was voted for by the 
whole House in June, $4.3b was allocated to the SDIO, and although Brilliant Pebbles would still 
receive some funds, it was not the “robust funding” that the SDIO and Bush had hoped for.148  The 
Bill also stipulated that 1996 was no longer the target date for deployment, and that compliance 
with the ABM Treaty was a primary goal of US strategic policy.
149
  As such, the bipartisan BMD 
consensus embodied in the Missile Defense Act, the strategic necessity of deployment, as well as 
any apparent drive from technology appeared to have eroded by mid 1992.   
While this was going on, Bush remained focused on pushing for nuclear arms reductions and more 
secure relations with Moscow during 1992.  The president was keen to see whether some type of 
agreement on BMD cooperation might allow changes to be made to the ABM Treaty to allow for 
GPALS, without disrupting other ongoing strategic arms reduction talks.  Bush was also interested 
in the possibility of BMD cooperation, and agreed with Yeltsin at a summit meeting in Washington 
during June to “work together with allies and other interested states to develop a concept for global 
protection systems against limited ballistic missile attack”.150  It was also agreed that a high-level 
BMD cooperation working-group under the stewardship of Soviet specialist Dennis Ross and 
Russian Deputy Foreign minister Georgi Mamedov would be established to examine the 
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possibilities of a variety of different practical applications of this idea.
151
  The working group would 
seek to examine issues to do with the sharing of early-warning data and the possibilities of 
cooperating on the development of BMD technologies, but most importantly for Bush, the group 
would also begin discussing and exploring the possibilities of constructing a legal basis for the 
initiative, and whether the ABM Treaty could be amended, or even discarded in favour of a new 
agreement.
152
  
However, both parties had very different ideas over what the concept of a “global protection 
system” actually meant, and more importantly, what they hoped to gain from it.  Bush had 
instructed the US officials present at the discussion that their primary aim was to try to push Yeltsin 
to agree to radically alter the ABM Treaty; actual BMD cooperation, which Bush thought was 
unlikely given the gaps in relative technologies, was very much a secondary concern.
153
  Secretary 
of Defense Dick Cheney outlined the goals of US negotiators in a statement to the Senate Foreign 
Relations Committee in late June 1992:       
[Our primary aim is] changes that would permit deployment of [US] ABM interceptors at 
 multiple sites, deployment of a full range of sensors, freedom to develop and test all ABM 
 systems and components, and loosened restraints on tactical defenses.
154
 
The US negotiating stance was underpinned by a hope that pursuing the cooperation agenda with 
Moscow, and perhaps acquiring ABM Treaty amendments, could help change public and 
Congressional perceptions of BMD in the US without relying on Congress.  As Stephen Hadley, the 
then Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Policy, later suggested, “if we could 
get the Russian’s to agree on BMD then even Sam Nunn and Carl Levin couldn't oppose it.”155  
However, Russian officials continued to link BMD cooperation with a joint commitment to the 
sanctity of the ABM Treaty, and although discussions would continue into October, nothing was 
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ever specifically agreed during these consultations, and Bush remained hamstrung in his BMD 
efforts by the ABM Treaty and the growing domestic opposition to GPALS.
156
  
 
Before the defence budget was debated in Congressional conference, more reports emerged 
questioning the technology and development programmes at the SDIO.  Firstly, in September 1992 
the GAO published two more in a long line of damning reports into various aspects of the SDI.  In 
the first, which had been mandated by John Conyers (D-MI), the GAO fundamentally undermined 
those who maintained that Patriot had performed successfully during the Gulf War by claiming that: 
 The Army did not collect performance data during Operation Desert Storm that would 
 permit an absolute determination of how many of its targets the Patriot killed or failed to 
 kill.
157
 
The report went on to say that the “strongest evidence that an engagement resulted in a warhead 
kill” supported only about 9% of the Patriot’s engagements, while such evidence did not support the 
other 16% claimed by the Army at all.
158
  The second GAO report further eroded domestic support 
for BMD by suggesting that of the seven tests of the ERIS interceptor that had taken place between 
January 1990 and March 1992, four results had been exaggerated and the other three were either 
complete failures or only partially successful.  What is more, it pointed out that no Brilliant Pebbles 
test had yet been successful.
159
  The administration and the prospects for SDI were not helped by 
another failed ERIS test on 22
nd
 October.
160
    
After conference in October 1992, Congress voted to appropriate $3.8b for SDI for fiscal 
year 1993, over $1.5b less than the Bush administration had asked for, and nearly $300m less than 
had been authorised.
161
  Although Bush and Cheney both threatened a veto if SDI was “not 
adequately funded” they made no real effort to see their threats through, realising that sufficient 
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domestic support for the programme simply did not exist, and deciding instead to focus their 
energies and attentions on other policy issues.
162
  As part of the defence budget, Congress cut 
funding for space-based research and development projects, included official language that made it 
clear that no BMD system should come into conflict with the ABM Treaty, and removed any 
pretence at a 1996 deployment date.
163
  Nevertheless, in mid-January Henry Cooper outlined his 
projected budget for the SDIO for the next five years, which envisaged spending $51b through 
fiscal year 1999, including vast sums on Brilliant Pebbles, which would include a $7b request for 
SDI in fiscal year 1994.
164
   
 
(3) Assessing the drivers of policy, 1989-1993 
Changes in the international system and the lack of credible technology explain the general loss of 
enthusiasm for missile defence during Bush’s presidency, and indeed some of the policy decisions 
that he made.  However, the particular rhythms of the debate between 1989 and 1993, along with 
many decisions crucial to the shape and components contained in the US BMD effort, can only be 
explained by looking at the interaction of competing domestic dynamics within this overarching 
context.  
 
International and technological factors 
The tumultuous changes in the international system between 1989 and 1993 go along way to 
explaining the gradual demise of the missile defence programme under George H. W. Bush.  The 
end of the Cold War and its replacement with an international environment where the US appeared 
to face no obvious threat meant that the SDI programme lost much of its strategic necessity.  In 
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addition to this, the demonstration of the threat from battlefield missile attack during the Gulf War 
was an equally important factor in establishing a bipartisan consensus for the need to develop and 
deploy battlefield missile defences to protect troops overseas.  The Gulf War was also a key reason 
for the surge in support for missile defence during 1991 that resulted in the Missile Defense Act.  
As a result, policy broadly reflected the changing international system during this period. 
Nevertheless, these systemic changes do not explain why Bush outlined a BMD plan that 
continued to prioritise a comprehensive defence against a large-scale attack, consisting of hundreds 
of ground and space-based assets, despite the collapse of the Soviet Union.  Neither does it explain 
why Bush pursued a system that would contravene the ABM Treaty and thus make further arms 
reductions with Russia and the safe transition of the Soviet Union, more complicated.  Moreover, 
systemic pressures do not explain why Bush and Congress remained wedded to very different 
conceptions of missile defence.  Perhaps above all, it does not explain why Bush’s BMD plans 
appeared to pay relatively little attention to the new threat to US troops on the battlefield from the 
proliferation of short-range missile technology demonstrated by the Gulf War.  Lastly, the changes 
in the international system do not explain why sufficient accord existed in 1991 for the 
establishment of the Missile Defense Act and a scaled down version of GPALS, but which had then 
disintegrated less than a year later. 
Some of these questions can be answered by looking at developments in technology during 
this period.  In particular, the desire on the part of the Bush administration to deploy a 
comprehensive missile defence system was undoubtedly driven by the promise and possibilities 
offered by Brilliant Pebbles.  Secondly, the initial reports about Patriot’s success in the Gulf War in 
early 1991 were a driving force behind the Congressional “basis for consensus” plan and the 1991 
Missile Defense Act.  In addition to this, continued test failures of components key to GPALS, and 
reports that Patriot’s performance was overstated, were central reasons why support for missile 
defence gradually fell away towards the end of this period. 
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 All the same, this still doesn’t explain why Bush continued to favour technologies that had 
not been proven to work, or that were destined to contravene the ABM Treaty.  Neither does it 
clarify why both Bush and Congress continued to have such different and competing notions of 
what type of technologies should and could be deployed.  Finally, it can say little about why both 
Bush and Congress (in 1991) were keen to push for early deployment of a system that was far from 
technologically viable.  At best, the overall performance of technology during Bush’s presidency 
suggests that the US should have continued a research and development programme, and worst it 
implies that any type of credible deployment remained years, if not decades away.  Consequently, 
neither developments in the international system, nor the particular capabilities of technology can 
fully explain what happened between 1989 and 1993. 
 
Domestic factors 
A fuller understanding of why policy evolved in the way it did during this period can only be 
gained from an examination of the domestic realm, and in particular of the actions and thinking of 
the president and Congress.  While the BMD debate evolved within the larger strategic context set 
by the international system and technology during this period, the specific rhythms of policy were 
essentially shaped by the different ideas and conceptions of missile defence held by Bush and 
Congress.  It would be the interplay between these actors, exacerbated by the partisan imbalance 
between the institutions, that would cause policy to fluctuate within the fluid boundaries set by 
technology and the international system. 
 The actions and thinking of George H. W. Bush were central to the evolution of policy 
during this period.  Bush’s BMD thinking, which in turn was shaped by SDIO Director Henry 
Cooper, largely explains why the US continued to pursue a missile defence plan that appeared at 
odds with both the developments in the international system and the current capabilities of 
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technology.
165
  Primarily, Bush’s BMD plans were a reflection of his cautious and pragmatic 
approach to policy.  First, because Bush wanted to ensure continued support from the right of the 
Republican Party and from those who had been loyal to Ronald Reagan, the president felt obliged to 
pursue a BMD policy not-too-far removed from that of his predecessor, and based upon the 
Strategic Defense Initiative.  This involved retaining complex technologies such as Brilliant 
Pebbles, and adopting a BMD deployment plan that was likely to contravene the ABM Treaty.  
Second, because Bush wanted to retain a hedge against an uncertain future, he saw a comprehensive 
missile defence plan as the best way to do this.  Again, this meant the deployment of a wide-ranging 
system likely to breach the ABM Treaty.  Moreover, the result of hedging against future 
developments naturally meant that GPALS was out of sync with the types of threats the US looked 
likely to face at the dawn of a new era.  Third, although Bush was not against the idea of deploying 
missile defences, the programme was never a priority for his administration, and never surpassed 
other policy concerns, particularly strategic arms reduction agreements with Moscow, which in turn 
were based on limiting BMD.  The result was a policy that reflected a balance of political objectives 
rather than a strategic programme in its own right, and this is partly why Bush’s thinking often 
appeared at odds with the international context and technological capabilities. 
 In spite of this, to understand why Bush was unable to achieve his desired aims – for Bush 
was certainly not anti-missile defence – explanations must take into account the importance of 
Democratic control of both the House and Senate throughout this period.  Quite simply, the partisan 
institutional divide meant that between 1989 and 1993, excluding 1991, Democratic control of 
Congress ensured that Bush’s BMD plans, especially anything that looked set to violate the ABM 
Treaty, were subject to very high levels of scrutiny, particularly in the House of Representatives.  
Part of the reason for this may have been that Bush continued to push for funding to please the right 
of the Republican Party in the confidence that Congress would block it, and that it would therefore 
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not undermine his wider agenda with Russia.  In this sense, the programme could be seen to move 
ahead incrementally for primarily domestic political reasons during this period.   
The impact of Congress on the evolution of policy during Bush’s presidency is perhaps 
nowhere better highlighted than by the developments of 1991.  The Persian Gulf War was a key 
moment in the development of BMD thinking during this period for two main reasons.  First, it 
highlighted the growth of a new threat from short-range missiles and WMD proliferation.  Second, 
the Patriot BMD system appeared to show how missile defences could work under real world 
conditions.  However, Bush and Congress interpreted the meaning of these events very differently – 
primarily because of their contradictory predispositions towards BMD – and this led to the 
development of two different conceptions of what type of system the US should be pursuing.  
Congress agreed upon a smaller-scale deployment plan compliant with the ABM Treaty, while the 
president continued to push for the comprehensive GPALS system.  This variance in opinion on 
how to move forward with BMD resulted in two different policies, and would become manifest in 
the unstable Missile Defense Act.  As a result, the Missile Defense Act itself – which reflected 
neither Bush’s plans, the international system or indeed current technological capabilities – was an 
explicit demonstration of the importance of domestic political factors in the evolution of the BMD 
debate during this period. 
 
Summary 
While changes in the international system and the capabilities of technology can explain the general 
trend of policy during this period, the evolution of the US missile defence programme was 
primarily shaped by domestic dynamics.  It is only through the different conceptions and 
understandings of missile defence held by Bush and a Democratically controlled Congress, and 
their attempts to use the programme for domestic political reasons, that an understanding of the 
particular rhythms of policy during the period can be obtained.  It was the conflicting pressures 
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forcing Bush to maintain a comprehensive BMD system, pitted against a legislature keen to 
scrutinise any BMD plan and ensure that it remained legal under the ABM Treaty, which led to the 
particular dynamics of this period.  In the words of Major Garrett:  
 Without a Republican majority in Congress – and because it did not take a strong stand on 
 such fundamental issues as the ABM Treaty – the Bush Administration was hamstrung in its 
 effort to push for a strong ballistic missile defense.
166
 
 
Conclusion 
During George H. W. Bush’s presidency, US ballistic missile defence thinking and policy changed 
substantially.  In some regards, these changes reflected the transformation in the international 
system, and in the type of threat that the US was likely to face.  To a lesser extent, it also reflected 
the limitations of technologies designed to defend against large-scale missile attack.  Nevertheless, 
neither systemic nor technological pressures can explain the particular evolution and shape of the 
programme during this period.  This is because a president and Congress with different ideas about 
the role that the programme should play in US security strategy, and with markedly different 
reasons for doing this, were the key factors shaping the US approach BMD.    
 The BMD debate evolved in the manner in which it did because of the thinking and actions 
of the Bush Administration and a Democratic controlled Congress.  Bush’s cautious nature, focus 
on arms cuts with the Soviet Union, and need to placate BMD advocates within his party, were a 
key reason why the administration continued to favour a comprehensive BMD system, but without 
necessarily giving it sufficient political backing.  This in turn meant that a Democratic controlled 
Congress, neither convinced of the wisdom, necessity or practicality of such an undertaking, would 
make substantial cuts to funding in 1989 and 1990.  Much the same was true in 1991, when Bush 
continued to push for a missile defence system unacceptable to Congress, despite lawmakers 
warming towards the idea of BMD in the aftermath of the Gulf War.  The compromise contained at 
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the heart of the Missile Defense Act of that year was a direct reflection of these competing domestic 
pressures, and of a perceived necessity on the part of Democrats not to look weak on defence.  
Lastly, in 1992, Bush simply wasn’t prepared to jeopardise post-Soviet stability in Russia and the 
prospects of further arms cuts by pushing Moscow on the issue of BMD.  Consequently, Congress 
would impose further limitations and budget cuts on the programme during Bush’s final year in 
office.  The result was that although Bush wanted to be “for” missile defence, he never provided the 
backing that the programme required to survive in the political context within which he was acting.  
As George H. W. Bush left office in January 1993, the US ballistic missile defence 
programme, particularly the Strategic Defense Initiative, appeared to be at a crossroads.  The 
tumultuous changes in the international system and the transformation of the position of the US 
within it had much to do with this.  The collapse of the Soviet Union and the rise of US 
“unipolarity” meant that the missile threat had receded substantially, while even the growing 
awareness of a new threat from short-range missiles was only in its early stages.  In addition to this, 
most of the technologies required for even rudimentary battlefield defences, let alone nationwide 
systems, appeared far from ready to be deployed.  As a result, regardless of who won the 1992 
presidential election, the future of any US missile defence effort beyond relatively minimal 
battlefield defences appeared uncertain, but still alive.
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Bill Clinton and the End of the Star Wars era, (1993-1997) 
 
Bill Clinton took office in January 1993 determined to reduce the defence budget, concentrate on 
domestic priorities, and recalibrate US defence policy to a newly emerging, and what he perceived 
to be a less threatening world order.  The new president was also known to view the ABM Treaty as 
integral to US-Russian nuclear arms cuts, as a key means to reinforce the Nuclear Non-Proliferation 
Treaty, and as a central plank of international stability.  With Democrats still in control of Congress, 
the Cold War standoff with Russia now just a memory, and with the United States emerging as the 
world’s preeminent power, there appeared little need to pursue extensive BMD programmes.  As a 
result, it was assumed that Clinton would reduce spending on ballistic missile defence and put an 
end to the Strategic Defense Initiative.   
 The evolution of US ballistic missile defence policy between 1993 and 1996 provides a 
fascinating example of how a president’s initial plans can change.  In early 1993, in line with his 
pre-election pledges, Clinton announced his determination to completely reorient the Strategic 
Defense Initiative and replace it with a plan that would emphasise theatre and battlefield missile 
defences, and research on systems that would not contravene the ABM Treaty.  In 1994 and 1995 
Clinton went even further, by explicitly reiterating his administration’s commitment to the ABM 
Treaty as the basis of relations with Russia, and making it clear that he did not intend to pursue any 
BMD policies that might undermine relations with Moscow.  However, despite this, in 1996 
Clinton announced that the US would be embarking upon a national missile defence development 
and deployment plan.  What makes this change in the debate particularly interesting is that, unlike 
during the Bush administration, very little had actually changed in the international system between 
1993 and 1996: no immediate new threat had emerged, Russia was subdued, and China was only 
just beginning its drive to modernity.  Neither did there appear to be any great push from 
technology.  Despite this, Clinton’s initial BMD policy agenda would be almost entirely reversed 
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by 1996, which meant that missile defence would become an even greater part of his policy agenda 
during his second term in office.   
This period produces several interesting questions.  First, why did Clinton unveil a national 
missile defence deployment plan in 1996, despite attempting to “kill” the programme in 1993, and 
focus on battlefield and theatre defences?  Second, why did Clinton’s 3+3 plan appear to reflect 
neither international systemic developments nor current levels of technology?  Third, why did 
Clinton’s BMD plans evolve in such a manner that they essentially appeared to undermine his wider 
foreign and domestic agendas?  In order to understand these questions it is necessary to look at the 
interplay between domestic, international and technological influences, and at how these combined 
to produce the complicated policy outcomes described above. 
 
(1) Competing pressures on BMD policy 
With the collapse of the Cold War confrontation with the Soviet Union, and the considerable 
reduction in the threat of missile attack that this produced, Bill Clinton assumed the presidency at a 
time when most Americans felt more secure than they had done for several generations.  In addition 
to this, Clinton entered office at a time when almost all faith in the viability of the Strategic Defense 
Initiative had disappeared, and very little in terms of missile defence technology looked close to 
being able to be deployed.  Finally, at least for the first two years of Clinton’s presidency, 
Democrats remained in control of Congress, and continued to be sceptical of pursuing anything 
other than battlefield defences.  All of these factors suggested that Clinton would have little 
difficulty in redirecting and recalibrating the US BMD programme to what he perceived to be a less 
threatening international environment.  
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International pressures on policymaking 
In 1993, the US appeared to be standing at the edge of a new era in international politics; the Soviet 
Union had collapsed leaving the United States as the world’s pre-eminent power, and any new 
ballistic missile threat appeared to be many years into the future, if at all.  The only real concern in 
Washington that might warrant some type of BMD effort was the growing proliferation of short-
range missile technology in unstable regions throughout the world, but this too remained limited.  In 
fact, the international system changed very little during Clinton’s first four years in office, 
particularly the ballistic missile threat to the US, which meant that as he campaigned for re-election 
in 1996, international systemic pressures on policy – notwithstanding the relationship with Russia 
and the ABM Treaty – remained relatively benign. 
 The primary international pressure on policymaking during this period remained the US 
relationship with Russia.  Although the Soviet Union had collapsed, and the two powers were 
ostensibly no longer enemies, this dynamic remained of paramount importance to BMD policy.  
The centrepiece of this relationship, especially for Russia, was the continued centrality of the Anti-
Ballistic Missile Treaty as the cornerstone of the new post-Cold War US-Russia relationship.
1
  The 
fact that Moscow made it clear that that the Treaty was the basis upon which any new arms 
reduction agreements would have to be based, further cemented its importance to Clinton’s strategy.  
With growing concerns in Washington about the stability of the Russian government, securing the 
enormous ex-Soviet nuclear and weapons stockpile also looked set to be a high priority during this 
period.
2
  
 The second important international dynamic influencing policy was the fact that after the 
1991 Gulf War there appeared to be no new and near-term missile threat to the United States.  
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While concern was certainly growing that  “rogue states” such as North Korea and Iraq may be 
pursuing WMD programmes, a new credible threat from this source – particularly to the US 
homeland – was thought to be many years away.  As a 1993 National Intelligence Estimate into the 
ballistic missile threat to the United States suggested: “only China and the CIS strategic forces 
currently have the capability to strike the continental US”, and that; “Available information shows 
the probability is low that any other country will acquire this capability during the next 15 years”.3  
Nevertheless, the bipartisan consensus about the need to protect troops in the battlefield from the 
growing threat of short-range missiles continued to gain traction during this period as more states in 
unstable regions across the globe appeared set on acquiring this capability.
4
 
 Internationally therefore this period is characterised by an overwhelming sense of security – 
particularly from ballistic missile attack – and the emergence of what appeared to be a more 
peaceful and stable international order.  Although the proliferation of short-range missile 
technology remained a concern, especially on the Korean peninsular, any new serious and credible 
threat to the US homeland seemed to be many years away.  As a result, throughout this period, most 
Americans rated the threat from ballistic missile attack as one of their lowest national security 
concerns.
5
 
 
Technological pressures on policymaking 
In early 1993, it looked like the Strategic Defense Initiative – even George H. W. Bush’s scaled 
down GPALS plan – had run its course.  Very few of the technologies that had been developed over 
the past decade had shown any possibility of near term deployment, and even the Patriot BMD 
system remained many years away from providing a credible defence against short-range missile 
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attack.  To put it simply, there was very little push from technology to suggest that anything could 
or should be deployed during this period.
6
 
 However, this is not to suggest that technology just stood still.  In many ways, this period 
saw the genesis of a number of new programmes with different capabilities, designed to counter the 
wide gamut of short-range and battlefield ballistic missile threats that planners believed the US 
might face in the future.  Although work would continue on a newer version of the ERIS ground-
based interceptor – designed to protect the US against long-range threats – the majority of time and 
funding would go into developing a new range of theatre and battlefield missile defence systems.  
Specifically, the US began to develop the Patriot system into a fully-fledged missile rather than air 
defence system, and introduced a range of programmes designed to combat short and regional 
missile threats.  These included the Terminal High Altitude Area Defence (THAAD), the Medium 
Extended Air Defence (MEADS), the Navy’s Standard Missile (SM) 3, and Upper and Lower Tier 
sea-based-BMD systems.
7
  Nevertheless, between 1993 and 1997, these systems predominantly 
remained in the research and development stage.  Actual testing of the THAAD system for 
example, was not scheduled to begin until the end of the decade.  As a result, and while the US 
continued to develop a range of BMD technologies, nothing – even Patriot – was near to being 
seriously considered for deployment during this period.
8
 
 The last vestiges of the Strategic Defense Initiative disappeared between 1993 and 1997, 
and were replaced by a range of new and theoretically less technologically complex BMD research 
and development programmes intended for battlefield rather than national defence.  This change in 
focus was driven in part by the complexities associated with constructing a national missile defence 
system, but this did not mean that any of these new battlefield programmes represented an easy 
                                                          
6
 For more on the status on the US BMD programme in 1993 see “Ballistic missile defense: evolution and current 
issues”, US General Accounting Office, (July 1993) 
7
 For more on the systems being developed between 1993 and 1996, see “Statement of Lieutenant General Malcolm R. 
O’Neill, USA, Ballistic Missile Defense Organization”, before the Committee on National Security, House of 
Representatives, (4
th
 April 1995) 
8
 Ibid 
Bill Clinton and the end of the Star Wars era 
 78 
solution.  In fact, during this period the US really had “nothing that looked likely to be deployable 
in the near future other than Patriot”.9 
  
Presidential policy agenda 
Bill Clinton had been clear about his views on missile defence during the 1992 presidential election 
campaign, and it was widely accepted that the programme would not be a top priority for his 
administration should he defeat the incumbent George H. W. Bush.
10
  Clinton was keen to reap the 
rewards of what he perceived to be a new and more peaceful era in US foreign relations, and this 
would involve a refocusing of US resources away from defence.  The president and many of those 
around him also appeared eager to reorient the US BMD programme to reflect the different 
pressures of what they perceived to be a more peaceful and stable international environment.  As a 
result, Clinton looked unlikely to continue the missile defence policies he had inherited from Bush. 
The first dynamic that would shape Clinton’s BMD strategy during his first term was his 
desire to make significant reductions in the US defence budget and to concentrate his time and 
energy on domestic issues.  Clinton had made it clear in 1992 that he was determined to redirect the 
“resources once dedicated to winning the Cold War towards fulfilling unmet domestic needs”, 
declaring that “now that the Cold War is won, we cannot leave those who won that victory out in 
the Cold”.11  Even in terms of foreign policy, Clinton seemed to believe that funding should be 
reallocated towards non-proliferation programmes and less “militaristic” approaches to international 
affairs, and envisaged cutting BMD funding to around $3-4b per year rather than the £7-8b 
proposed by the outgoing Bush administration.
12
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 The second factor underpinning Clinton’s thinking was his determination to secure a stable 
relationship with Russia.
13
  Foremost amongst this was the president’s desire to successfully ratify 
the START II Treaty, which he believed could be facilitated by maintaining the US commitment to 
the ABM Treaty.
14
  In addition to this, Clinton hoped to use progress in relations with Moscow to 
move forward on the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) and to reinforce the Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Treaty (NPT).  Both of these aims, he believed, were fundamentally contingent upon 
stable relations with Russia and continued adherence to the ABM Treaty.
15
  According to John 
Holum, the then Director of the US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Clinton was 
determined to ensure that US BMD plans remained compliant with the Treaty, and therefore that 
missile defence did not complicate his primary goal of arms reductions and stability with a 
transitional Russia.
16
 
Finally, Clinton’s thinking was influenced by his understanding of the type of threats that 
the US seemed likely to face in the post-Cold War world.  Above all, the administration’s policy 
was shaped by the fact that Clinton and many of those around him – but particularly his first 
Secretary of Defense Les Aspin (January 1993- February 1994) – believed that any new ballistic 
missile threat to the US homeland from any source, but particularly from rogue states, remained 
many years away.
17
  There was also a feeling within the administration that future threats to US 
security would not necessarily be from ballistic missile attack.
18
  Nevertheless, Clinton had been 
strongly influenced by the Gulf War, and was determined to recalibrate the missile defence 
programme to what he believed were the most pressing requirements, namely theatre and battlefield 
missile defences to counter short range and regional missile threats.  In fact, Clinton made this clear 
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shortly before entering office by declaring that the SDI programme should “be geared towards the 
real threats that we face today and are likely to face in the future, not the fevered rationalizations of 
a weapons program in search of a mission”.19  Nevertheless, Aspin’s replacement, Secretary of 
Defense William Perry, along with other members of the administration such as Undersecretary of 
Defense for Policy Walter Slocombe and Special Assistant for National Security Affairs Bob Bell, 
believed that if the US could build something against the rogue threat it was worth doing.
20
 
Clinton, along with some of his close advisers, was not against the idea of developing 
missile defences, and it was certainly his intention to push ahead with a range of tactical missile 
defence systems to protect troops on the battlefield, and even develop some capability for national 
defence should it be required in the future.  But at the same time, he remained staunchly committed 
to the logic of Mutual Assured Destruction and the ABM Treaty as the cornerstones of international 
security.
21
  As a result, Clinton set out to recalibrate, reorganise and downgrade the SDI programme 
and to make sure that it did not get in the way of his wider policy agenda. 
 
Congressional pressure on policymaking 
Attitudes towards ballistic missile defence remained split along party lines within Congress 
between 1993 and 1997, with both parties largely sticking to the positions and thinking that had 
developed during the 1980s and under George H. W. Bush.  A large number of Republican 
lawmakers remained committed to the goals of the Strategic Defense Initiative, or at least to the 
notion of deploying ballistic missile defences as soon as possible, while most Democrats remained 
cautious and sceptical of the need for such grandiose schemes, but at the same time not against 
continued work on battlefield missile defences.
22
  As a result, the composition and dominant party 
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in Congress would again shape the amount and type of pressure that lawmakers would bring to bear 
on policy during this period.  
 For the first two years of Clinton’s presidency the Democrats remained in control of both 
Houses of Congress, which meant that there was very little push for BMD, or indeed resistance to 
the president’s plans to cut the programme back and restructure it.  In fact, much of the enthusiasm 
for even a limited missile defence system had melted away within the Democratic party by 1993, as 
lawmakers saw very little need for such a system in the post-Cold War and post-Gulf War world.  
Democrats simply could not see any reason why the US needed to pursue any type of large-scale 
BMD programme, and continued to view the ABM Treaty as the cornerstone not just of the new 
relationship with Russia, but also as the basis for stability in a new and changed global 
environment.
23
  Even Republican lawmakers seemed far less enthusiastic about BMD than they had 
been under Reagan and Bush, leaving only a few Congressmen and a small group BMD advocates 
in right-leaning think tanks in Washington DC, publicly pushing for a larger missile defence effort 
in 1993.
24
  The result was that during 1993 and 1994 Congress largely went along with the funding 
cuts and recalibration of the US missile defence effort instigated by Clinton. 
 This all changed in late 1994 as the Republican Party won control of both Houses of 
Congress for the first time in a generation, and set about implementing their Contract with 
America.
25
  Although the Contract consisted primarily of domestic legislation – reflecting the 
conservative nature of the new Republican leadership – it also included a commitment to deploy a 
national missile defence system as soon as possible.
26
  Consequently, Republicans in Congress – led 
by Newt Gingrich (R-GA) – began to exert far more pressure on policy, and pushed for more 
funding for BMD and a legally binding commitment to deploy both national and theatre missile 
defence systems at the earliest possible date.  Republican leaders called for a “cost effective, 
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operational antiballistic missile defense system as early as possible”, and declared the ABM Treaty 
to be “a Cold War relic that does not meet the future defense requirements of the United States.”27  
Although not all Republicans were behind this push – fiscal Republicans concerned about the cost 
of such a move remained highly sceptical, and Democrats continued their opposition to such plans 
in general – Congress, in alliance with think tanks such as the Heritage Foundation and Center for 
Security Policy, would exert considerable pressure and influence on policy during 1995 and 1996.
28
   
 Congressional pressure on policymaking during this period was overwhelmingly shaped by 
two key variables; (1) the split between Republican and Democratic Party lawmakers over BMD 
policy, and; (2) the change in control of Congress in late 1994.  As a result, for the first two years of 
this period a Democratically controlled Congress exerted relatively little pressure on BMD policy 
and was content to let the programme be recalibrated and downgraded.  However, after the 
Republican Party took control of Congress following the 1994 mid-term elections, this policy was 
reversed as the Republicans began to push for higher funding and a commitment to near term 
deployment.  The Republican takeover of Congress therefore represented a significant break in 
Congressional policy that had remained largely against a large-scale missile defence effort since 
1989.
29
 
 
(2) The evolution of policy, 1993-1997 
In terms of the international system, the years between 1993 and 1997 were relatively benign.  As a 
result, with the Cold War now safely relegated to history, the American public looked forward to 
reaping the benefits of a stable and more peaceful world order.  With relatively little support for any 
large scale defence spending – especially on ballistic missile defence – America voted for a 
president in 1993 promising to put the economy first.  In this new era, it appeared that the grandiose 
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BMD plans of Ronald Reagan and George H. W. Bush would be modified and downgraded to 
reflect the exigencies of this new international and domestic political context.   
 
1993 and 1994: Restructuring the US missile defence effort 
As Bill Clinton took office, he made it clear that his administration was intent on substantially 
recalibrating and reorganising the US ballistic missile defence effort.  In particular, the new 
president announced that he no longer saw the need to retain a substantial strategic defence 
programme, and that missile defence resources would be reduced and redirected towards the threats 
that he believed were “here and now”.30  Subsequently, Clinton would embark on a two-pronged 
strategy at the start of 1993 that would combine BMD budget cuts and a recalibration of the SDIO 
domestically, with a different approach to Russia and the ABM Treaty internationally. 
The first component of this new approach to missile defence would be a significant 
alteration of policy domestically, and the Clinton administration made it clear very early in 1993 
that the BMD plans outlined by George H. W. Bush would not be continued.  In fact, Clinton had 
clearly made this point in his 1992 campaign booklet: 
 We should focus our research and development on the goal of a limited missile defense 
 system with the strict framework of the ABM Treaty.  Deployment of a massive space-based 
 defense, such as Brilliant Pebbles, is not necessary.
31
 
To this end, the administration initiated a comprehensive review of US national security strategy for 
the post-Cold War era, known as the “Bottom up Review”, which was intended to form the basis of 
the administration’s defence policy for the rest of Clinton’s presidency.  One of the most notable 
and immediate impacts of the Review was the recommendation that missile defence funding should 
be slashed and recalibrated as part of a broader planned reduction in US defence spending.  
Specifically, the Review recommended that no more than $16.9b in total would be required for 
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missile defence research and development over the next five years, with only $3b needed for 
strategic and national missile defence programmes.
32
  In light of this, Secretary of Defense Les 
Aspin – who one senior Congressional official described as “looking hard for a post-Cold War 
peace dividend” as he entered office33 – made it clear to SDIO Director Henry Cooper that as well 
as needing to rethink the SDI programme in light of these cuts, the highest priority in development 
should now be placed on theatre and battlefield missile defence systems.
34
  To ensure these new 
plans were adhered to, Lt. General Malcolm O’Neill would replace Henry Cooper at the SDIO in 
January 1993. 
Perhaps the most symbolic of the changes instigated by the Clinton administration in early 
1993 was the decision to replace the SDIO with a new organisation more in tune with the revamped 
missile defence and national security plans.  The new “Ballistic Missile Defense Organization” 
(BMDO)
35
 would not report directly to the Secretary of Defense – as the SDIO had done – and 
would be organised to reflect the growing short-range and regional missile threat, and not that of a 
more sophisticated or accidental strike from a major strategic competitor.
36
  Secretary of Defense 
Aspin declared that this decision was necessary because “the fate of Star Wars had been sealed by 
the end of the Cold War” and because “10 years after SDI had been announced the US has a very 
different need for ballistic missile defense” and in particular that “Saddam Hussein and the Scud 
missile showed us that we need BMD for our forces in the field”.37  Consequently, the BMDO 
would be set up to prioritise the development of theatre and battlefield missile defence systems, and 
would represent a complete reorientation of the nation’s missile defence effort.  Under the BMDO, 
70% of future funding would go on TMD, 25% on NMD, and 5% on research and development for 
advanced BMD concepts, meaning that work on strategic missile defence would be downgraded 
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into a basic technology readiness programme.
38
  In light of this, the Clinton administration 
requested $3.8b for BMD in the forthcoming year, including an increase of 60% for tactical and 
battlefield missile defence programmes, and slashed funding for space-based weapons such as 
Brilliant Pebbles.
39
 
 The second half of the Clinton administration’s BMD plan would involve a recalibration of 
policy internationally, more specifically, in the US’s approach to Russia and towards the ABM 
Treaty.  Unlike his predecessor, Clinton had no intention of amending or scrapping the ABM 
Treaty; instead, he strove to make it clear that the Treaty remained the cornerstone of US strategic 
policy and of US-Russian relations.
40
  Clinton firmly believed that his extensive agenda of proposed 
arms cuts – in particular further strategic arms reductions agreements with Russia – were highly 
contingent on international stability, and particularly on Russian trust and acquiescence.  As a 
result, soon after taking office Clinton cancelled the Ross-Mamedov talks on ABM Treaty 
amendments and BMD cooperation that had begun a year earlier, and rejected a Russian proposal to 
establish a joint BMD early warning centre.  In addition to this, Clinton also officially dropped the 
proposals made by the Bush administration to the Standing Consultative Commission on the ABM 
Treaty in Geneva for ABM Treaty amendments.
41
  In a further concession to Russia, and in another 
succinct expression of its BMD priorities, the Clinton administration officially repudiated the 
“broad interpretation” of the 1972 ABM Treaty proposed by Ronald Reagan in 1985, and agreed 
not to test or deploy any strategic sea-based, air-based, mobile land based or space based missile 
defence systems and components.
42
  In essence, Clinton was more than happy to pay the price of 
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not fully developing his preferred range of TMD systems if it meant securing Russian acquiescence 
on other priorities.
43
 
However, the president was keen to see whether some of his preferred TMD systems could 
be accommodated under the Treaty, and therefore proposed to switch the focus of the Treaty’s 
Standing Consultative Committee in Geneva from the possibility of BMD cooperation and 
amendments, to Treaty demarcation.
44
  In practical terms, Clinton was keen to discuss whether the 
Treaty might be clarified to allow for development and deployment of various theatre missile 
defence systems to cope with the growing threat of short-range missile attack by “rogue states”.  
Although the pursuit of theatre missile defences was not prohibited under the 1972 Treaty, Clinton 
was determined not to embark upon any BMD development that might be seen to contravene the 
rather vague wording in the Treaty regarding demarcation between what constituted “strategic” or 
“non-strategic” BMD systems.45   
The dual approach of not pushing for “modification” in return for “clarification” of the 
Treaty, formulated by Special Assistant for National Security Affairs, Defense and Arms Control 
Robert Bell, and codified in Presidential Decision Directive 17 (PDD-17) in December 1993, would 
become known as the “Grand Bargain”.46  The Grand Bargain would essentially institutionalise 
Clinton’s approach to BMD and ensure that US missile defence plans would remain limited in the 
future, and by doing this, remove a possible cause of Russian intransigence to further arms 
reduction deals.  As part of this policy, Clinton also agreed to recognise the Soviet successor states 
as additional members of the agreement, strengthening Russia’s hand in further ABM Treaty 
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negotiations.
47
  As Michael Krepon pointed out at the time, “By steering a sensible course President 
Clinton can have both an effective theatre missile defence and deeper cuts in nuclear weapons”.48   
  
Talks about reaching an ABM Treaty demarcation agreement began in November 1993 with the US 
delegation seeking to clarify what was and wasn’t legal under the Treaty.  US negotiators were keen 
to push for the acceptance of any system that had no demonstrated capability to intercept a target 
missile moving faster than 5kmp/s,
49
 while their Russian counterparts were staunchly opposed to 
anything that might appear to have a limited strategic capacity.
50
  Consequently, in early 1994, the 
Russians suggested that in addition to US proposals, a 3kmp/s limitation should be placed on 
interceptor missiles, and that the range of the target missile should be no more than 3500kms.
51
  
Although this would allow for THAAD, Patriot and the Navy’s Lower Tier system, the US 
delegation were concerned that such a demarcation would prevent the development of several other 
important projects.
52
   
 In early March 1994, Clinton’s room for manoeuvre in these talks was significantly 
encumbered by all 44 Republican Senators as they urged the president to resist any restrictions on 
missile defence systems underneath the administration’s original proposal, and stressed that any 
agreement must be submitted to the Senate for approval.  With this in mind, during a meeting in 
Moscow on 11
th 
- 13
th
 July 1994, US negotiators presented the Russian delegation with an updated 
proposal that would accept a 3kmp/s limit on both land and lower tier sea-based systems, but would 
also retain the possibility of conducting six flight tests a year of interceptors travelling at 4-
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4.5kmp/s.
53
  In August, the Russian delegation accepted the 3kmp/s limitation but continued to 
restrict anything that travelled at a higher speed.  However, despite the lack of progress on 
demarcation, and consequently in beginning testing and development of the administration’s 
favoured TMD systems, Clinton and Yeltsin issued a joint statement confirming the sanctity of the 
ABM Treaty in September 1994.
54
 
At the same time as Clinton was recalibrating US ballistic missile defence policy at home 
and abroad, Congress was pushing for even bigger cuts in the missile defence budget.  The 
Democrats had retained control of both houses of Congress in the 1992 elections, and there was 
little to suggest that the party’s previous dislike of BMD, or belief in the importance of the ABM 
Treaty, had changed.  Much like President Clinton, the Democratic controlled Congress was keen to 
reduce the defence budget and recalibrate US national security policy to what it perceived to be a 
new and less threatening environment.  Democrats in Congress were equally keen to continue 
working towards further arms reductions with Russia – a goal which they believed was highly 
contingent on retaining the centrality and credibility of MAD and the ABM Treaty – to ensure the 
safety of the vast ex-Soviet nuclear stockpile.
55
  Consequently, Clinton’s reorganisation of the 
American BMD programme met with little resistance in Congress; Democrats were pleased that the 
ABM Treaty would remain “the cornerstone of US strategic thinking”, while even BMD advocates 
in the Republican Party, with little threat upon which to base any objection, were relatively 
acquiescent.
56
  As a result, by the end of 1993 Congress had voted to reduce Clinton’s first BMD 
budget request by nearly $1b to $2.6b, of which $1.5b would be for theatre missile defence systems, 
and just $650m for research into strategic defences.  Congress also included language in the Bill 
officially repudiating the 1996 national missile defence deployment goal contained in the 1991 
Missile Defense Act, and made half of the research funds for the programme contingent upon an 
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ongoing review into the compliance of various systems with the ABM Treaty.
57
  Clinton signed this 
Bill into law with little complaint.
58
   
One of the main reasons Congress voted for such large cuts in Clinton’s BMD request in 
1993 was because lawmakers simply not did feel that the threat of missile attack justified significant 
funding for anything other than the low-key effort proposed by the president.  Russia was no longer 
considered to be a strategic adversary, while substantial progress was being made through the 
Nunn-Lugar initiative and other agreements to reduce any threat of accidental attack or proliferation 
from the former Soviet Union.
59
  What is more, Congress felt that after the 1991 Gulf War, only 
North Korea presented a serious threat, but while tensions did arise in mid 1994 over Pyongyang’s 
suspected nuclear programme
60
, it was felt that a mix of diplomacy and sanctions could counter this 
threat.
61
  Moreover, the administration felt that it would have ample time to respond should any new 
strategic missile threat emerge.  This feeling of security was reiterated in late 1993 as the CIA 
released its latest National Intelligence Estimate into the ballistic missile threat to the United States.  
The Estimate suggested that “only China and the CIS strategic forces currently have the capability 
to strike the continental US”, and that; “Available information shows the probability is low that any 
other country will acquire this capability during the next 15 years”.62  The Estimate also went on to 
suggest that the missile programmes that were currently underway in much of the third world were 
primarily regional and defensive in nature.
63
  While this had a significant impact on the Clinton 
administration – in a sense, seeming to validate its restructuring of BMD – it also had a profound 
influence on lawmakers, particularly Democrats in Congress, who remained intent on limiting any 
costly NMD development.  The result was that the Clinton administration’s $3.25b BMD budget 
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request – of which $2b was designated for theatre and battlefield defences – would meet significant 
resistance in Congress.
64
  In fact, by September, Congress had voted $2.8b for BMD, $400m less 
than Clinton had requested, but meeting the $2b requested for TMD programmes.
65
  In addition to 
this, language had been included making it clear that any substantive change in the ABM Treaty 
would require Senate approval, and that funds would be restricted for any BMD activities 
considered inconsistent with the “traditional” interpretation of the Treaty.66 
 During 1993 and 1994, the US BMD effort was comprehensively restructured and 
recalibrated to meet the perceived necessities and realities of a new era.  Funding was cut, priorities 
were altered, and while support remained for ABM Treaty compliant TMD programmes such as 
Patriot and THAAD, neither Clinton nor Congress was interested in pushing for strategic defences.  
The reason for this was the Clinton administration’s determination to reorganise the US BMD effort 
to meet what it perceived to be the real threats of the post-Cold War era, and because the ABM 
Treaty was viewed as the primary vehicle for international stability and for further Russian arms 
reductions.  With Democratic lawmakers in Congress equally keen to reduce BMD funding and to 
maintain the ABM Treaty as the cornerstone of strategic stability, and who felt that current threats 
did not justify anything more than what Clinton was proposing, support and interest in missile 
defence gradually eroded. 
 
1995: The Republican challenge in Congress 
Although support for national missile defence had never really gone away amongst conservative 
think tanks, large defence contractors, and small groups within Congress, there was limited 
enthusiasm for a revived NMD push in Congress or the White House during 1993 and 1994.  The 
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renewed Republican drive for national missile defence would instead originate amongst a small but 
vocal group of conservative activists coordinated by the Heritage Foundation, including former 
SDIO Directors Henry Cooper and James Abrahamson and Center for Security Policy founder 
Frank Gaffney, and would formally begin with the establishment of the “Coalition to Defend 
America” in mid 1994.67  The Coalition, which was composed of Republican Congressman, retired 
members of the US military and many officials from the Reagan administration, launched a radio 
and television advertising campaign around the need to revive the nation’s quest for a national 
missile defence, and successfully persuaded 193 Republican Congressional candidates to sign a 
pledge to revive NMD.
68
  This group, but particularly Gaffney, managed to convince the 
Republican Party leadership to include the deployment of a national missile defence as part of their 
Contract with America: highlighting its utility both as a galvanising conservative strategy and 
useful weapon to attack the incumbent Clinton administration.
69
  As a result, the idea gained 
traction with Republican leaders such as Newt Gingrich (R-GA) during 1994, as strategists sought 
to use BMD at least in part as an important weapon with which to attack Clinton on defence and 
security in the forthcoming presidential election.
70
  According one senior official, the Republican 
Party adopted the policy largely because they felt that they needed a “military plank to the Contract, 
and missile defence was virtually the only defence or military platform that the Republican Party 
leadership could agree on”.71   
The Republican Party fought the 1994 election on a range of policies contained in their 
Contract with America manifesto.
72
  The National Security Restoration Act, the sixth plank of the 
Contract, and the only one not dealing with domestic policy, set as its objective to “rapidly provide 
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the American people, United States Forces, and United States allies with a capable defense against 
missile attacks”.73  It went on to state that:   
 It shall be the priority of the United States to deploy at the earliest possible moment an 
 antiballistic missile system that is capable of providing a highly effective defense of the 
 United States against ballistic missile attacks … and provide at the earliest possible moment 
 highly effective theatre missile defenses to forward deployed and expeditionary elements of 
 the Armed Forces of the United States and to friendly forces and allies of the United 
 States.
74
 
However, and although a consensus had formed around developing TMD, not all Congressional 
Republicans thought that the resurrection of a commitment to NMD was worth the price, and many 
remained staunchly devoted to the core principles of cutting taxes and balancing the budget 
contained in the Contract.
75
  Outside of Congress, the reaction to the “Republican revolution” was 
equally mixed.  Many national editorial writers were critical of the “revival of Star wars”,76 while 
polls conducted at the time suggested that public opinion found increased defence spending to be 
the least compelling plank of the Republican manifesto.
77
  Democrats in Congress – who had little 
problem with the provision in the proposed Bill to implement advanced theatre missile defences –
remained firmly against an expanded NMD deployment programme and particularly against 
contravening the ABM Treaty.  Democrats also struck a popular chord with voters by branding an 
accelerated NMD programme as strategically unnecessary and a waste of billions of dollars.
78
 
 
In late 1994, the rejuvenated Republican Party won both Houses of Congress for the first time in 
over 40 years, and the new Republican leadership wasted little time in bringing pressure to bear on 
President Clinton.  Within weeks of taking office, Newt Gingrich (R-GA) and other Republican 
House leaders sent Clinton a letter outlining their intention to block any negotiations with Russia 
that might preclude accelerated development and deployment of a national or advanced theatre 
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missile defences, and made it clear that they did not support Clinton’s approach to Russia and the 
ABM Treaty.  Clinton replied a few weeks later: 
 The administration is firmly committed to two fundamental objectives in the area of missile 
 defenses.  First, we believe it is critical to preserve the ABM Treaty.  This important Treaty 
 remains the cornerstone of US security policy and our new relationship with Russia.  
 Second, we are committed to deploying highly effective theatre missile defence systems.
79
  
Nevertheless, the Republicans were determined to challenge virtually every aspect of the Clinton 
administration’s policy on BMD, and replied by urging the president to cease all attempts to abide 
by or modify the ABM Treaty, pending a review by a Congressional select committee.
80
   
The Republican leadership also wasted little time in introducing a missile defence Bill into 
the House of Representatives, calling for the deployment of a ground-based, multi-site national 
missile defence system by 2003.
81
  However, the new legislation immediately came under fire from 
Democrats in the House, with Congressman John Spratt (D-SC) proposing a successful amendment 
to the Bill by forcing the House to choose between funding NMD and funding military readiness 
(including TMD).  Presented with this choice two-dozen House Republicans crossed party lines to 
vote for it.
82
  After much debate, the final version of the House Bill placed NMD as a third priority 
for the BMDO, and although continuing to order deployment “as soon as practicable” was quick to 
say this would be “subject to the availability of funding”.83  This omission was one of the rare 
occasions when a provision from the Contract didn’t make it onto the floor of the House in the first 
100 days of the new Congress.
84
  One of the reasons for this, as David Morrison had presciently 
suggested at the time, was because a small group of Republican deficit hawks were not convinced 
of the financial prudence of a large-scale BMD programme, joined with Democrats to stall the 
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renewed drive to deploy.
85
  In fact, even Newt Gingrich had earlier declared: “I’m a hawk – but a 
cheap hawk”.86 
 Nonetheless, in May 1995 the House National Security Committee (formerly the Armed 
Services Committee)
87
 voted to increase Clinton’s $2.9b BMD budget request by $628m, with a 
large proportion of these extra funds ($550m) going towards NMD, but refrained from including 
language committing the nation to deployment.
88
  After a Democratic amendment that would have 
redirected the $628m to housing allowances for soldiers narrowly failed, the Bill sent to the Senate 
still upheld that “it is the policy of the United States to deploy at the earliest possible date … a 
national missile defense system”. 89  As this was playing out in the House, Senator Strom Thurmond 
(R-SC) introduced the National Security Revitalization Act in the Senate, and by the end of June the 
Senate Armed Services Committee had declared it the policy of the United States to deploy multiple 
site national missile defences by 2003; arbitrarily and unilaterally declared that theatre missile 
defences were permitted under the ABM Treaty, and attempted to ban the Clinton administration 
from negotiating with Russia over demarcation.  The Committee also added $500m to the 
administration’s original budget request.90   
After numerous proposed Democratic amendments were narrowly defeated, thanks in part to 
a call from Senator Bob Dole (R-S) that “all Republicans hold firm”, Senator Carl Levin (D-MI) 
threatened a Democratic filibuster on the Senate floor.
91
  Facing the prospect that the entire Bill 
would stall, a group of moderate Senators in the Armed Services Committee decided to put together 
a compromise package that would be considered when the Senate reconvened in September 1995.  
In a move reminiscent of the 1991 basis for consensus plan, Republicans John Warner (R-VA) and 
William Cohen (R-ME), and Democrats Sam Nunn (D-GA) and Carl Levin (D-MI), put together a 
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middle-ground plan that would mandate development not deployment of a national missile defence 
system.
92
  However, House Republicans rejected this new Senate proposal in conference, and 
restored the original language.
93
  In a further effort to force the Clinton administration to change its 
BMD policy, 16 Senate Republicans sent the president a letter during December criticising him for 
his failure to move ahead with NMD.
94
   
 
The Clinton administration had spent much of 1994 focussing on ABM Treaty demarcations with 
Russia, and by May 1995 had come to an agreement on lower velocity TMD systems.  The 
demarcation would not permit interceptors travelling faster than 3kmp/s or their testing against 
target missiles travelling at over 5kmp/s and a range of over 3500km.  This would allow for the 
development of THAAD, Patriot and the Navy’s Lower Tier System, and as a result, the Clinton 
administration no longer appeared to be in a rush to negotiate further ABM Treaty demarcations on 
higher velocity systems.
95
  At the same time, the administration had also spent a significant amount 
of time defending its $2.9b BMD budget request, and making it clear to Congress that it would not 
accept any major changes to BMD policy, especially not Congressional provisions to deploy NMD.  
With this in mind, Clinton ordered the BMDO to continue with its NMD “technology readiness 
programme”, which would provide a hedge against the emergence of a future ballistic missile threat 
to the US homeland, but would wait for that threat to emerge before beginning deployment or 
deciding exactly what to do.
96
   
 It was in this context that Secretary of Defence William Perry  (February 1994 – January 
1997) would send a letter to Senator Tom Daschle (D-SD) making it clear that the Clinton 
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administration would fight any new push to force construction of NMD.
97
  Perry’s letter took 
particular issue with the 1995 Defense Authorization Bill: 
 The Bill in its current form continues to contain objectionable provisions that raise serious 
 constitutional issues and unduly restrains our ability to execute our national security and 
 foreign policy responsibilities.
98
 
In particular, he suggested that the provision for NMD was a “needless waste of billions of dollars’” 
that would “lock into a specific technological option that may become redundant as the threat 
arises”, and would require “multi-sites that would mean collision” with the ABM Treaty.99  As a 
result, when it came to him to sign, Clinton vetoed the Bill, later saying that: 
I felt I had to do it because it mandated the complete deployment of a national missile 
 defence system by 2003, well before a workable system could be developed or would be 
 needed, moreover such an action would violate our commitments under the ABM Treaty 
 and jeopardize Russia’s implementation of START I … [he went on the say that] no 
 responsible president, Republican or Democrat could have allowed that defence bill to 
 become law.
100
 
Ultimately in order to get the Bill passed, lawmakers removed the language mandating deployment 
and settled for doubling the administration’s request for NMD from $371m to $745m.101 
 Although renewed drive was provided for NMD by the Republican leadership in Congress, 
this pressure was not enough to push the Clinton administration into making any substantial 
changes to BMD strategy during 1995.  The primary reason for this was that there didn’t seem to be 
any threat that justified spending vast amounts of money on a substantial NMD programme, or give 
reason for deploying anything other than what the Clinton administration was proposing.  Of equal 
importance was the fact that some fiscally conservative Republicans, particularly in the House, 
were determined to reduce taxes and balance the defence budget, and therefore simply couldn’t 
countenance a vast new BMD spending plan.  What is more, the Democratic leadership in Congress 
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remained firmly behind Clinton, and seeing no need to rush ahead with NMD, continued to view 
the ABM Treaty as the cornerstone of national security.     
 
1996: Clinton’s 3+3 plan 
At the start of 1996, the Republican Party leadership remained keen to push the Clinton 
administration to commit to deploying a national missile defence system, at least partly because 
they believed it could be an important issue in the forthcoming presidential elections.
102
  Republican 
presidential candidate Senator Bob Dole (R-KS) in particular, appeared determined to use the issue 
of BMD to attack the Clinton administration as being weak on defence and thus to provide a natural 
wedge issue in the approaching election.
103
  For Dole and other leading Republicans, the issue of 
NMD appeared to have three main strengths; firstly, it provided an issue with which to differentiate 
presidential candidate Bob Dole and the Republicans from Clinton, especially as both retained 
similar views about America’s more general role in the world; secondly, because NMD would be a 
productive issue with which to the make Clinton look weak on defence policy; and, thirdly it was an 
issue around which most Republicans could gather.
104
  In fact, national security analyst at the 
Federation of American Scientists John Pike suggested that the “primary purpose [of the 
Republican push for BMD] was to create a campaign sound bite that Clinton was unwilling to 
‘defend America”’.105  Nevertheless, Dole spoke effusively about the threat from North Korea, 
which he described as being “armed to the teeth”, and also argued that America remained 
defenceless not because “America is lacking in technological knowhow”, but because it is “lacking 
the presidential leadership to get it done”.106 
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Dole and Gingrich introduced their respective Defend America Bill’s, calling for the 
deployment of a national missile defence system (able to protect all 50 states, including Alaska and 
Hawaii) by 2003, into the Senate and House in early 1995.
107
  The legislation called for additional 
sea, space and land based capabilities to be added later, and insisted on immediate negotiations to 
amend the ABM Treaty.
108
  The intent was to be able to protect against not just a few missiles 
launched from a rogue state, but also from a possible unauthorised or accidental missile launch 
from a major nuclear power with anything up to 200 warheads.
109
  Although the Bill did not 
stipulate instant withdrawal from the ABM Treaty, it made it clear that if negotiations did not 
produce a result within a year, Congress and the White House should hold consultations about 
withdrawing.
110
  Dole described the act as “one of the key defining pieces of legislation that 
Congress will consider this year” and that “missile defense must be America’s top priority”, while 
Gingrich declared it “the most important national defense debate since [Winston] Churchill argued 
for building radar”.111  Despite the fact that public opinion polls continued to suggest that very few 
voters cared much about missile defence,
112
 by spring 1996, both the Senate and House Armed 
Services Committees had approved the Defend America Bill.
113
  A fundamental reason for this 
support was the belief that the legislation would trigger another veto from Clinton, and would 
therefore provoke confrontation during the forthcoming presidential campaign.  In this sense, it was 
as much Republican Party politics as it was the sincere desire of Republican lawmakers to deploy a 
national missile defence that drove the legislation forward in 1996.
114
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Clinton described Dole’s BMD stance as “not only unnecessary” but also potentially 
“harmful to our broader national defense interests” because it would “divert vital defense funds 
from other more pressing needs”.115  He went on to portray the Defend America Bill as “imprudent 
and dangerous” because it would “force the Pentagon to commit prematurely to a technological 
option that maybe outdated when the threat emerges”.  Above all Clinton argued, this would “put at 
risk continued Russian implementation of START I and START II”.116  In a speech during June 
1996, Dole referred to Clinton’s continued opposition to deploying a national missile defence as 
“one of the most negligent, short-sighted, irresponsible and catastrophic policies in history.”117  
However, before the Defend America Bill was to be debated in Congress, a report from the 
Congressional Budget Office (CBO) into the potential cost of Dole’s plan severely undermined 
support for NMD in Congress, and ultimately caused the Republican candidate to drop the Bill.  
The CBO estimate suggested that it could cost anything up to $60b to implement the provisions 
contained in the “Defend America Bill”, and that this did not include costs that would need to be 
paid each year in order to keep the defence functioning after the initial deployment.
118
  This was 
nearly 12 times what leading Republicans had originally suggested that the system would cost.
119
  
The impact was considerable; many freshman Republicans in the House, particularly fiscal 
conservatives committed to balancing the budget and cutting defence spending were “spooked”, 
while in the Senate the estimate made sure that Republicans were unable to muster enough support 
to overcome a Democratic filibuster.
120
  Although in mid-July 40 Congressional Republicans filed a 
lawsuit against President Clinton and Secretary of Defense Perry accusing them of “disregarding 
Congresses intent on missile defence policy”, and attempted to force the administration to move 
more quickly towards developing missile defences, Republican leaders decided to withdraw the Bill 
from Congress entirely during the Party caucus in August, and Bob Dole hardly mentioned BMD 
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again during the run up to the 1996 presidential election.
121
  In the words of Joseph Cirincione – 
president of the Ploughshares Fund: 
 Faced with united Democrats, divided Republicans, military opposition, budget pressures, 
 and a sceptical public, Senate and House supporters of “Defend America” conceded 
 defeat.
122
 
  
The battle raging between Democrats and Republicans and between Dole and Clinton was also 
being shaped and driven by conflicting assessments of the missile threat facing the US.  In 
particular, debate was becoming centred on the conclusion of the latest National Intelligence 
Estimate in into the ballistic missile threat facing the US.  The main conclusion of the Report, 
which was released in late 1995, was that: 
 No country other than the major declared nuclear powers will develop or otherwise acquire 
 a ballistic missile in the next 15 years that could threaten the contiguous 48 states and 
 Canada.
123
 
The Estimate went on to suggest that US intelligence would “detect any indigenous long-range 
ballistic missile program many years before deployment”, and that unauthorised or accidental 
missile launches remained only a remote possibility.
124
  Although the estimate was welcomed by 
Democrats in Congress – who saw no strategic reason or necessity to waste money trying to address 
a threat which didn't exist – it came under strong attack from Republicans in Congress, with 
Congressman Curt Weldon (R-PA) describing the NIE as “a political document drafted to support 
the Clinton administration’s views on BMD”.125  Clinton saw the document as vindication of his 
policy, and reiterated his commitment not to spend vast amounts of money on a NMD system that 
could be either unnecessary if the threat failed to materialise, or technologically or strategically 
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obsolete if and when in did.  Consequently, Clinton requested $2.8b for BMD in fiscal year 1997 - 
$643m less than the previous year.
126
 
Nevertheless, after several months spent studying different options for an expanded missile 
defence programme – primarily in response to the pressure from Congress – in the spring of 1996 
the Pentagon announced a stepped-up effort to develop a national missile defence system for the US 
homeland.
127
  The 3+3 plan, which would be different from both GPALS and Bob Dole’s Defend 
America proposal, would replace the current “technology development scheme” with a deployment 
programme.
128
  Under the new plan, the Pentagon would conduct NMD research and development 
for three years beginning in fiscal year 1997 after which a deployment decision would be made in 
June 2000.  If Clinton then judged that the continued existence of a rogue state threat and the US 
ability to field an effective limited NMD necessitated and allowed for it, then he would push ahead 
with deployment beginning in 2003.
129
  The plan was therefore designed to provide a hedge against 
the emergence of a future long-range missile threat but also allow Clinton to help blunt the 
Republican BMD attack.
130
  It also ensured that the administration would have the best technology 
available if-and-when a new strategic threat emerged, without putting at risk continued strategic 
arms reductions with Russia.
131
  In the words of Undersecretary of Defense for Policy Walt 
Slocombe: 
With the 3+3 plan, we would always be in a position to deploy something within the 
 timeframe of threat development.  E.g., Iran was not suddenly going to emerge with a 
 ballistic missile.  We felt that we would be able to get a defence up before the threat had 
 materialised”.132 
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The total costs of the proposal introduced in 1996 and projected for fielding in 2003 was estimated 
by the Pentagon at about $8b – substantially less than the Dole-Gingrich plan.133  Moreover, the 
administration continued to argue that the possibility of a rogue nation or terrorist attacking the US 
by far less “exotic” means was a far more pressing and likely concern, and that the development of 
any new missile threat to the homeland would be detected long before it became operational.
134
 
According to Strobe Talbott, the Clinton Administration had been “urged by leading Democrats to 
come up with an alternative scheme that was compatible with the ABM Treaty” to help blunt the 
consistent Republican pressure.
135
 
During a speech to the United States Coast Guard Academy in May 1996, Clinton declared 
that the US was pursuing a “strong, sensible national missile defense program based on real threats 
and pragmatic responses”, but that the administration’s first priority “is to defend against existing or 
near term threats, like short and medium-range missile attacks on our troops in the field or our 
allies”.  The correct way to combat future threats, Clinton went on, was to stop the spread of WMD 
by building smart missile defences which take into account the best technology if and when the 
threat arises in the future.
136
  With this in mind, the 3+3 plan was designed in three stages; the first 
(C1) would involve the placement of 20 interceptors in Alaska, a new X-band radar in the Aleutian 
Islands and construction of a BMC3 (Battle Management Command Control and Communications) 
system, and could be operational by 2005; the second (C2) would involve 100 interceptors at 
Alaska, with additional X-band radars in Alaska, Great Britain and Greenland, which could be 
operational by 2007; the third (3) would have up to 250 interceptors at Alaska and North Dakota 
and additional X-band radars on the US coast and in South Korea, this could be done by 2010-2011.  
C1 would have the capability to defeat a few warheads that only employed simple penetration aids; 
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C2 could defeat a few 10s with more sophisticated countermeasures, while C3 could defeat a few 
10s with complex penetration aids and countermeasures.
137
   
Clinton further elaborated on the thinking underpinning the 3+3 plan at the August 
Democratic national convention: 
We are developing a sensible national missile defense, but we must not, not by the year 
 2000 – squander $60bn on an unproved, ineffective Star Wars program that could be 
 obsolete tomorrow.
138
 
As a result, the administration remained committed, at least rhetorically, to be in a position to 
deploy a limited NMD system by 2003, and thus to have a theoretical capability to counter any new 
long-range missile threat should it emerge sooner than predicted by the intelligence community.
139
  
Nevertheless, the deployment plan remained ambitious.  Lt General Malcolm O’Neill, head 
of the BMDO between November 1993 and May 1996, argued that there would be “little margin for 
error” and that “lengthy bidding procedures would have to be foregone”.140  His successor at the 
BMDO, Lt Gen Lester Lyles (August 1996 – May 1999), also expressed concern that a workable 
national missile defence system could be deployed in as little as six years.
141
  Part of the reason for 
was the problems experienced with THAAD during 1995 and 1996 – the technology upon which 
the long-range interceptors for the NMD system would be based – but also because of the 
emergence of reports suggesting that the public and Congress had been deceived of the test results 
of the Ground-Based Interceptor during 1995 and 1996.
142
  Despite this, Congress agreed to 
appropriate $3.7b for BMD, an $855m increase in Clinton’s request, which would include $833m 
for NMD.
143
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At the end of 1996, the dynamics of the BMD debate were altered again by the conclusions 
of a report chaired by former CIA Director Robert Gates into NIE95.  The Gates Review, which 
would include a panel of “independent, nongovernmental individuals with appropriate expertise and 
experience”, had been ordered by the Republican Congress in the wake of the 1995 intelligence 
estimate to review its underlying assumptions and conclusions.
144
  When its findings were released, 
the Gates Report found no “evidence of politicization” in the original NIE, and was “completely 
satisfied that the analysts” views were based on the evidence before them and their substantive 
analysis.  Moreover, that: 
Unsubstantiated allegations challenging the integrity of the intelligence community analysts 
 by those who simply disagree with their conclusions, including members of Congress, are 
 irresponsible.
145
 
Although another report from the GAO suggested that the certainty contained in NIE95 might have 
been “overstated”,146 the net effect was that missile defence actually played a very minor role in the 
1996 presidential election, and certainly far less than had been hoped for by the Republican 
leadership.  According to one administration official, the Gates Report, 
… Strengthened the belief within the Clinton administration that any new strategic missile 
 threat remained many years away, and that any new missile threats would be spotted long 
 before they became operational, giving the administration ample time to respond.
147
   
Another Clinton administration official would later suggest that the Gates Report was also crucial in 
Democrats keeping a majority in favour of the administration’s plans in Congress.148  
 Clinton adapted his BMD strategy even though evidence suggested that a new strategic 
ballistic missile threat to the US homeland remained many years away, despite any significant 
technological push, and regardless of a lack of public interest in either the threat or BMD.  The 
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adoption of a national missile defence deployment plan must therefore be seen as a product of 
domestic politics and of political calculation designed to neuter the Republican BMD challenge.  
However, this approach also gave the administration both a capacity to respond should a new 
missile threat emerge, while at the same time allowed Clinton to maintain control over the future of 
NMD policy and make sure missile defence would not become an important election issue in 1996. 
Nevertheless, and although NMD would continue as a secondary priority to theatre missile defence 
development, the decision to begin a deployment readiness programme marked a distinct change in 
Clinton’s strategy.  
 
(3) Assessing the drivers of policy, 1993-1997 
Changes in the international system and the lack of credible missile defence technology explain the 
loss of enthusiasm and push for a large scale missile defence plan during 1993 and 1994.  They 
also, to an extent, explain why President Clinton appeared reluctant to make any large-scale 
commitment to BMD during 1995 and 1996.  However, these dynamics really only explain a small 
part of the evolution of policy during this period, instead it was the importance of domestic 
variables, particularly the institutional balance between president and Congress, that caused the 
rhythms of policy between 1993 and 1997. 
 
International and technological factors 
The international system altered very little between 1993 and 1996, and this arguably explains the 
decisions taken by the Clinton administration to reduce and recalibrate the US BMD effort.  It also 
explains why GPALS no longer seemed to be an appropriate response to the threats that the US 
looked likely to face in the near future.  The gradual move away from the threat of the Russian 
nuclear arsenal (and the possibility of an accidental launch) and towards the growing threat from the 
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proliferation of short-range and battlefield missile technology, also explains why the focus of the 
programme shifted towards tactical and theatre ballistic missile defence technologies.  Above all, 
international pressures provide a strong justification of why the Clinton administration focussed its 
time and attention on battlefield and not national missile defences. 
 Nevertheless, changes in the international system do not explain why Clinton decided to 
unveil his 3+3 deployment plan in 1996, especially in light of his very public desire to downgrade 
the programme in 1993.  The plan, which if fully enacted, would involve deploying up to 250 
missile interceptors in Alaska and North Dakota by 2007, contravening the ABM Treaty, and 
arguably representing an even more ambitious programme than Bush’s GPALS.  Moreover, Clinton 
decided to unveil this new plan despite the fact that the Intelligence Community believed it would 
be many years – if ever – that the US faced a new direct threat to the homeland from a limited 
missile attack.
149
   
 Some of these dynamics can be explained by developments in technology.  The problems 
experienced with GPALS and Brilliant Pebbles essentially underpinned the Clinton administration’s 
desire to recalibrate the US BMD programme towards more manageable and less futuristic 
technologies.  Technological problems also explain the administration’s general reluctance to 
commit to deployment of a national missile defence system in the near-term.  However, at the same 
time, the promise of new battlefield technologies such as THAAD and Patriot – particularly with 
regard to technologies needed for national missile defence – can partly explain the administration’s 
desire to push ahead with these systems and secure an ABM Treaty demarcation agreement to allow 
for them.   
All the same, technology cannot explain the change of tack performed by Clinton over BMD 
during this period.  Nothing in 1996 suggested that near-term deployment of a credible and 
workable national missile defence system was an achievable goal.  In fact, Theodore Postol, 
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Professor of Science, Technology and International Security at the Massachusetts Institute of 
Technology, would later argue that the 3+3 plan “was dead on arrival” and had “no chance of 
working right from the start”.150  Moreover, many questions continued to be raised about the 
capability and performance of far less demanding tactical missile defence systems upon which any 
larger system would be partly based.  As such, it would appear that technology can say little about 
the decision to unveil a BMD deployment plan in 1996, other than that it was at best an unlikely 
endeavour.  Consequently, neither developments in the international system nor the capabilities of 
technology can fully explain the particular evolution of policy during this period.        
 
Domestic factors 
To fully understand why policy evolved the way it did between 1993 and 1996 we must turn to the 
domestic realm, and in particular to the actions and thinking of President Clinton and the nature of 
the pressure brought to bear on policy by Congress.  While to some extent policy evolved during 
this period within the larger strategic contexts provided and set by the international system and by 
technology, the particular rhythms of policy were essentially driven by the different ideas and 
conceptions of missile defence held by Clinton, and after 1994, by a Republican Congress.  It would 
be the political interplay between domestic institutional factors that would cause Clinton’s BMD 
thinking to fluctuate over this period, and that would account for the considerable differences in 
BMD policy between the first and second two years of Clinton’s first term in office.  
 The actions and thinking of Bill Clinton were arguably the primary factor in understanding 
the particular evolution of policy during this period.  Clinton’s BMD thinking largely explains why 
the US BMD programme was scaled back and recalibrated during his first two years in office.  
Moreover, Clinton’s determination to “depoliticise” missile defence and ensure that it not did 
become a hindrance to his wider policy priorities explains why by 1996 policy and the debate had 
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shifted.  As such, Clinton’s missile defence strategy was often underpinned by domestic political 
reasons.  Nevertheless, to explain this transformation, and why Clinton was forced into this 
position, the examination of what happened must also consider the changes and pressures brought 
to bear on policy by Congress.  
 For the first two years of his presidency, Clinton was working with a like-minded 
Democratic controlled Congress that shared a similar view of BMD.  As a result, he was able to 
pursue his BMD strategy relatively unhindered, which meant that policy was recalibrated, reduced 
and downgraded during 1993 and 1994, and more specifically, that the focus on SDI-type strategic 
defences was replaced with a new focus on theatre and tactical missile defences.  However, the 
Republican take-over of Congress in late 1994 fundamentally altered this dynamic, and with the 
institutional balance now split along party political lines, the president and Congress became 
embroiled in a new political battle over BMD.  The Republican leadership made missile defence a 
key priority, and set about forcing Clinton to make a commitment to NMD deployment, and to 
make BMD a US priority.  Faced with a constant barrage of pressure from Congress, Clinton acted 
to depoliticise the issue by announcing his own 3+3 BMD deployment plan – a plan described by 
one commentator as “primarily a response to Republican pressure”151 – allowing him to retain 
control of the direction of policy while also neutering the issue in the 1996 presidential campaign.  
It would be Congressional pressure – partly driven by perceived strategic necessity and partly by its 
value as a political weapon against the president – that would shape BMD policy during 1995 and 
1996.  Washington Post correspondence Bradley Graham would later comment that it “was clever 
how Republicans revived NMD and used it as an effective rallying point against President 
Clinton”.152   
BMD policy between 1993 and 1997 was therefore a reflection of domestic political actors, 
namely President Clinton and after 1994, the Republican controlled Congress, often acting for 
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inherently domestic political reasons, whereby both presidential and Republican strategy was not 
necessarily always a reflection of their sincere beliefs about BMD.  In the words of Lawrence 
Freedman: 
Clinton gave the impression that he hoped, as his Democrat predecessor, Lyndon Johnson, 
 thirty years earlier had done, that authorizing an anti-ballistic missile programme would help 
 defend him against a domestic Republican threat as much as defend the country from an 
 external threat.
153
 
 
Summary 
To some extent, changes in the international system and technology explain the mounting pressure 
to develop battlefield and tactical missile defences during this period.  However, international 
pressures do not credibly explain why the push for national missile defences gained momentum 
after 1994.  Instead, it was the interplay of domestic political actors often acting for domestic 
political reasons that explain how and why policy evolved as it did.  In this sense, it was the 
interaction between a president determined to reduce the role of BMD, but at the same time 
conscious of being labelled as weak on defence, and after 1994 a Republican controlled Congress 
eager to find a unifying issue with which to attack the president, that explains why the domestic 
political context played such a different role in 1993 and 1994 than it did in 1995 and 1996.   
 
Conclusion  
Bill Clinton tried hard during his first term to recalibrate, downsize and restructure the US missile 
defence programme towards what he perceived to be the very different requirements of the post-
Cold War world.  To some extent – especially during the first two years of his presidency – he 
achieved this, most notably by disbanding the Strategic Defense Initiative and reaffirming the ABM 
Treaty as the centrepiece of US-Russia relations and of international stability.  Moreover, Clinton 
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successfully bolstered research and development on theatre and battlefield missile defences, 
building upon the consensus that had been established during George H. W. Bush’s time in office. 
Although Clinton’s initial restructuring and prioritisation of theatre missile defence appears roughly 
in sync with pressures from the international system and technology, neither systemic nor 
technological factors can explain what happened during 1995 and 1996 as Clinton appeared to 
change direction appreciably, and which would result in the announcement of a programme that 
appeared to have little strategic or technological rationale.  To understand this requires an 
examination of the change in pressure brought to bear on policy by Congress.  
 Without question, the key development for BMD policy during this period was the 
Republican takeover of Congress in the 1994 mid-term elections.  For a mixture of political and 
strategic reasons, the Republican leadership was determined to make missile defence a key national 
security issue in 1995 and 1996, and to some extent, they achieved this.  Clinton’s 3+3 plan was 
almost certainly driven by the perceived requirement to depoliticise the programme – particularly in 
an election year – and had arguably little to do with either strategic necessity or technological 
capability.  As a result, policy was shaped by the competing interests of president and Congress, 
and by the domestic political battle between Democrats and Republicans and the Republican 
leadership and Clinton.  In this way, the period 1993-1997 provides an example of how domestic 
political actors, often for primarily domestic political reasons, shaped BMD policy.  Nevertheless, 
the fact that Clinton did not agree to deployment outright – by unveiling a hedging strategy rather 
than a specific commitment to deploy – suggests that the debate remained within the general 
confines set by technology and international strategic requirements.  
 As Bill Clinton ended his first term in office, the US ballistic missile defence programme 
appeared to be on the rise.  Congressional pressure had forced Clinton into a position on missile 
defence driven partly by party political and domestic dynamics, and this ensured that BMD would 
remain at the centre of the policy debate in the future.  That said the extent of this pressure would 
depend very much on which party won the 1996 mid-term Congressional elections, and on whether 
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Bob Dole or Bill Clinton would be president.  What is more, by the end of 1996 it was still unclear 
as to what might be viably deployed in terms of BMD technology, and indeed, what such a 
deployment was supposed to be for.  Above all, Clinton’s change of direction during this period put 
the US on a direct collision course with the ABM Treaty, making a decision on this issue likely to 
be unavoidable over the next four years.  
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Party Politics and Republican Pressure for Deployment, 
(1997-2001) 
 
Clinton began 1997 in much the same way as he had 1993, determined not let ballistic missile 
defence undermine his wider domestic and international policy agendas.  Although the debate had 
moved forward – most notably thanks to the Republican takeover of Congress, and the president’s 
3+3 plan – Clinton was still in control of policy.  Clinton remained unconvinced that neither the 
technical capability, or in the case of national defence, the military and strategic necessity, required 
anything different from what he was currently pursuing, although he would continue to fund and 
develop both tactical and national missile defence technologies during his second term.  Moreover, 
and although Clinton would be confronted by a hostile Republican led Congress, Democrats in both 
Houses remained loyal to the president, and appeared to have little interest in an expanded BMD 
programme.  As a result, it was assumed that Clinton would continue to prioritise his arms control 
agenda internationally, while at the same time developing a BMD capability in case it might be 
needed at some point in the future.   
 A combination of various different pressures would push the US and the Clinton 
administration into a greater acceptance of BMD during this period.  In fact, this is one of the few 
phases looked at in this thesis where policy evolved roughly in sync with the developments in the 
international system.  Both Clinton and the Democrats relaxed their opposition to BMD in 1998 
following the North Korean missile test and the Rumsfeld Report, and both would become far more 
concerned about combating the apparently growing missile threat during 1999 and 2001.  It was in 
this context that the 1999 Missile Defense Act was signed into law, and the Clinton administration 
strove to find a balance between BMD and the ABM Treaty.  The result was that although Clinton 
did not make the final step towards deployment because of the diplomatic and technological issues 
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that the programme remained steeped in by 2000, the debate had moved appreciably closer towards 
acceptance of a national ballistic missile defence system. 
This period raises a number of interesting questions.  First, why did Clinton pursue a missile 
defence plan that appeared to be at odds with his wider policy agenda, and looked set to contravene 
the ABM Treaty?  Second, why did Clinton, alongside Democrats in Congress, stand against 
deployment in 1997 and 1998, and then agree to it in principle in 1999?  Finally, why did the 
politics of the missile defence deployment debate appear so out of sync with the technology needed 
to perform the tasks being outlined, especially in 1997 and 1998?  In order to understand these 
questions it is important to look at the interplay between domestic, international and technological 
influences, and at how these combined to produce the complicated policy outcomes described 
above. 
 
(1) Competing pressures on BMD policy, 1997-2001 
As Clinton began his second term, relatively little had changed regarding technology or the 
international system since 1993, and any new threat from ballistic missile attack appeared to be 
distant and limited to battlefield and regional short-range missile proliferation.  Moreover, even a 
rudimentary test of the components needed for the proposed 3+3 national missile defence system 
remained several years away.  As such, and although the Republican leadership was determined to 
force the BMD issue during Clinton’s second term, both the president and his Democratic allies in 
Congress remained resolutely committed to pursuing a cautious missile defence policy and to 
ensuring that the programme did not become a spoiler in the administration’s international plans. 
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International pressures on policymaking 
In 1997, international pressure on policymaking remained largely the same as during Clinton’s first 
term, and the bilateral relationship with Russia continued to be the most important international 
factor shaping BMD thinking.  However, as momentum gathered behind deployment in the US 
during this period, additional pressure was brought to bear on policy by American allies in Europe, 
and by the Chinese, both of whom were concerned about the implications of deployment.  In 
addition to this, the growing concern about WMD proliferation and the need to respond to the 
mounting rogue state missile threat to the US, especially after 1998, created a second set of 
pressures on policymaking.  Consequently, international pressure on the US BMD debate was 
bifurcated, and would often appear to provide contradictory pressures on policy. 
The primary pressure on policymaking between 1997 and 2001 remained the residual 
strategic relationship with Russia and the centrality of the ABM Treaty to the possibility of stability 
and arms reductions.  In particular, the relationship with Russia continued to dominate US 
international and missile defence thinking.
1
  There were two reasons for this: first, Moscow 
remained suspicious of US BMD plans and concerned about the impact of missile defence on 
Russian security; second, and linked to this, Russian leaders continued to link further nuclear arms 
reductions with limits in US BMD plans.
2
  However, this period would also see the beginning of a 
more vocal Chinese opposition to US BMD plans – often in accordance with Russia3 – as Beijing 
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became more concerned about the implications of US plans.
4
  The growth in Russian and Chinese 
anxiety during this period would also lead to growing concerns from US allies, particularly in 
Europe.  The reason for this was that many European leaders saw US missile defence plans – and 
especially ABM Treaty abrogation – as internationally destabilising, and the possible precursor to a 
new nuclear arms race.
5
  In addition to this, many US allies did not consider that the level of missile 
threat warranted such moves, and therefore could not understand the developments in the US BMD 
debate.
6
 
The second important international pressure on the debate during Clinton’s second term was 
the growing rogue state missile threat, particularly from North Korea.  The most significant 
international event during this period was Pyongyang’s decision to test-fire a 3-stage rocket in 
August 1998, which took US policymakers – and especially the intelligence community – largely 
by surprise.
7
  This event also served to compound a growing sense of insecurity that had been set in 
motion by Pakistani missile tests in April, Pakistani and Indian nuclear tests in May, and an Iranian 
missile test in July 1998.
8
  Domestically, the influential 1998 “Rumsfeld Report”9 and the 1999 
National Intelligence Estimate
10
 would further compound these developments by suggesting that the 
missile threat was growing far quicker than had been previously believed.  The result was that 
international pressure began to shift from the strategic relationship with Russia, towards a far 
greater concern about ballistic missile proliferation to a new cohort of rogue states. 
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According to Strobe Talbott, by 2000, the Clinton Administration was essentially faced with 
two competing international pressures; firstly, from Russia, China and allies in Europe, who for 
different reasons cautioned against any hasty move on BMD, and secondly from the growing WMD 
threat from rogue states.
11
  Consequently, this period was characterised internationally by the 
growth in anti-BMD sentiment amongst US allies and Russia and an increase in the perceived 
missile threat from rogue states, and therefore by two often-competing pressures on the US missile 
defence debate.    
 
Technological pressures on policymaking 
In terms of technology, there was very little pressure to push ahead with ballistic missile defence 
deployment, especially of a national system, during this period.  In fact, most independent scientific 
advice argued that at best, more time was needed for proper testing and development, and at worst, 
deployment remained a considerable technological challenge.  Part of the reason for this was that by 
2000, only three of the planned 17 tests of the Clinton administration’s 3+3 proposal had been 
conducted, and only one of these could be considered as a success.   
 The overwhelming feeling amongst the US scientific and engineering community during 
this period was that a workable and effective national missile defence system remained many years, 
and many dollars away.
12
  In fact, several members of the Clinton administration had expressed 
extreme doubt that the 3+3 plan was a technologically viable undertaking when it was unveiled in 
early 1996
13
, and Undersecretary of Defense Paul Kaminsky had admitted that the 2006 deployment 
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date stipulated in the 3+3 plan would be very challenging, and that the system “might not work”.14 
Moreover, evidence would surface throughout this period suggesting that the national missile 
defence plan was largely unworkable in its current guise, and General Larry Welch – who was 
asked to conduct an independent review into the NMD plan in 1998 – would notably argue that the 
programme was “rushing to failure”.15  To a lesser extent the same was true for the technologies 
required for tactical and battlefield missile defence systems, many of which – especially THAAD16 
– were based on similar technologies to the NMD system.17  The Patriot Advanced Capability  
(PAC-3), however, had been successfully tested several times by 2000, and progress was being 
made on the Aegis sea-based system.
18
 
A second important technological dynamic during this period was the emergence of 
evidence suggesting that some reporting of BMD development had been misleading.  Foremost 
amongst these was the case of former TRW employee Nira Schwartz who alleged that unsuccessful 
testing had deliberately been covered up by the Pentagon to make the BMD programme appear 
more advanced than it was.
19
  Perhaps more importantly, according to scientist Benn Tannenbaum, 
the result of this and other concerns about the programme was that the Pentagon would become 
much more secretive about BMD, which meant that independent science advice and analysis was 
made increasingly difficult.
20
  
 The combined effect of these technological pressures suggested that from a purely 
technological point of view, it was implausible that a national missile defence system deployment 
decision could be made as early as 2000, let alone that a functioning system could be deployed and 
working by the middle of the next decade.  Consequently, technological pressure on the BMD 
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debate appeared to favour a “go-slow” approach that would postpone a deployment decision until 
further testing had been conducted.
21
 
 
Presidential policy agenda 
Clinton began his second term hoping that the 3+3 programme, combined with a plan to develop 
and deploy robust battlefield defences, would be sufficient to address the political and strategic 
threats that his administration would face between 1997 and 2001.  The president hoped to occupy a 
middle ground on BMD; in the words of Brookings Institution scholar Michael O’Hanlon “adopting 
the right rhetoric and funding programmes, without any real chance of deployment”.22  As Clinton 
Administration official Strobe Talbott would later recall: 
 We saw NMD as a research and development program that should be continued but that had  
 a long way to go before it was ready for deployment … [and that for the time being] should 
 remain within the bands of the ABM Treaty.
23
 
Two dynamics in particular would shape the way that Clinton, and those around him, approached 
the issue of BMD during this period: (1) a desire to balance the requirements of a growing missile 
threat with international stability, and (2) an attempt to nullify Republican political pressure 
domestically. 
Internationally, Clinton remained determined to place stability and strategic nuclear arms 
reductions with Russia at the centre of his policy agenda.  For Clinton, this also meant continued 
adherence to the ABM Treaty - and the necessary acceptance of the limits on missile defence 
development and deployment that this entailed - as he believed this was the best means of creating a 
conducive environment for the arms control measures he wished to pursue.
24
  However, at the same 
time, according to Walt Slocombe, “there were people in the Administration who were very 
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enthusiastic about missile defence, and others who although not theology opposed to BMD 
deployment”.25  Consequently, as Clinton and those around him became more aware that BMD 
might be required to play a role in combating future threats from rogue states, especially after 1998, 
opinion would remain split with the administration over how to move forward with the 
programme.
26
  A direct reflection of this would be the difficult position that Clinton would find 
himself in by 1999 of balancing the threat from rogue states with the need for stability in relations 
with Russia and China. 
The second dynamic shaping Clinton’s BMD policy was his desire to chart a middle-way 
domestically.  According to Michael O’Hanlon, the president was determined to keep BMD from 
becoming too politicised by placating the Republican leadership in Congress with moves towards 
BMD deployment, while at the same time making sure not to alienate his supporters and arms 
controllers in the Democratic Party.
27
  In this respect, while Clinton realised that he “couldn’t beat 
the BMD push with nothing”, the programme remained shaped by the perceived domestic political 
requirements of the time.
28
  One commentator suggested that at least part of Clinton’s BMD 
thinking was driven by his decision to “co-opt” the BMD issue in a continuing hope of 
depoliticising it.
29
  Towards the end of 2000, Clinton’s thinking was also shaped by his desire to 
shield vice president and Democratic presidential nominee Al Gore from attacks on defence during 
the forthcoming presidential election.
30
   
Clinton’s BMD policy during this period was therefore inherently political, and this spread 
across both domestic and international policy realms.  In both respects, Clinton’s thinking was 
underpinned by a desire to balance competing priorities; internationally this was between 
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responding to the growing missile threat from rogue states and securing arms reductions and 
stability with Russia; and domestically it was between a Republican Party determined to force 
Clinton’s hand on BMD and a Democratic Party equally keen to resist.  In the words of one senior 
official, “Clinton remained very good at triangulating the BMD issue”, and the result would be a 
complex compromise between these often-competing policy priorities.
31
 
 
Congressional pressure on policymaking 
Although bipartisan support for battlefield defences remained strong during this period, opinion on 
national missile defence was polarised in Congress between 1997 and 2001, with Democrats 
generally favouring restraint and Republicans generally keen to push ahead.  As a result, with the 
Republican Party in control of both Houses, Congressional pressure on policy would largely be 
towards higher funding for BMD, and in the direction of pushing for early NMD deployment.  
However, up until 1998, the Democratic Party ensured that this pressure would not be 
overwhelming by containing most of the debate to within Congress, and by watering down much of 
the Republican legislation pushing for a greater commitment to BMD.
32
   
During 1997 and 1998, Congressional pressure on policy was limited by the fierce partisan 
debates between Republicans and Democrats in Congress.  Nevertheless, the Republican leadership 
pushed hard to pressure Clinton’s BMD plans, and introduced four separate pieces of legislation 
into Congress calling for BMD deployment during these two years.
33
  All of these Bills called for a 
US commitment to deploy a national missile defence system as soon as possible, and most of them 
implied that the US should either amend or leave the ABM Treaty.
34
  In fact, one senior official 
later claimed that the “Republicans wanted to find something political to break the ABM Treaty so 
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they designed missile defence systems and legislation wording that would run into conflict with 
it”.35  At the same time, Democrats in Congress remained unconvinced about the necessity, 
desirability or feasibility of such a move, and therefore continued to stymie the push for an NMD 
commitment.  In addition to this, Congress was locked in a heated debate during 1997 and 1998 
about the composition of the “Commission to assess the ballistic missile threat” which Republicans 
hoped would bolster their case for NMD deployment.
36
  The result of this was that much of the 
BMD debate during these years occurred within Congress, rather than between Congress and the 
president. 
 Although the 1998 mid-term elections altered the balance between Democrats and 
Republicans relatively little, Congress would exercise far more pressure on policy during 1999 and 
2000.  Fundamentally, this was because after 1998 the strategy and thinking of the Democratic 
Party changed.  Specifically, Democratic lawmakers became more concerned about the threat of 
ballistic missile attack, but this change was also the product of what they perceived to be an 
alteration of strategy by the Clinton administration following the 1998 North Korean missile test.
37
  
Either way, the result was that both parties moved closer to an agreement on NMD deployment, 
although not necessarily anything that would contravene the ABM Treaty.  Consequently, in the last 
two years of Clinton’s presidency, as Democrats realised the futility of opposing missile defence 
outright, Congressional opinion shifted towards acceptance that NMD deployment some time in the 
future might be necessary.  Nevertheless, Democrats remained committed to ensuring that anything 
that was deployed would be “technologically viable, strategically necessary and prudent”.38 
 Congressional pressure on BMD policy was split during this period.  For the first two years, 
Democrats and Republicans battled hard along party lines over policy, but this debate was largely 
confined to Congress.  During the second two years, Democratic opposition to NMD deployment 
softened, which provided the opportunity for the Republican leadership to apply pressure on 
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presidential policymaking, and allowed Congress to pass the 1999 Missile Defense Act.  As a 
result, and while opinion over BMD would remain fundamentally party political, the contours of the 
debate shifted closer towards deployment during this period.  
 
(2) The evolution of policy, 1997-2001 
Although Clinton had reluctantly unveiled a commitment to national missile defence towards the 
end of his first term, at the beginning of 1997 the future shape of the US BMD effort remained 
uncertain.  In part, this was because the American public appeared no more fearful of a ballistic 
missile attack in 1997 than they had done in 1993, but it was also because the types of technologies 
required for a credible defence were still largely in their infancy.  Nevertheless, Republican control 
of Congress ensured that pressure for a US commitment to deploy a national missile defence system 
as soon as possible would remain at the forefront of policy during Clinton’s second term. 
 
1997 and 1998: The Republican BMD challenge continues 
The Republican Party leadership began 1997 determined to continue their attack on the Clinton 
administration’s BMD plans.  The first component of this attack would involve the establishment of 
a high-level commission to reassess the judgments contained in NIE95, which many Republican 
lawmakers viewed as being too soft.  The Commission, which would share stark similarities with 
the “Team B” exercise undertaken in the late 1970s39, would be chaired by Donald Rumsfeld, and 
would seek to provide an alternative view on the ballistic missile threat that the US might face in 
the near future.  Leading Republicans hoped that the Rumsfeld Report might be used to facilitate 
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the case for deployment and attack what they continued to perceive as the cautious approach to 
BMD being taken by the Clinton administration.
40
  
 The second component of the Republican attack would be direct legislation pushing for 
BMD deployment.  After the failure of the “Defend America Act” of 1996, the primary objective of 
the Republican leadership remained to force a deployment decision on NMD to respond to a threat 
that they maintained was closer and far more dangerous than the administration, and Democrats in 
Congress, asserted.  To this end, two separate NMD Bills were introduced into Congress in early 
1997.  The first, sponsored by Senator Trent Lott (R-MS), entitled the “National Missile Defense 
Act of 1997”, mandated deployment of a national missile defence system able to protect all 50 
states from limited accidental, unauthorised or deliberate missile launches by 2003.  It also 
proposed that the Clinton administration should begin negotiations with Russia immediately to 
amend the ABM Treaty to allow for this, and if this hadn’t succeeded within one year, that the US 
should announce its attention to abrogate the Treaty.
41
  The second Bill, introduced by Senator 
Richard Lugar (R-IN) was an attempt at finding a middle ground compromise that would pass 
Congress and be acceptable to the Clinton administration.  The “Defend the United States of 
America Act of 1997” called for the US to develop a national missile defence system that was 
capable of being deployed by 2003, but that would be subject to a Congressional vote in 2000 to 
decide whether or not to begin deployment based on threat, cost, implications for arms control, and 
US preparedness.  Moreover, and whereas Lott’s Bill would push Clinton to negotiate and possibly 
abrogate the ABM Treaty, Lugar suggested that the ABM Treaty should have “sufficient flexibility 
to accommodate new US BMD plans”.42 
However, these efforts would be neutered by Democrats in Congress who continued to view 
the legislation as “unnecessary, unworkable, wasteful and a threat to the nuclear arms control 
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regime”.43  As a result, neither Bill introduced into Congress was successful; Lott’s legislation was 
unable to overcome a Democratic filibuster in the Senate, while Lugar’s did not pass the Armed 
Services Committee.
44
  In addition to this, budget conscious Congressman from both parties 
remained wary of; (1) the spiralling costs outlined by the Congressional Budget Office, (2) the 
immaturity of the technology, and (3) the fact that according to opinion polls the American national 
media paid less attention to the need for a national missile defence system in 1997 than at any point 
since the Republican Party began the battle for NMD in 1994.
45
  
At the same time, Clinton began his second term keen to reach an agreement with Russia on 
the ABM Treaty in order to permit his preferred range of non-strategic missile defences, which he 
continued to view as the necessary and adequate response to the current and near future 
international threat.  In September 1997, as part of a wider move towards a possible START III 
Treaty, Clinton and Boris Yeltsin agreed upon a set of demarcation statements formally codifying 
what was and wasn’t permitted by the ABM Treaty.46  In addition to this, the two leaders issued a 
joint statement declaring their determination to “preserve the ABM Treaty, prevent circumvention 
of it, and enhance its viability”, as well as reaffirming the joint belief that the Treaty continued to 
represent the “cornerstone of strategic stability”.47  This agreement was designed as the springboard 
for negotiations on a START III Treaty, which would potentially reduce nuclear stockpiles to 
between 2000 and 2500 warheads each.
48
  Clinton hoped that by publicly declaring US support for 
the ABM Treaty, he would be able to create the conditions to pursue his wider international agenda, 
in particular, the CTBT.  David Smith argued that the accord was “little [about] demarcation, [but] 
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really an agreement about strengthening the ABM Treaty” in order to foster a new round of arms 
reductions.
49
 
 In the end, Clinton did not submit the demarcation agreements to the Senate for fear that the 
Republican majority would reject them.  House Leader Newt Gingrich (R-GA) had made it clear 
that Congressional Republicans would oppose Clinton’s ABM Treaty demarcation agreements with 
Russia because they would “halt the development of the most effective possible ballistic missile 
defense” and would “place the lives of millions in jeopardy”.50  Nevertheless, the Pentagon was 
now able to move ahead with the development and deployment of several promising TMD systems.   
 
The Republican Party continued to push for NMD deployment in 1998, and in March Senator Thad 
Cochran (R-MS) introduced the “American Missile Protection Act of 1998” into the Senate, which 
proposed that the US should “deploy as soon as technologically possible an effective NMD”.51  
Unlike the previous year, Cochran’s Bill made no mention of the ABM Treaty and did not instruct 
the Pentagon to pursue a particular architecture, instead choosing to focus on the threat rather than 
the system or the ABM Treaty.
52
  However, the Bill was defeated in May by a Democratic 
filibuster, as Democrats remained reluctant to pursue a policy that seemed unnecessary given; (1) 
the level of threat, (2) the maturity of technology and the likely ramifications of such a move for the 
ABM Treaty, and (3) the impact on relations with Russia, nuclear disarmament and overall 
international stability.
53
  In addition to this, Democrats remained confident that such a move did not 
appear to reflect either developments in or requirements of the international system.  In spring 1998 
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for example, the Joint Chiefs of Staff announced that they continued to expect that the US would 
have plenty of warning before any new missile threat emerged, probably around three years.
54
  
A second reason why the legislation failed was because missile defence technology, but 
NMD technology in particular, was struggling to keep pace with political developments.  In order to 
meet the 2000 date for a deployment decision mandated by Clinton in 1996, the BMDO had been 
forced to bypass many of the normal developmental procedures and rush the testing of several 
components that otherwise would have taken much longer to develop.
55
  The first warning of the 
problems with this approach came in February 1998 as a panel established to look into the flight-
testing programme being conducted by the BMDO, led by retired Air Force General Larry Welch, 
found that: “The perceived urgency of the need for these systems has led to high levels of risk that 
have resulted in delayed deployments because of failures in the development test program”.56  
Welch also suggested that planning for NMD testing had been “over optimistic” and that 
consequently the entire US BMD programme was “rushing to failure”.57  A subsequent report from 
the GAO also cast doubt on the programme, commenting that “even with increased funding, 
schedule and technical risks associated with a 2003 deployment remain high.”58  These concerns 
were echoed by Undersecretary of Defense Paul Kaminski, when he later admitted that a 2006 
deployment date would be very challenging, and even then, that the system “might not work”.59  In 
general, Pentagon officials believed that a workable system remained “many years and many 
billions of dollars away”.60   
Although these technological shortcomings were partly the result of the political schedule 
driving the NMD plan, and a direct product of the programme’s lack of funding and general neglect 
by the Clinton administration, it also undermined the case for those pressuring for a near-term 
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deployment decision.  Fundamentally, it convinced many lawmakers that it would be imprudent to 
begin a deployment programme before either the technology had been proven to work, or before the 
threat had actually materialised, because such a move would likely make any system strategically 
obsolete when it came to be deployed.  Anthony Cordesman warned that “politicizing a program 
and creating artificial deadlines do not help make it successful”.61   
  
In July 1998, the findings from the “Commission to assess the ballistic missile threat”, which had 
been mandated by the Republican leadership in 1996 to challenge the 1995 National Intelligence 
Estimate, were released.  Most notably, relating specifically to North Korea, Iran and Iraq, the 
commissioners found that: 
 The threat to the US posed by these emerging capabilities is broader, more mature and 
 evolving more rapidly than has been reported in estimates and reports by the intelligence 
 community.
62
 
Moreover, the commissioners also claimed that “the intelligence communities’ ability to provide 
timely and accurate estimates of ballistic missile threats to the US is eroding” and that “the warning 
times the US can expect of new, threatening ballistic missile deployments are being reduced”, 
consequently, “the US might have little or no warning before operational deployment”.63  The Staff 
Director of the Commission, Stephen Cambone, suggested that the conclusions reflected the general 
feeling amongst the commissioners that the “CIA had not covered itself with glory”, particularly 
regarding ABM Treaty compliance issues, and that the Agency had a tendency to understand 
circumstances as being less threatening than others might understand it to be.
64
   
                                                          
61
 Anthony Cordesman, “Strategic threats and national missile defenses”, (London, Praeger Publishers: 2002) 318 
62
 Executive Summery of the “Report of the commission to assess the ballistic missile threat to the United States” (The 
Rumsfeld Report), (15
th
 July 1998) 
63
 Ibid 
64
 Interview with Stephen Cambone (5
th
 August 2010) 
Party politics and Republican pressure for deployment 
 128 
 The Commission was split between Democratic and Republican appointees (5 Republican, 3 
Democratic)
65
, and had been deliberately set up to ensure that any recommendations had bipartisan 
support.
66
  The Commissioners were also instructed to look at the “missile threat” problem in a 
different way to the CIA.  According to Stephen Cambone, whereas the Agency tended to start with 
intentions and try to understand technology, the commissioners would begin by looking at what was 
known about technology and from there try to extrapolate what they thought the technology was 
capable of doing or evolving into.  In addition to this, it was also agreed that the issue of BMD 
would not be directly addressed, which according to Cambone, “liberated the Commission to do the 
work it needed to do”, and allowed them to have “open and earnest conversations”.67  By looking at 
the problem in this manner, the Commission came to very different conclusions to those of the 
CIA.
68
  Of equal importance, the unanimity of the Commissioner’s findings ensured that these 
conclusions would carry significant weight in policy circles.
69
  Newt Gingrich (R-GA) described 
the 1998 Rumsfeld Report as “the most important warning about our security since the end of the 
Cold War”, and missile defence advocates in Congress immediately jumped on the report as 
vindication of their policy, and to criticise President Clinton.
70
 
 On 21
st
 August 1998, the Report’s findings were bolstered by news that North Korea had 
unexpectedly tested a three-stage rocket; a development far beyond what the US had until then 
believed Pyongyang was capable of.  The launch highlighted the fact that the intelligence 
community could not be certain to have as much warning about missile developments as it had 
suggested in NIE95, which in turn gave added weight to the conclusions contained in the Rumsfeld 
Report.
71
  The North Korean test compounded a growing sense of insecurity throughout 1998, 
which had begun in April when Pakistan had tested its Ghari ICBM; increased as Pakistan and India 
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conducted underground nuclear tests in May, and was bolstered in July as Iran flight-tested its 
Shahab-3 ballistic missile.
72
  Nevertheless, a few days later, Chairman of the JCS Hugh Shelton 
(1997–2001) argued that the US would have “ample warning of any attempt by rogue nations to 
develop ballistic missiles, let alone threaten the US with them”.73 
 Although the Report made Congressional Democrats anxious about their continued ability to 
coordinate voting against Republican efforts to legislate an accelerated timetable for a more robust 
NMD deployment, the Democratic leadership in the Senate remained confident that they could 
stymie the latest push for BMD, and hotly contested the findings contained in the Report.
74
  As a 
result, the Democrats successfully filibustered Trent Lott’s second attempt to introduce NMD 
legislation into the Senate in September 1998, because according to one Congressman “it was based 
on antiquated technology and would undermine international weapons treaties”.75  After defeating 
the Bill, Senator Kent Conrad (D-ND) reflected the views of many when he argued: “lets make sure 
we deploy the best initial system not just the first one off the shelf”, while Carl Levin (D-MI) 
warned that: “this will weaken and jeopardize our national security”.76  The feeling that the 
president’s NMD plan was currently sufficient was backed up during the 1998 mid-term 
Congressional elections, as several Republican Senate candidates tried unsuccessfully to make the 
administration’s approach to BMD an election issue.77  Nevertheless, Senate Republicans were just 
one vote short of invoking the Bill through cloture (59-41), and Congress did vote to appropriate 
$1.5b for NMD for the fiscal year of 1999, a $600m increase in the Clinton administration’s 
request.
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1999: The Missile Defense Act 
The events of 1998 had a profound impact on the Clinton administration.  National Security Aide 
Bob Bell described the North Korean missile test of 1998 as “a game changer”, as it both forced the 
Clinton administration to consider the issue of NMD far more seriously, and fundamentally 
undermined Democratic opposition to the programme in Congress.
79
  Undersecretary of State for 
Arms Control and International Security John Holum, would later remark that the North Korean 
missile test was “well beyond what we had up until then thought was their capability”, and it caused 
many within the administration – including himself - to change their thinking on BMD.80  
Nevertheless, the national missile defence programme continued to be beset by technological 
challenges, and in mid 1999 Brigadier General Willie Nance, NMD programme manager at the 
BMDO, declared that “major challenges” remained for the NMD system, and that the 2005 
deployment schedule remained “extremely demanding”.81  A few months later, General Larry 
Welch would again warn about moving too quickly, and suggested that the Deployment Readiness 
Review (DRR) should be treated more as more a “feasibility decision with some long term 
deployment actions rather than a readiness decision”.82  Consequently, and although Clinton was 
still not convinced about the technology required to build a national missile defence system, he 
realised that the programme needed to be taken more seriously, especially given the commitment he 
had made to make a decision on deployment in 2000 under the 3+3 plan.
83
 
 With this in mind, the administration held a series of high-level meetings about how the 
BMD programme could be altered to provide a credible and workable deployment option by 2000.  
It was decided that in light of the technological difficulties being experienced that more time would 
be required to develop a workable system, and that a new deployment plan was needed.  When 
Secretary of Defense William Cohen announced the revised plan in mid-January 1999, he declared 
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that the earliest possible deployment date for the NMD system would be pushed back two years to 
2005.
84
  As part of this revised plan, the administration asked Congress for $6.6b in funds for NMD 
deployment between fiscal years 2000-2005, and at the same time agreed to begin examining the 
nature and scope of possible ABM Treaty amendments with the Russians to allow for the 
deployment of a system in the future.
85
 
In a press conference that accompanied the announcement of the revised NMD deployment 
plan, Secretary of Defense Cohen made it clear that the administration accepted that the long-range 
missile threat was real and growing.  Cohen also suggested that the ABM Treaty should be 
modified to allow for deployment, and that if it could not be amended then “we have the option of 
simply pulling out”.86  This appeared to mark a significant change of strategy by the administration 
on the ABM Treaty – which until now had seemed sacrosanct – and caused Clinton to order Senior 
NSC Official Robert Bell to conduct a press conference the next day to “clarify” what Cohen had 
meant.
87
  While accepting that there had been acceleration over the last six months in the ballistic 
missile programmes of rogue states, Bell announced that: 
 The ABM Treaty remains, in the view of this administration, a cornerstone of strategic 
 stability, and the US is committed to continued efforts to strengthen the Treaty and enhance 
 its viability and effectiveness.
88
 
In a further effort to clarify the administration’s position, National Security Advisor Sandy Berger 
threatened a presidential veto in response to any future NMD Bill that looked set to contravene the 
ABM Treaty, and the administration reiterated its commitment to make a decision in 2000 based on 
four criteria; cost, threat, technology and the impact on arms control.
89
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While Democrats in Congress had also been surprised by the events of 1998, the party leadership 
might have continued trying to filibuster legislation had it not been for the perceived change in 
stance of the Clinton administration.  Consequently, when the Republican Party again introduced 
legislation calling for national missile defence deployment in early 1999, leading Democrats 
realised that they would be unable to sustain another filibuster in the Senate, and because they did 
not feel confident that they could block the legislation, set about trying to revise it.
90
  At the same 
time, the Republican Party leadership also appeared more inclined to compromise in order to get 
their legislation passed.  As a result, the legislation introduced into Congress in early 1999 did not 
demand that the ABM Treaty be abrogated, and Senator Thad Cochran (R-MS) suggested that the 
Bill include an amendment making NMD deployment funds subject to the annual authorisation and 
appropriations process.
91
  
Nevertheless, Democrats only agreed to vote for the Bill once it included a second 
amendment, proposed by Senator Mary Landrau (D-LA), which stated that it would remain the 
“policy of the United States to seek continued negotiated reductions in Russian nuclear forces”.92  
With both parties believing that they had got what they wanted from the Bill; the Republicans were 
pleased that NMD legislation had finally passed Congress, while the Democrats believed that they 
had comprehensively disarmed the Bill by the inclusion of the two amendments, the legislation 
passed in late May.
93
  In doing this, the NMD Bill had been amended enough for it to gain Clinton’s 
tacit approval, primarily because the two amendments made by the Senate; (1) to keep deployment 
subject to annual appropriations, and (2) by linking any deployments with continuing arms control 
policy.  As such, Clinton felt that signing the Bill did not constitute a deployment decision.
94
  After 
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the House had agreed to amend the Bill so that it contained the same provisions as the Senate 
version, it was sent to Clinton who signed it into law in June 1999.
95
   
When it came to signing the Bill, Clinton made it very clear that he did not view the 
legislation as representing a clear and definite decision on deployment, stating: 
By specifying that any NMD deployment decision must be subject to the authorization and 
 appropriations process, the legislation makes it clear that no decision on deployment has 
 been made.
96
   
Moreover he argued: “by continuing to support negotiated reductions in strategic nuclear arms, the 
Bill reaffirms that our missile defense policy must take into account arms control objectives”.97  
And that: 
 Section 3 [of the bill] puts Congress on record as continuing to support negotiated 
 reductions in strategic nuclear arms, affirming my administration’s position that our missile 
 defense policy must take into account our arms control and non-proliferation objectives.
98
 
As a result, Clinton was able to maintain control of the NMD programme and reaffirm that any 
missile defence system that the US decided to deploy would have to meet his original criteria on 
threat, cost, technology, and arms control.  House majority leader Dick Armey (R-TX) declared: 
“once again, the president’s agility with language is making it difficult to do the nation’s 
business”.99  While Michael O’Hanlon described the 1999 Missile Defense Act as “a deep 
disagreement masquerading as an agreement”.100 
 
Despite believing that the Missile Defense Act did not represent a decision to deploy, as Clinton 
signed the Act in July 1999, major decisions regarding the specific components and architecture of 
the proposed US NMD system had not been made.  Most importantly, the final design for the 
system had not been decided, and much of the testing had not even begun.  As a result, and because 
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Clinton had tried to balance politics, diplomacy and security between 1994 and 1999, the 
administration found itself “boxed into a corner” by mid 1999; caught between trying to make a 
credible deployment decision and not undermining the ABM Treaty.
101
  Moreover, because NMD 
deployment was never really a serious policy for the Clinton administration – at least until 1998 - 
little thought had been put into exactly what type of architecture might be needed and what would 
be required diplomatically to allow for this.  Consequently, it was only in August 1999 that Clinton 
and his national security team agreed a three-part plan to proceed with NMD and make the ABM 
Treaty more relevant, while also continuing to push for cuts in nuclear weapons with Russia.
102
  
The new NMD plan called for 20 interceptors in Alaska by 2005, rising to 100 during 2006 to 
combat the threat from North Korea, with the possibility of a combined second and third phase of 
an additional 100 interceptors at a separate site (probably North Dakota) by 2010 to counter 
possible future threats from the Middle East.
103
  Professor John Steinbruner, Director of the Center 
for International and Security Studies at the University of Maryland, argued that the schedule must 
“have been inspired by domestic politics, since it made no sense in technical or strategic terms”.104 
 The shift in the domestic BMD debate was also reflected in the views of the US intelligence 
community, as the 1999 National Intelligence Estimate revised its earlier judgements and declared: 
“during the next 15 years the US most likely will face ICBM threats from Russia, China and North 
Korea, probably Iran, and possibly Iraq”.105  Although Joseph Cirincione argued that the NIE was 
based upon a “lowering of previously established standards for judging threats”, rather than a 
substantial increase in the ballistic missile threat, the estimate represented the changing dynamics of 
the missile defence debate.
106
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 Even though the events of 1998 fundamentally changed thinking about the ballistic missile 
threat inside the Clinton administration, the president remained determined not to let NMD interfere 
with his wider policy agenda.  Clinton signed the 1999 Missile Defense Act because he believed 
that the provisions it contained would allow him to continue to control policy and defuse any 
political value that Republicans might attach to it, and not strictly because he saw the need or 
feasibility of near-term deployment.  The Missile Defense Act had been driven primarily by the 
change in the perception of threat during the second half of 1998, which in turn caused the Clinton 
administration to rethink its NMD plans, and which caused the resistance of Congressional 
Democrats to weaken.  But it had also been driven by politics, particularly by the president’s 
realisation that the ballistic missile threat was real and growing, and by his move to depoliticise it, 
and by doing so ensure that he retained control of the policy.
107
 
 
2000: The decision to defer deployment 
In September 1999, the Clinton administration announced that for strategic reasons (namely the 
ability to cover the entire country, including Hawaii, against missile attack from North Korea) the 
NMD site would have to be in Alaska, and this created a number of substantial problems.
108
  The 
first of which was that an Alaska deployment as opposed to one based in North Dakota would 
require changes or amendments to the ABM Treaty; the second problem was that Clinton had given 
himself barely a year in which to negotiate these changes.  The key to any deal seemed to be linking 
the amendments to a new START III Treaty, which the Russians were keen to pursue, but this also 
contained its problems: (1) firstly the Pentagon strongly resisted any proposals that would involve 
reducing US nuclear weapons down to less than 1500 warheads, the minimum they argued that was 
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required to maintain a credible three-part nuclear deterrent;
109
 (2) secondly the upcoming elections 
in both Russia and the US meant that any decision would have to be reached in a short period of 
time. 
 With this in mind, in late 1999, the Clinton administration embarked on a programme of 
trying to modify the ABM Treaty to allow for NMD, while attempting to preserve the Treaty as a 
key component of strategic stability for the future.
110
  This plan however brought with it its own set 
of problems; namely how to push ahead without disrupting international stability.  The Russians did 
not seem keen on amendments, especially following the election of Vladimir Putin in May 2000, 
and in November, the Russian delegation to the UN General Assembly sponsored a successful 
resolution opposing any missile defence system that violated the ABM Treaty.
111
  In the words of 
Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott: 
 Like Sandy [Berger], I believed the trifecta was a long shot, probably coming too late in the 
 Clinton presidency to be achievable either diplomatically or politically.  It was worth trying 
 for but  not betting the ranch on.  We should make an all-out effort at getting a deal while 
 leaving the president a range of choices about what to do if the Russian’s refused”.112 
All the same, on 19
th
 January 2000 US officials presented their Russian counterparts with the 
proposed set of changes to the ABM Treaty.  The centrepiece of these proposals was to change the 
single site permitted by the Treaty from North Dakota to Alaska.
113
 
In April 2000, the Russian Duma ratified START II and the ABM Treaty demarcation 
agreements signed in 1997, but linked these decisions to continued US adherence to the ABM 
Treaty.  Vladimir Putin told Clinton that Russia would “tear up” START II if the US abrogated the 
ABM Treaty, which consequently made any likelihood of an agreement on NMD virtually 
impossible.
114
  On the 5
th
 July 2000 Putin and Chinese President Jiang Zemin issued a joint 
announcement stating that the deployment of national missile defence “will signify the undermining 
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of the global balance” and therefore “that the ABM Treaty should not be altered”.115  On the same 
day, General Vladimir Yakovlev Commander of the Russian Strategic Rocket Forces announced 
that Russia “might increase the number of warheads on the Topol-M ICBM or might build more 
medium range nuclear capable missiles”.116  Putin and Zemin also criticised the US for trying to 
“secure unilateral advantage” in a move that would have, “serious negative consequences” and 
which might “reignite the arms race”.117  Professor Dean Wilkening, of the Center for International 
Security and Cooperation, warned that: 
Any unilateral withdrawal would probably cause the end of US-Russian strategic nuclear 
 force reductions, and would cause China to react by modernising its strategic nuclear forces, 
 with possible knock-on effects to India, Pakistan and others.
118
  
The new US push for BMD was equally badly received by US allies, particularly in Europe, where 
one of the main problems was that the Europeans, much like the Russians and the Chinese, didn't 
think that the current level of missile threat justified the response that the US was pursuing.
119
  
 
After an aborted practice test, the first trial of the national missile defence system was conducted on 
1
st
 October 1999, less than 12 months before the deployment decision would be made, and although 
regarded as a success, soon became marred in controversy as it later emerged that a bright decoy 
had been included with the warhead to help guide the kill vehicle to its target.
120
  The second test of 
the system, carried out on 18
th
 January 2000, failed after the kill vehicle did not separate from the 
booster missile.  Consequently, with one (scripted) success, and one failure, much would depend 
upon the third and final test scheduled for the summer.
121
  According to Strobe Talbott, the test 
failures also represented a significant “setback for diplomacy”, as technological credibility would 
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undoubtedly make negotiating ABM Treaty amendments much harder if the Russians remained 
unconvinced that such a system could work.
122
  
Concern about the programme was compounded in June after another report from General 
Larry Welch suggested that although improvements had been made, the NMD schedule continued 
to cause a “very high risk”.123  The third test of the system, conducted in July 2000, was also 
unsuccessful as the kill vehicle again failed to separate from the booster rocket.
124
  In addition to 
this, the Pentagon’s internal investigation into whether NMD technology was sufficiently advanced 
to warrant deployment suggested that: 
 Given the immaturity of ground testing, the delays in ground test capabilities; the 
 limitations of flight-testing and the inadequacy of available simulations, a rigorous 
 assessment of potential system performance cannot be made.
125
 
As a result, the Report felt strongly enough to argue that: “the system has not demonstrated an 
integrated capability… [Or] an ability to defend all 50 states satisfactorily”.126   
 The immaturity of NMD technology was a key reason behind Clinton’s decision to postpone 
deployment.  Undersecretary of Defense for Policy Walt Slocombe – a supporter of BMD within 
the administration – would later quip that the programme “was not a technological success to put it 
mildly.”127  It was also indirectly a key reason for the decline of bipartisan support for the system in 
Congress, and why negotiations with the Russians over the ABM Treaty became increasingly 
complicated.  With only three tests of the NMD system having been carried out by the time Clinton 
made his decision, the president simply didn’t believe the evidence existed to push ahead with 
deploying an untested and unproven national missile defence.  
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While the successful NMD test in October 1999 had intensified support for a national missile 
defence deployment, in the wake of the second, but particularly the third test failures, pressure from 
Congress, and Democratic acquiescence with the NMD plan, gradually fell away.
128
  This would be 
replaced by a strong feeling that deployment should be postponed until after the forthcoming 
election.
129
  Moreover, Republicans could no longer accuse the administration of deliberately 
ignoring the programme, and could do little until Clinton announced his decision in late summer 
2000, or until a third test of the system had been conducted.  Nevertheless, significant support 
remained amongst NMD enthusiasts in the Republican Party, and in April 2000, 25 prominent 
members sent Clinton a letter outlining their complete opposition to ABM Treaty amendments, 
suggesting that without a change of approach any agreements would not be ratified in the Senate.
130
  
The resolve of these lawmakers was underlined on 13th October 1999 as the Senate failed to ratify 
the CTBT, the first security related treaty in 80 years that the Senate had rejected.
131
  According to 
Stephen Cambone, in this context, the defeat of the CTBT was “politically important,” as it 
demonstrated the antagonistic nature of the Republican controlled Congress to Clinton’s arms 
control agenda.
132
 
 In addition to the problems with technology, international developments throughout 1999 
and 2000 reduced the feeling that the missile threat to the US was imminent and growing.  In 
August 1999, for example, proposals with North Korea about suspending its ballistic missile 
programme began, and in September, an agreement was reached whereby Pyongyang would halt its 
missile tests while discussions were underway with the US.
133
  Additionally, in early 2000, the State 
Department relabelled both North and Iran as merely “states of concern”.134  As a result, the 2005 
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deployment date began to look more arbitrary and unnecessary, and political pressure for immediate 
deployment began to cool. 
 Clinton chose not to push ahead with NMD deployment in the summer of 2000 because of 
the substantial international problems he perceived such a decision would cause.  In order to field a 
system able to protect all 50 states, as had been stipulated by the Missile Defense Act, the ABM 
Treaty needed to be amended, but the Russians did not accept that there was any need for this, and 
other international allies and strategic competitors remained deeply against any violation of the 
Treaty.  According to Robert Bell, Clinton always had in the back of his mind the international and 
diplomatic cost that ordering deployment would entail, and this was a key reason, in addition to 
technology, why he decided to postpone it.
135
  Another senior Administration official would later 
explain that “Clinton decided not to authorise construction outside the Treaty because he didn’t 
want to be responsible for busting the relationship with Russia”.136  Nevertheless, Bell later 
suggested that the decision was a “close call”.137  
In the end Clinton announced during a speech at George Washington University on the 1
st
 
September 2000 that: 
 I simply cannot conclude, with the information I have today, that we have enough 
 confidence in the technology and the operational effectiveness of the entire NMD system to 
 move forward with deployment.
138
 
As a result, the first possible date for the system to become operational slipped from 2005 to at the 
earliest 2006, as work would not begin on the radar site in Alaska until the next year.  Michael 
Krepon later remarked that “Clinton got the balance right” because there were only “fictional 
benefits” of ordering deployment and getting rid of the Treaty.139  In Bradley Graham’s view, the 
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decision was also overshadowed by the president’s focus on developments in North Korea and the 
Middle East.
140
 
 Clinton decided to postpone a decision on deployment of a national missile defence for two 
main reasons; firstly, the technology had not been proved mature enough, and secondly Clinton was 
desperate not to upset international stability by abrogating the ABM Treaty.  Clinton was not helped 
by either the politically driven NMD development schedule that made technological problems 
almost inevitable, or by Russian intransigence and other international complications over amending 
the ABM Treaty.  This in turn, according to John Holum, was a product of the “rushed schedule” 
following the events of 1998.
141
  Ultimately, although the administration was not against beginning 
to field a national missile defence system if the threat warranted it, and tried hard to find a 
compromise whereby the NMD plan could remain within the ABM Treaty, the maintenance of the 
Treaty continued to be a more important foreign policy priority.  Nevertheless, Clinton set in train 
policies that were ultimately to derail the Treaty under the next president. 
 
(3) Assessing the drivers of policy, 1997-2001 
Alterations in the international system largely explain why Clinton was forced to change gear on 
BMD during this period, while the immaturity of missile defence technology and the importance 
placed on the relationship with Russia, would appear to explain why the president did not order 
deployment in 2000.  However, these dynamics do not clarify the full story, and as such, the 
importance of domestic variables needs to be evaluated; particularly the institutional balance 
between president and Congress, and the political divide between Democrats and Republicans, in 
order to understand the particular rhythms of policy between 1997 and 2000. 
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International and technological factors 
International and systemic pressures broadly explain the direction and evolution of policy between 
1997 and 2001.  The North Korean missile tests in 1998 – which compounded the findings of the 
influential Rumsfeld Report – largely explain why the contours of the missile defence debate 
shifted, and why the US moved inexorably closer to deploying both national and theatre missile 
defences during this period.  At the same time, international pressures partly explain Clinton’s 
reluctance to commit his administration to a deployment decision.  In particular, Clinton remained 
conscious of Russian and Chinese opposition and the views held by key US allies of US BMD 
plans, and of the negative international implications he believed such a move would have for 
international stability.  Developments in the international system can also explain to some extent 
why Democrats shifted position midway during this period from outright opposition and attempting 
to prevent Republican NMD legislation, to a positioning of trying to ensure the programme 
remained within the ABM Treaty. 
Nevertheless, changes in the international system do not explain why Clinton signed the 
1999 Missile Defense Act but then decided against making a decision on deployment in 2000.    
Neither do systemic pressures explain why the focus of US BMD policy shifted from theatre and 
battlefield missile defence to national missile defence despite the fact that the new types of threat 
appeared to be limited, short-range and primarily regional.
142
  But perhaps most importantly, 
international pressures do not explain why Clinton signed the Missile Defense Act despite having 
no credible deployment plan, or indeed, one that appeared technologically, politically or 
strategically viable.
143
  Above all, the international system cannot explain why opinion remained 
fundamentally divided over BMD between Republicans and Democrats, and between president and 
Congress. 
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 Some of these dynamics can be explained by developments in technology – or more 
specifically – the lack of it.  In particular, Clinton’s decision to push back the earliest possible 
deployment date for a national BMD system to 2005, and then not to order deployment in late 2000, 
was certainly shaped by the fact that he didn’t feel that enough successful testing had been 
conducted to push ahead.
144
  The absence of credible technology also explains the resistance shown 
by both Clinton and the Democrats to Republican calls for early NMD deployment.  However, the 
progress in technology does not explain why Clinton pursued a missile defence plan that appeared 
largely at odds with his wider foreign policy agenda.  Neither can technology explain why Clinton 
decided to jeopardise and complicate relations and arms reductions with Russia by pushing for 
ABM Treaty amendments, or why the Republican Party continued to legislate for near-term 
national missile defence deployment.  Consequently, neither developments in the international 
system nor the capabilities of technology can fully explain the particular evolution of policy during 
this period.  
 
Domestic factors 
To fully understand why policy evolved in the manner it did between 1997 and 2001 requires 
examination of the actions and thinking of President Clinton and lawmakers in Congress.  The 
Clinton administration’s policy agenda and decision to pursue a national missile defence 
deployment plan for primarily domestic political reasons, explains why policy appeared to be in 
disarray by 1999.  However, this in turn can only be understood by assessing the particular 
influence of a determined Republican leadership in Congress to shape and push ahead with policy, 
which was also driven in part by domestic political reasons.  As a May 2000 op-ed declared: 
 Given the serious technical, cost and arms control problems plaguing the Clinton 
 administration’s proposed NMD system, the most convincing explanation for the undue 
 haste with which this issue is being decided is that both the Clinton Administration and its 
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 conservative adversaries in Congress and the Bush campaign, are playing politics with the 
 missile defense issue.
145
 
As such, it was both the Clinton administration’s complex and in some respects contradictory 
international policy agenda, and the political interplay both within Congress and between Congress 
and the president, that would shape policy between 1997 and 2001. 
 President Clinton’s actions and policy priorities were a key reason why the missile defence 
programme evolved in the manner it did.  In particular, it was his desire to retain international 
stability through continued adherence to the ABM Treaty, while at the same time attempting to 
depoliticise the issue of BMD domestically, which would shape policy.  More specifically, the 
importance given to the relationship with Russia (at least in terms of nuclear reductions) ensured 
that developing and deploying national missile defences would be a complicated diplomatic 
undertaking, while the general lack of attention given to the programme domestically meant that the 
technological requirements of deployment were only seriously considered in late 1999.  In addition 
to this, presidential pressure on policy making, and the domestic politics of BMD, would also be 
shaped by the impeachment trial that Clinton faced during this period.  The multifaceted problems 
that confronted the Clinton administration by 2000, namely trying to balance a wide range of 
international and domestic requirements, were a direct result of these dynamics.  The result, in the 
words Anthony Cordesman, was that domestic political dynamics created a “lowest common 
denominator system” largely bequeathed by the “incessant political battles between the 
administration and Congress”.146 
 Nevertheless, it is unlikely that the Clinton administration would have been pressured into 
confronting these issues or taking these decisions, had it not been for the pressure exerted on policy 
by Congress.  Although much of the BMD debate was confined to Congress during 1997 and 1998, 
by 1999 both parties had essentially reached a loose agreement on BMD, which would become 
codified in the 1999 Missile Defense Act.  This can partly be explained by the change in attitude of 
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the Democratic leadership in Congress, which after 1998, and specifically after the Clinton 
administration appeared to change tack, softened their stance on BMD deployment.  However, the 
main pressure was produced by the unstinting desire of the Republican leadership to push for 
deployment, which in 1999, after five years of pressure, looked set to be realised.  Nevertheless, the 
amendments written into the Missile Defense Act at the Democrat’s behest ensured that Clinton 
retained enough flexibility to defer deployment of the system in 2000.  In the words of Walt 
Slocombe: 
 A lot of this was pure politics.  But if you could find a responsible and useful use for missile 
 defence, then the fact that it could nullify some Republican pressure was far from being a 
 bad thing.
147
 
Consequently, policy was a reflection of both domestic political actors in general, and of 
domestic political reasons in particular.  In this sense, while genuine support existed for BMD both 
within Congress and the White House, the rhythms of policy were essentially shaped by party 
politics and by the particular pressures arising from the institutional balance between president and 
Congress during this period. 
 
Conclusion 
Bill Clinton’s second term in office represents a period of marked change in US ballistic missile 
defence thinking, whereby debate shifted noticeably closer towards acceptance of both battlefield 
and some type of national BMD deployment.  For example, in 1996, debate about US national 
missile defence plans remained staunchly partisan, and split between those advocating deployment 
and those advocating further research and development.  By 2001, this debate had shifted to a point 
where disagreement was about how to field such a system, what guise this system would take, and 
how this could be balanced with other international dynamics and pressures.  By the end of 
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Clinton’s presidency, the US had largely moved towards accepting that both TMD and NMD had a 
role to play in US national security strategy. 
 This shift in thinking can be explained by a collection of dynamics driven by perceived 
developments in the international system.  As such, whereas Clinton’s 1996 “3+3 plan” was 
arguably the product of domestic party political pressures, the 1999 Missile Defense Act reflected a 
growing acceptance that the missile threat was increasing faster than had previously been believed.  
Specifically, the 1998 North Korean missile launch and Rumsfeld Report cemented the idea that the 
environment in which the US was acting was changing.  Nevertheless, the debate may not have 
moved forward as briskly during this period had it not been for the incessant pressure from 
Republicans in Congress, and for the political manoeuvring of President Clinton.  It is therefore 
unlikely that the perceived changes in the international system would have had quite such an impact 
were it not for Republican dominance in Congress, and Clinton’s natural desire to chart a political 
middle ground.  As a result, the speed and shape of the change in the debate must be put down to 
the particular influences of both president and Congress, and to both domestic political actors and 
domestic political reasons.  According to Anthony Cordesman,  
It is extremely unlikely that such a system architecture would ever have evolved in this 
 particular form if a pro-NMD Republican president had not first faced anti-NMD Democrat 
 majorities in Congress, and if President Clinton had not had to make key decisions at a time 
 when he was perceived as weak on defense and had to deal with the threat of 
 impeachment.
148
 
 As Bill Clinton left office, the US ballistic missile defence programme and debate had 
shifted considerably, and although the pace at which BMD would advance would likely be 
conditioned by the outcome of the 2000 presidential election, it seemed probable that BMD would 
continue to play a bigger role in the future.  That said, there was still little indication that the 
Pentagon had mastered the problems of “hitting a bullet with a bullet”, or that North Korea, Iran or 
Iraq were on the brink of being able to threaten the US homeland with a nuclear-armed ICBM.  
Nevertheless, by 2001 both national and theatre missile defence had essentially become accepted as 
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an important future component of US national security strategy, and debate had largely shifted from 
zero-sum disagreements about NMD to differences about the extent, type and effectiveness of such 
defences.
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George W. Bush, ABM Treaty Abrogation and 
Deployment, (2001-2005) 
 
George W. Bush took office with very different ideas about ballistic missile defence than had Bill 
Clinton.  In fact, Bush was probably the first post-Cold War president to truly embrace the idea of 
BMD.  Bush fervently believed that the US could no longer rely on Cold War security frameworks, 
and specifically that the 30-year-old Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty should either be fundamentally 
adapted, or abrogated, in order to allow the US to deploy a full range of both offensive and 
defensive weaponry to ensure its security.  In Bush’s mind, the US needed the freedom to deploy a 
range of ballistic missile defences in order to meet the new missile threats of what he and many in 
his administration believed to be a more dangerous and unstable international environment.  
Nevertheless, as Bush took office, the US remained bound by the ABM Treaty and limited by the 
technological immaturity of the majority of BMD systems under development at the time.  
Moreover, Bush entered office faced with a Democratic leadership in Congress determined to limit 
Bush’s BMD plans and retain the ABM Treaty as the centrepiece of US security.  As a result, in 
early 2001, it was unclear whether Bush would be able to push ahead with the type of BMD 
programme that he wanted. 
 Had terrorists not attacked the US on September 11
th
 2001, it is arguable that Bush’s missile 
defence plans may have remained hampered, and it is equally likely that his administration would 
have found it far harder to abrogate the ABM Treaty.  However, the events of that day – while not 
necessarily changing the views of those within the administration
1
 – did provide the political 
opportunity for Bush to push ahead.  As a result, within two years of the ABM Treaty ending, the 
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Bush administration had begun fielding long-range missile interceptors at two bases on the US 
homeland, begun informal discussions about further deployments in Europe and elsewhere around 
the world, and were actively pursuing a wide-range of different BMD programmes.  The pace of 
these developments had much to do with a new type of deployment plan adopted by the 
administration – one whereby assets would be deployed before fully tested – under a model known 
as spiral development.  When this was coupled with Democratic acquiescence after 9-11, and a 
Republican controlled Congress after 2002, the Bush Administration was able to push ahead 
precipitously with its BMD plans.  The result was a seismic shift in the BMD debate. 
 The developments during this period therefore raise several interesting questions.  First, why 
did Bush view the abrogation of the ABM Treaty as integral to US security, while the Clinton 
administration had remained determined not to undermine it?  Second, why did the Bush 
administration pursue a technological development and deployment model that allowed BMD assets 
to be deployed before being fully tested or proven?  Third, why did the terrorist attacks of 9-11 have 
such a transforming impact on the debate, despite having relatively little direct connection with 
BMD policy?  In order to understand these questions an examination of the interplay between 
domestic, international and technological influences, and how these combined to produce the 
complicated policy outcomes described above, is required. 
 
(1) Competing pressures on BMD policy, 2001-2005 
Despite the progress made during the Clinton administration, as Bush began his presidency, US 
missile defence plans remained constrained by the ABM Treaty and international opinion, and 
technologically by a range of engineering and developmental problems.  Moreover, and although 
Bush entered office determined to push ahead and deploy both national and theatre missile defences 
as soon as possible, his administration remained hampered by the continued scepticism of the 
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Democratic leadership in Congress.  As such, it was widely felt that a polarised partisan debate, as 
well as international and technological pressures, would impede progress on BMD.
2
 
 
International pressures on policymaking 
International pressure on the BMD debate during this period was a direct reflection of the changing 
balance between the importance of strategic relations with Russia and the growing threat from 
rogue states.  This pressure was also split between the first two years of Bush’s presidency and the 
second, or more specifically, between the years before abrogation of the ABM Treaty, and the years 
that followed.  On top of this, perhaps the most important international pressure was the terrorist 
attacks of September 11
th
 2001, which although not directly linked to the issue of missile defence, 
had a significant transforming impact on the domestic debate in general, and threat perception in 
particular.  
 As Bush took office, there was little to suggest that Russia, China, or many US allies in 
Europe had changed their largely sceptical views of US BMD plans.  Russia and China remained 
concerned about the impact that US BMD plans would have on nuclear deterrence and on their 
respective security and status
3
, while US allies, particularly in Europe, were concerned about the 
greater international instability that such a move might bring.
4
  As a result, international opinion 
remained firmly behind the ABM Treaty at the beginning of this period, and Moscow and Beijing 
continued voicing their concerns about US BMD plans throughout.
5
    
 At the same time, and although the latest National Intelligence Estimate released in 
December 2001 suggested that any new long-range missile threat to the US remained at least a 
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decade away,
6
 pressure continued to grow from developments in Iran, North Korea and Iraq.  In 
August 2002 for example, Iranian dissident Alireza Jafarzadeh revealed that Teheran had been 
pursuing a secret nuclear weapons programme, and had already constructed a uranium enrichment 
facility at Nanantz, and a heavy water facility at Arak, deep inside Iran.
7
  The North Korean 
decision to expel IAEA weapons inspectors and to restart its uranium enrichment programme at 
Yongbon in December 2002, combined with the announcement in January 2003 that it would be 
leaving the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, compounded this growing concern.
8
  Although the 
declaration by Tripoli that Libya would be giving up its WMD programme in late 2003 served to 
lessen the threat,
9
 as did, in theory, the invasion of Iraq and removal of Saddam Hussein the same 
year, concern continued to grow about the rogue state WMD threat – particularly after 9-11.10 
 The final key international dynamic during this period was the impact of the terrorist attacks 
of September 11
th 
2001, and the subsequent decision taken by the Bush administration to abrogate 
the ABM Treaty.  Essentially 9-11 had three significant implications.  First, the attacks ushered in a 
new sense of vulnerability, and for some within the Bush Administration, highlighted the fact that 
the US could no longer rely solely on Cold War era national security thinking.
11
  Second, the 
attacks paved the way both domestically and internationally for the end of the ABM Treaty, and as 
such opened the door for the Bush administration to begin legally developing and deploying a 
comprehensive missile defence system.  Thirdly, in the wake of the attacks, America’s NATO allies 
would begin a gradual move towards accepting BMD, and even Russia would suspend its 
opposition to US missile defence plans.  The net result was that the US was no longer legally, and 
to an extent diplomatically, bound to limit missile defence plans.   
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As a result, international pressure on policymaking varied during this period as the balance 
between rogue state missile threats and diplomatic relations with Russia and China appeared to 
shift.  Moreover, with the abrogation of the ABM Treaty, the international legal context changed, 
which meant that the US was no longer constrained in what it was able to test and deploy.  
However, the wars that would follow in Afghanistan, and particularly in Iraq, would influence US 
BMD policy both through their cost, and through the international diplomatic fallout that they 
would cause. 
 
Technological pressures on policymaking 
Although the Bush administration would double funding for missile defence research and 
development during this period, the majority of commentators and independent scientists remained 
sceptical of the capability of the technologies under development.  In fact, a review conducted by 
the Pentagon in 2001 found that other than the Ground-Based Interceptor programme and the 
Patriot system, very few technologies were anywhere near ready for deployment.
12
  Moreover, 
many of the tests of these systems remained developmental in nature.   
 Throughout this period the independent science and engineering community in the US 
expressed strong scepticism that there was any technological justification for rushing ahead with 
deployment of an integrated ballistic missile defence system.
13
  Even some members of the Bush 
administration remained unconvinced about the capability of some technologies.  A key part of the 
reason for this was that the Pentagon simply did not conduct many tests of the system between 2001 
and 2005, and that when they did, the results of these tests were often classified and characterised as 
being far from “realistic”.14  In fact, the failed test of the Ground-Based Midcourse Defense System 
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in December 2004 would be the last trial before testing shifted to “operationally configured 
interceptors” i.e. those that had been deployed.15  According to one Senior Official: 
The result was that many independent scientists and engineers felt that there simply was not
 enough evidence to support a decision about early deployment or abrogation of the ABM 
 Treaty, let alone actually putting the interceptors in the ground.
16
  
That said, progress was made in other BMD technologies that continued to improve during this 
period, notably battlefield systems such as Patriot.
17
 
 The second key technological pressure on policy came from a fundamental change in how 
the BMDO (after 2002 the US Missile Defence Agency) went about developing and deploying 
BMD systems.
18
  In 2002, the Bush administration announced that it would be adopting a 
“capabilities based approach with spiral development”, which would replace the “fly before you 
buy” model used by previous administrations.  Under this new model, BMD assets could be 
deployed before being fully tested, and once deployed, could be altered and upgraded as 
technologies advanced and threats changed.  Although this meant that many commentators and 
lawmakers were deeply sceptical of the capability of the assets deployed in 2004
19
, this model did 
allow US troops to use Patriot PAC-3 batteries during Operation Iraqi Freedom in 2003, which they 
would not otherwise have been able to do under fly before you buy.    
 Much of the testing and development of missile defence technologies during this period 
suggested that the US remained years away from deploying a national missile defence system.  In 
fact, because so little testing had been done, many did not think that the Pentagon had enough 
information to even make a credible deployment decision in 2004, let alone begin putting 
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interceptor missiles in the ground.
20
  However, this was largely tempered by the adoption of a new 
development and deployment strategy by the Bush administration, which ensured that assets could 
be deployed earlier than they might have been before.
21
 
 
Presidential policy agenda 
George W. Bush entered office convinced that missile defences were an important component of 
US national security policy in an era where the requirements of nuclear deterrence, and the types of 
threat that the US faced, had changed.  Bush viewed missile defences as fundamental to ensuring 
US security against rogue states, which he and many of those around him, believed were intent on 
acquiring and possibly using nuclear weapons.  The president also hoped that missile defence 
deployments could be combined with US (and possibly Russian) nuclear disarmament as part of a 
“new strategic framework” that would finally put an end to the Cold War thinking about arms 
control.
22
 
Unlike the two presidents that preceded him, Bush entered office firmly committed to 
deploying missile defences, and if necessary, unilaterally withdrawing from the ABM Treaty.  
According to then Deputy National Security Adviser Stephen Hadley, Bush strongly believed that 
the “US needed to move beyond Cold War thinking” and this meant abrogating the ABM Treaty to 
allow for the deployment of limited national missile defences.
23
  According to Bush: 
  Today’s world requires a new policy, a broad strategy of active non-proliferation, counter-
 proliferation and defenses … we need new concepts of deterrence that rely on offensive and 
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 defensive forces … defenses can strengthen deterrence by reducing the incentive for 
 proliferation.
24
 
This mix of offensive reductions, defensive deployments and other counter-proliferation measures 
would become the central tenets of Bush’s “new strategic doctrine”, and would mark a fundamental 
break from previous policy.  Under this new thinking, nuclear reductions with Russia would be 
pursued at the same time as ballistic missile defences were deployed to counter the growing WMD 
threat from rogue states.
25
  Bush outlined this thinking in a speech on 1
st
 May 2001:  
 Today, the sun comes up on a vastly different world … Russia is no longer our enemy … 
 yet this is still a dangerous world, a less certain, a less predictable one.  More nations have 
 nuclear weapons and still more have nuclear aspirations … most troubling of all, the list of 
 these countries includes some of the world’s least responsible states … unlike during the 
 Cold War, today’s most urgent threat stems not from thousands of ballistic missiles in 
 Soviet hands, but from a small number of missiles in the hands of these states.
26
 
In the words of Special Assistant to the President, Robert Joseph, the Administration was 
determined that “arms control would not get in the way of nuclear reductions”.27 
 Finally, Bush entered office surrounded by a group of hawkish conservative advisers and 
officials, dubbed “the Vulcans”.28  Foremost amongst this group was National Security Adviser 
Condoleezza Rice who had earlier made it clear that she saw the threat from rogue states and 
nuclear proliferation as “the most important reasons to deploy missile defenses as soon as 
possible”.29  Other prominent figures included Undersecretary of Defense for Policy Paul 
Wolfowitz, Vice President Dick Cheney – both of whom had a strong dislike of the ABM Treaty, 
and Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, who according to Stephen Cambone, had spent the two 
years since the publication of the “Rumsfeld Report” thinking long and hard about missile 
defence.
30
.  Consequently, Bush entered office with a team of advisers – with the exception of 
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Secretary of State Colin Powell
31
 – that viewed the world in a similar way, and were all positively 
disposed towards the idea of ending the ABM Treaty and deploying missile defences.
32
   
Under Bush, presidential pressure on policymaking was strongly geared towards deploying 
a range of integrated missile defences as soon as possible.  A key reason for this was the pessimistic 
view of Bush and many of those around him about the unstable and dangerous nature of the 
international system, but it was also part of Bush’s vision to move beyond the Cold War logic of 
MAD and move to an era where missile defences could be combined with nuclear reductions.  
Moreover, unlike either George H. W. Bush or Bill Clinton, George W. Bush was also far less 
concerned about Russia - who he “really didn’t think was a problem” - and far more optimistic 
about BMD technology.
33
  In the words of Principal Deputy Assistant to the Vice President for 
National Security Affairs Eric Edelman, this was driven by Bush’s determination to “finally end the 
thinking that had dominated the Cold War relationship with Russia” because he “cared far more 
about Iran, Iraq and North Korea”.34 
 
Congressional pressure on policymaking 
At the start of 2001, attitudes towards BMD remained split along party lines in Congress, and the 
Democratic leadership would begin this period determined to limit Bush’s missile defence plans, 
especially anything that undermined the ABM Treaty.
35
  However, and while Democrats launched 
vocal attacks on the Bush administration’s plans during the first half of 2001, the party leadership 
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was only really able to apply serious pressure on policy after Senator James Jeffords defected from 
the Republican Party in May, giving the Democrats control of the Senate.
36
  From this new position 
of strength, the Democratic leadership began reworking Bush’s proposed BMD budget, redirecting 
funds to other Pentagon projects, and cancelling funding for anything that appeared “inconsistent 
with the ABM Treaty”.37  Republicans, while keen to support their president and back the 
administration’s revamped missile defences plans, were relatively powerless in the face of 
Democratic control of Congress during the summer of 2001.
38
 
Congressional pressure on policymaking changed considerably with the terrorist strikes of 
9/11.  Democrats almost immediately became less willing to directly oppose the president’s plans, 
and consequently relaxed their opposition to Bush’s budget request.39  Moreover, although 
Democrats remained concerned about Bush’s desire to abrogate the ABM Treaty, and would 
continue to apply pressure – particularly for more rigorous testing and oversight before deployment 
– after 2001 the debate had changed.  This shift was compounded in late 2002 as Republican 
victories in the Congressional elections ensured that Congress exerted relatively little pressure on 
BMD during the second two years of Bush first term; instead, lawmakers were largely complicit 
with the president’s plans during 2003 and 2004.40  Fundamentally, the actions of the Bush 
administration shifted the political debate in Congress during this period from disagreements over 
whether to deploy and how, to disputes about the pace of deployment, and ensuring what was 
deployed was properly tested.   
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(2) The evolution of policy, 2001-2005 
Although the US BMD debate had moved forward during Clinton’s presidency, the future shape, 
type and pace of deployment remained uncertain.  Primarily, this was because in early 2001, US 
missile defence plans remained constrained by the ABM Treaty, and by the relatively 
underdeveloped and immature state of technology.  Moreover, much suggested that the political 
battles that had surrounded missile defence during the 1990s between Democrats and Republicans 
would continue, which in turn suggested that Bush’s plans would be heavily scrutinised throughout 
this period.  As a result, and even though Bush took office keen to push ahead with missile defence, 
it was unclear how the US BMD programme would develop during his presidency. 
 
2001: Ballistic missile defence before 9/11 
According to Washington Post correspondent Bradley Graham, although Bush’s interest in missile 
defence could be traced back to the 1980s, and in particular, to Ronald Reagan’s SDI speech, the 
issue had featured little in Bush’s political career until he embarked upon his campaign for the 
presidency in the late 1990s.
41
  In fact, it wasn’t until September 1999 during a speech in South 
Carolina that Bush publicly declared his intention to deploy both “theatre and national missile 
defences at the earliest possible date” and that this would be done “even if Russia did not agree to 
amend the ABM Treaty”.42  Following this, the issue of missile defence would become a key 
defining issue for Bush in the presidential campaign against his Democratic rival Al Gore in the 
summer of 2000.
43
  Bush accused the Democratic candidate of being complicit in the Clinton 
administration’s “excessively deliberate, limited and half-hearted a BMD policy”,44 and warned the 
then incumbent Democratic administration against concluding a deal with Russia that would hinder 
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any future US NMD deployment, saying that “no agreement would be better than a flawed 
agreement” on the ABM Treaty and BMD.45  However, despite speaking vociferously about BMD 
during the election, and while few questioned the fact that, if elected, Bush would look to push 
ahead and expand the programme, James Lindsay and Michael O’Hanlon described Bush as being 
“long on rhetoric but short on detail” about the specifics of this missile defence plan.46  Moreover, it 
was assumed that the Bush administration would prioritise its domestic agenda, which included a 
$1.6t tax cut and education reform.
47
 
 One of the first things that Bush did upon assuming office was to order Secretary of Defense 
Donald Rumsfeld and leading officials at the Pentagon, to conduct a wide-ranging and extensive 
review of BMD technologies and programmes currently under development.  Under instructions 
from Bush, Rumsfeld told Pentagon officials to think “outside of the box” when it came to the types 
of programmes or systems that it might be both possible or necessary to develop, and most 
importantly made it clear that these should not be constrained by what may or may not be permitted 
by the ABM Treaty.
48
  When it was completed two months later, the review found that other than 
the Ground-Based Interceptor (GBI) system preferred by the Clinton administration (and which was 
originally based on the ERIS interceptor), and the Patriot theatre BMD system used by the Army, 
very few technologies were anywhere near being ready for deployment.
49
  To help streamline the 
missile defence effort and in order to prioritise the most promising technologies and pursue a wide 
variety of systems, Rumsfeld abolished the bureaucratic distinction between “national” and 
“theatre” BMD systems, and integrated all BMD research and development under one institutional 
umbrella.
50
  To fund the new BMD project the administration asked Congress for a 57% increase in 
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funding for BMD for fiscal year 2002, taking the annual appropriation from $5.3b to $8.3b.
51
  
Although the majority of funds were given to the GBI, the budget also gave significant preference 
to other means of protecting against long-range threats, and included plans to give both THAAD 
and the Navy Theatre Wide (NTW) system long-range defensive capabilities.
52
 
 Although it had been clear that the Bush administration was preparing and planning to push 
ahead with missile defence, it was not until 1
st
 May 2001 during a speech to students and faculty at 
National Defense University that Bush outlined his vision for the future of US missile defence 
policy.  The key point to the speech was that “missile defenses were needed to counter the different 
threats of today’s world”, and equally importantly, Bush stated: 
 We must move beyond the constraints of the 30 year-old ABM Treaty.  This Treaty does 
 not recognize the present, or point us to the future.  It enshrines the past.  No Treaty that 
 prevents us from addressing today’s threats, that prohibits us from pursuing promising 
 technology to defend ourselves, our friends and our allies is in our interests or in the 
 interests of world peace.
53
 
Although the actual shape and components of the plan remained vague, Bush continued to stress 
that the US BMD programme would come into conflict with the ABM Treaty in “months not 
years”.54  However, the president was also equally eager to convince the international community 
that US action regarding missile defence and the ABM Treaty would not be unilateral.  In fact, he 
made sure to call various European leaders personally to discuss the speech before it was made.
55
  
Bush was keen to stress that he “intended to prepare the diplomatic ground for a US withdrawal 
[from the ABM Treaty] rather than present the world with a fait accompli.”56  Nevertheless, neither 
Russia and China, nor America’s traditional allies in Europe, responded particularly favourably to 
the speech.  In Europe, notably in France and Germany – where relations had already been strained 
by Bush’s decisions on the International Criminal Court and the Kyoto protocol – Secretary of 
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Defense Donald Rumsfeld’s announcement during a speech to a meeting of NATO defence 
ministers that he believed that the ABM Treaty “stands in the way of a 21st century approach to 
deterrence” was greeted with some trepidation, especially after Rumsfeld also made it clear that 
America had no reservations in moving beyond the Treaty, and that the Bush administration was 
likely to deploy certain BMD systems before fully testing them.
57
   
 Bush’s plan was received with equal concern by Russia and China, and leaders from both 
countries cautioned the president against undermining the ABM Treaty and ushering in a new 
period of instability.  Nevertheless, discussions with Russia about amending the Treaty had begun 
almost as soon as Bush entered office, and in February 2001, Bush sent Secretary of State Colin 
Powell to meet Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov in Cairo, Egypt to discuss possible 
amendments.
58
  Bush met Putin in person in Ljubljana, Slovenia during June 2001 to see what could 
be agreed regarding the ABM Treaty and missile defence, but Putin held firm, even threatening to 
place Multiple Independently Targetable Reentry Vehicles (MIRV)
59
 on Russian ICBM’s in 
response to any American BMD deployments not permitted by the Treaty.
60
  Although Bush and 
Putin expressed a desire to move towards a “new strategic framework on nuclear arms reductions”, 
nothing specific was agreed on the ABM Treaty.
61
  
 The Strategic Survey, published by the International Institute for Strategic Studies, claimed 
that; “no security issue so preoccupied the first nine months of an otherwise domestically focused 
Bush administration than the deployment of global missile defenses”.62  But despite this, very little 
of any tangible nature was achieved during the first nine months of Bush’s first term in office, for 
although the president had made it clear he wanted to deploy an extensive system and move beyond 
the ABM Treaty, neither priority had achieved much progress.  The reasons for this were partly 
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technological; primarily the fact that an actual system simply didn’t exist to be deployed, 
diplomatic; because the plan was not well received internationally, and political; because Congress 
and above all Democrats simply didn’t feel that the threat justified Bush’s policy.   
 
The 2000 general elections had not only resulted in a negligible political mandate for George W. 
Bush, but had also greatly eroded Republican power in Congress.  Consequently, for the first time 
since the Republican takeover of power six years earlier, Democrats could bring more influence to 
bear to the missile defence debate, and more directly on Bush’s BMD plan.  Moreover, with Bill 
Clinton now gone from the White House, the Democratic leadership were no longer constrained by 
the president’s policy agenda, and subsequently set about transforming BMD into a key issue with 
which to energise and unite the party base against the Bush administration, much as the 
Republicans had done against President Clinton in 1994.
63
  Senator Tom Daschle (D-SD) described 
the forthcoming battle over missile defence as “one of the most important and consequential 
debates we will see in our life time”.64 
 Although the Democrats had begun their campaign in the Senate against Bush’s new missile 
defence plan almost immediately upon taking office, real impetus did not arrive until Bush’s 
National Defense University speech in May 2001.
65
  The Democratic leadership raised sharp 
objections to Bush’s plan, pointing to the likely negative impact on arms control, diplomacy and 
military strategy, as well as the budgetary implications of the proposal, and strongly voiced their 
concern that abandoning the ABM Treaty in pursuit of this goal would represent a grave mistake.
66
  
Senator Joseph Biden (D-DE) warned that “the devil is in the details” because Bush still hadn’t 
actually outlined what he intended to do, while Senator Tom Daschle (D-SD) simply stated that “a 
missile defense system that undermines our nation politically, economically and strategically – 
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without providing any real security – is no defense at all”.67  What is more, because it was clear 
from the provisions of the budget request and the administration’s plans in general, that the Bush 
administration would breach the ABM Treaty, Democrats on the Senate Armed Services Committee 
felt legally bound to clarify and if necessary oppose them.
68
  As such, Senator Carl Levin (D-MI) 
maintained that Democrats would “try in some way to stop the expenditure of funds for a system 
that would abrogate the ABM Treaty”.69  Nevertheless, Vice President Dick Cheney’s casting vote 
in the Senate meant that the Republicans retained de facto control of BMD policy.  
 On 23
rd
 May 2001, Senator James Jeffords (R-VM) defected from the Republican Party to 
become an Independent, citing the strongly conservative agenda outlined by the Bush 
administration – including its missile defence plans – and in one stroke fundamentally altered the 
domestic BMD political context.
70
  Jeffords defection tipped control of the Senate to the Democrats, 
handing them control of key committees in the US Senate, and thus the ability to set the political 
agenda and to stand up to the president’s BMD programme.71  The change put BMD sceptics 
Senator Carl Levin (D-MI) in charge of the Senate Armed Service Committee and Senator Joseph 
Biden (D-DE) at the Foreign Relations Committee.  One commentator suggested that the 
transformation would mean that the Bush administration would no longer be able to “govern 
through a megaphone”, and would be forced to seek consensus with Democrats who generally did 
not see missile defence as a priority.
72
  As the Associated Press pointed out, one obvious 
implication was that “Bush’s BMD plan would now come under much more scrutiny and 
pressure”.73 
 With the Democrats now in charge of the Senate, lawmakers went to work immediately on 
Bush’s proposed BMD budget, and by the 7th September the Senate Armed Services Committee had 
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passed a Bill by 13 votes to 12 (along party lines) approving a revised version of the 
administration’s request.  The revision redirected $1.3b of the $8.3b request to other Pentagon 
projects, and included language that banned funding for any missile defence activities that Congress 
believed were “inconsistent with the ABM Treaty”.74  In the House, Representatives Ike Skelton 
(D-MO) and John Spratt (D-SC) filed an amendment to cut $918m from the budget request, 
cancelling much of the funds needed to begin construction of a test site in Alaska.
75
  Although the 
Democrats did not want to end the programme entirely – for there was a perception that it could 
have an important role to play in the future – and were prepared to countenance increased funding 
for further research, they simply did not see the urgency of the Bush administration’s plan, nor the 
need to upset the diplomatic international arms control system by running up against the ABM 
Treaty.
76
 
 One of the key reasons why Democrats remained so vehement in their opposition to Bush’s 
proposed expansion of the American missile defence effort, was because the technology needed to 
achieve such a task seemed to remain many years away.  In particular, continued problems with the 
missile defence development programme being carried out by the BMDO meant that the 4
th
 test of 
the Ground-Based Interceptor missile did not take place until mid-July 2001, and even then Major 
General Willie Nance, head of the NMD programme at the BMDO, was quick to point out that the 
recent test was “scripted” and was very much a “developmental” rather than “operational” test 
success.
77
  When this was coupled with a general lack of concern within Congress and amongst the 
US public – who remained far more interested in domestic issues such as education, Medicare and 
social security than on issues of national security – and particularly America’s allies in Europe78, 
very little support for what Bush was proposing to do existed outside of his administration.
79
 
                                                          
74
 Wade Boese, “Democrats withdraw missile defense restrictions”, Arms Control Today, (October 2001) 
75
 Ibid 
76
 Alison Mitchell, “Senate leader to challenge Bush today on missile defense”, New York Times, (9th August 2001) 
77
 Burns & Brune (2003) 187 
78
 For more on this see Colin Gray, "European perspectives on US ballistic missile defense," Comparative Strategy, 21 
(2002) pp279-310 
79
 Graham (2003) 350  
George W. Bush, ABM Treaty abrogation and deployment 
 165 
 Attitudes toward missile defence in Congress, particularly after the Democrats gained 
control of the Senate in mid-2001, was a key reason why Bush did not push ahead with BMD as 
precipitously as perhaps he might have liked during the first nine months of his administration.  The 
Democratic leadership sought to make opposition to Bush’s missile defence plans a key unifying 
issue for the party, and saw little need to damage international stability by running up against the 
ABM Treaty.  On top of this, the American public remained relatively uninterested in matters of 
defence, and the technology – particularly the GBI programme – seemed a long way from proving 
itself ready to be deployed.  Consequently, on the eve of 9-11 Bush’s push for missile defence 
appeared to have stalled. 
 
2001: The impact of 9/11 and the end of the ABM Treaty 
The terrorist attacks of September 11
th
 had three important transforming impacts on the American 
missile defence debate.  The first was that it temporarily eradicated Democratic opposition to 
Bush’s BMD programme as lawmakers moved quickly to show solidarity with the president.  The 
second was that international opposition to Bush’s missile defence plan weakened, as Russia and 
key European allies pledged their support to Washington.  Lastly, and as well as providing a 
window of opportunity, 9-11 bolstered the perceived necessity of pushing ahead with BMD in the 
minds of the Bush administration.  Thus, despite having a tenuous link at best with BMD, 9-11 
changed the US missile debate substantially by reducing the perceived diplomatic and political 
costs that might previously have been associated with ABM Treaty withdrawal, or with rapid and 
expansive missile defence deployments. 
 The first and perhaps most important impact was that the terrorist strikes temporarily 
neutered the Democrat’s attempts to contain Bush’s BMD plan.  In the words of Wade Boese, 
analyst at the Arms Control Association:  
George W. Bush, ABM Treaty abrogation and deployment 
 166 
 Seeking to show solidarity with the president after the September 11
th
 terrorist attacks,  
 Democrats largely shelved legislative efforts to limit the Bush administration’s ballistic 
 missile defense plans.
80
 
The fundamental reason for this was that leading Democrats – particularly Senator Carl Levin (D-
MI) – had been equally shocked by the events, and did not want to look unpatriotic.  Levin, who 
had led the Democratic campaign against Bush’s proposed missile defence plan before 9-11, 
desperately wanted to avoid a fight over BMD in this new and uncertain period, stating that “this is 
the wrong time for divisive debate on issues of national defense”.81  A Senior Congressional Staffer 
later commented that this was because Levin was a “honourable man who was desperate to show 
solidarity with the president in a time of crisis”.82  Eight days after the attacks, Levin introduced a 
new Bill into the Senate that no longer limited Bush’s BMD request, and two days after that, Levin 
and Senator John Warner (R-VA) co-sponsored an amendment that reinstated the $1.3b that had 
originally been cut.
83
  Bradley Graham suggested that the Democrats had essentially been 
“politically handcuffed” by 9-11.84 
 The temporary relaxation of opposition to Bush’s plans by the Democratic leadership did 
not however mean that they had dropped their strong support for the continuing validity and 
importance of the ABM Treaty, and while many lawmakers agreed that BMD should be pursued as 
part of a broader national security strategy, this did not necessitate any violation of the Treaty.  
Senator Jack Reid (D-RI) was quick to caution the Bush administration that ABM Treaty 
withdrawal would be “counterproductive because the US needs help from the international 
community, including Russia and China, in combating global terrorism”, and unwarranted because 
most BMD “concepts remain many years away”.85  The Federation of American Scientists warned 
Bush to deny funding for:  
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 Any program, project, or activity that is inconsistent with the Anti-Ballistic Missile 
 Treaty.  The tragic events of September 11 eliminated any doubt that America faces 
 security needs far more substantial than a technically improbable defense against a 
 strategically improbable Third World missile attack.
86
 
The attacks also had significant ramifications internationally, and helped soften attitudes 
towards the Bush administration, and US BMD plans.  Following the attacks, Vladimir Putin 
moved quickly to align Russia with the United States and pledged support for the US response.
87
  
As such, and as well as strengthening bilateral relations between Moscow and Washington, the 
attacks also quietened European criticisms of the Bush administration’s plans.88  Russian reaction to 
the Bush (and Clinton) administration’s plans had been one of the key reasons that European allies 
had expressed concern about BMD, but with the newfound Russian willingness to work with the 
US – which Robert Bell suggested was driven largely by the belief that a “war on terror” would 
allow Russia far more freedom to deal with problems in Chechnya, and the Caucuses – much of this 
concern dissipated.
89
  Moreover, many in Europe hoped that 9-11 would be the lynchpin for a new 
period of multilateral US policy.
90
  According to Daalder and Lindsay, “the differences that had 
divided the United States from its allies and friends before September 11
th
 gave way to widespread 
solidarity and support”.91  However, much like with the Democrats domestically, the 9-11 attacks 
did not mean that Russia or America’s European allies would necessarily support US abrogation of 
the ABM Treaty.   
 The third impact of the terrorist attacks was on Bush and the Bush administration itself.  
According to the Strategic Survey, it “effected the administration’s strategic calculations about how 
potential adversaries might wish to threaten the American homeland.”92  In particular, it reinforced 
Bush’s belief that the world was a dangerous and threatening place where a determined adversary 
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would stop at nothing to threaten the United States.
93
  Principal Deputy Assistant to the Vice 
President for National Security Affairs Eric Edelman, suggested that key Bush administration 
officials understood the events as “essentially a missile attack” because fully fuelled airliners were 
“not that much different to a conventional ballistic missile in practice”.94  In addition to raising 
question marks about air defence, Edelman argued that it also fundamentally underscored the notion 
within the administration that nuclear deterrence simply was not sufficient to keep the nation 
secure.
95
  In the wake of the attacks, Bush declared that it was his duty to “protect American cities 
by all available means”, which would include missile defence.96  
Bush’s interpretation of the 9-11 attacks and their relationship to missile defence was not 
unanimously held throughout the American political establishment, and many commentators 
cautioned that what 9-11 really demonstrated was that more sophisticated, cheaper and arguably 
more effective ways of attacking the US homeland existed, than the use or threat of ballistic 
missiles.
97
  Of particular note, Dennis Gormley cautioned the Bush administration about this 
fixation on ballistic missiles, warning: “as policy makers look to the future, they should take care 
not to mistake the most familiar threats – such as ballistic missiles – for the most likely ones”.98  
But despite this, 9-11 energised the Bush administration and made the president determined to push 
ahead with his missile defence plans. 
 The terrorist attacks of 11
th
 September 2001 did not radically alter the policy or worldview 
of the Bush administration, or its approach to BMD, but it did provide the political opportunity to 
push ahead.  With both domestic and international opposition temporarily moderated, the president 
wasted little time in seizing this opening, and once negotiations began to stall, informed Russia that 
the US would be leaving the ABM Treaty.  This decision had little to do with technology, or indeed 
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the missile threat; instead, it had everything to do with political window of opportunity presented by 
9-11, and the worldview and policy priorities of the Bush administration. 
  
Following 9-11, invigorated by the terrorist attacks, and sensing an opportunity to push ahead with 
talks on the Treaty while “the political climate … at home and abroad [meant] that costs of 
withdrawal were low”, Bush stepped up his attempts to negotiate amendments to the ABM Treaty 
with Vladimir Putin.
99
  To this end, a meeting was arranged with Putin in Shanghai on 22
nd
 October 
2001 to discuss what could be done regarding the Treaty, and in a joint press conference it was 
announced that both leaders might be able to work out some changes to its provisions.  However 
when the pair next met in Crawford, Texas, between 14
th
-16
th
 November, to “hammer out the 
details”, Putin refused to accept the types of changes to the ABM Treaty that Bush was pushing for, 
while Bush refused continued compliance if the Treaty was not amended.  Putin left the meeting 
threatening to pull out of “all previous arms control deals based round the Treaty” if Bush chose to 
abrogate it.
100
  However, according to Stephen Hadley, much of this had actually been scripted and 
planned by Bush and Putin, with Bush asking his counterpart how he wanted to respond to US plans 
to leave the Treaty and saying “how can I do this so that it is not a problem”.101  Bradley Graham 
later suggested that Secretary of State Colin Powell – who also played a key role in these 
discussions – considered the abrogation of the ABM Treaty as one of his greatest achievements 
during his time in office.
102
 
Following these meetings, on the 13
th
 December Bush gave Russia formal notice that the US 
would be abrogating the ABM Treaty.  Bush cited Article XV of the agreement which stated that “if 
extraordinary events related to the subject matter of this treaty have jeopardized its supreme 
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interests either party may chose to abrogate the Treaty”, as justification for his doing so.103  Under 
the terms of the agreement, the Treaty would expire in six months time.  In a press release, Bush 
declared that: 
 I have concluded that the ABM Treaty hinders our government’s ability to develop ways to 
 protect our people from future terrorist or rogue state missile attacks … protecting the 
 American people is my highest priority as Commander in Chief, and I cannot allow the US 
 to remain part of a Treaty that prevents us from developing effective defenses.
104
 
The decision took few by surprise and caused only a limited reaction both at home and abroad - 
even from leading Republicans who had spent the best part of a decade pushing for such a 
decision.
105
  Lt General Henry Obering, soon to be head of the Missile Defense Agency, described 
the withdrawal from the ABM Treaty as “the single most enabling event” during this period 
because it “allowed you to integrate different systems, e.g. have different sensors with different 
launchers, allowing for the possibility of an integrated and layered defence.”106  Vladimir Putin 
simply responded by saying that he believed the action to be “mistaken” but that he had “complete 
confidence that Bush’s decision present[ed] no threat to the national security of the Russian 
Federation.”107  Putin’s reaction did much to neuter any dissatisfaction amongst America’s allies.   
   Despite these developments, many experts continued to argue that BMD testing and 
development could be designed to continue within an un-amended ABM Treaty for at least a few 
more years.  In fact, this lack of workable and readily deployable technology had been a key reason 
why Bush had not pushed ahead with a specific BMD plan, or with amending the ABM Treaty in 
the first few months of his administration.
108
  Philip Coyle and John Rhinelander suggested at the 
time that: 
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 There will be years of development and developmental testing ahead before the Treaty in 
 the near or medium term raises any obstacles to this work … for the foreseeable future, 
 adequate developmental testing and even some operational testing, can be performed within 
 the Treaties current restraints.
109
 
Coyle and Rhinelander went on to suggest that the only thing making ABM Treaty withdrawal 
necessary was the perceived political value of the deployment of interceptors before the end of 
Bush’s first term in 2004,110 while renowned physicist Wolfgang Panofsky described the decision 
as “a political act, not supported by extraordinary events or technological justification”.111  This 
rationale seemed to be upheld by the reality on the ground, for while three successful tests of the 
GBI were carried out between July and March 2002, the tests remained “developmental” in nature; 
none of the tests used realistic decoys - the interceptor missile moved slow enough to decrease 
stress on the Kill Vehicle (KV), and the intercept point and trajectories of both tests were known 
prior to launch.
112
  Lisbeth Gronlund of the Union of Concerned Scientists argued that “the 
administration’s argument for withdrawal is specious”, suggesting that testing of the “SPY” radar, 
or the construction of new testing facilities in Alaska – both of which would break to the provision 
of the ABM Treaty - were either “unnecessary or unworkable”.113   
 The second controversy was that 9-11 should have any impact on missile defence policy at 
all, and if anything, should have signalled that the US was spending vast sums of money and 
concentrating on the wrong type of threat.
114
  For many the attacks highlighted the need for the US 
to concentrate its efforts on protecting against terrorism and not on the more conventional threat 
from ballistic missiles.  Dennis Gormley argued that 9-11 was: 
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 Proof that more sophisticated routes to attacking the US homeland – notably long-range 
 ballistic missiles – are far less likely to occur in future than the low tech ones demonstrated 
 so effectively on September 11
th
.
115
 
Such thinking seemed to be confirmed by the National Intelligence Council which – when it 
released its latest ballistic missile threat estimate in December 2001 – suggested that any new long-
range missile threat to the US remained at least a decade away.
116
  In response to these 
developments, a Senior Congressional official later quipped that: “the Bush administration wanted 
to double funding on missile defense, but had no idea of how this money would be spent.  Perhaps 
they would simply begin packing missile tubes with money?”117 
  Bush’s decision to abrogate the ABM Treaty appeared to have little correlation with 
developments in technology and in many respects seemed to go against the lessons drawn from the 
terrorist attacks of 9-11.  Although Bush had vociferously stated his intention to abrogate the Treaty 
during the first nine months of his administration, both domestic and international political 
constraints made such a move untenable.  9-11 served as both a catalyst and as a facilitator, 
temporarily neutering opposition and discontent, and creating a window of opportunity for Bush to 
press ahead with his BMD programme by abrogating the ABM Treaty. 
 
2002-2004: The push for deployment 
During the first few months of 2002, widespread and significant changes were made to the US 
ballistic missile defence effort.  The first action taken by Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld 
was to rename the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization (BMDO) the Missile Defense Agency 
(MDA).  Although this rebranding was in many ways symbolic – highlighting the Bush 
administration’s desire to move beyond the confines of the Clinton era programme – it also had 
more structural importance.  The MDA, unlike its predecessor, would be granted full agency rank 
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and with it, the power and influence associated with such positioning.
118
  But perhaps more 
importantly, it reflected the administration’s belief that all missile defence plans should be brought 
under one large administrative umbrella.
119
   
As well as a name change, and elevation in rank, Rumsfeld announced in January 2002 that 
the Missile Defense Agency’s development programme would be granted “special status”, which 
would mean excluding the vast majority of systems under development from the Pentagon-wide 
Operational Requirements Documents, and from other provisions that might either impede or 
complicate rapid decisions, progress and deployment.
120
  As a corollary Rumsfeld also announced 
that the majority of programme elements would no longer be required to meet named cost and 
schedule estimates or formal performance requirements, as they had been forced to in the past.
121
  A 
few months later Rumsfeld declared that the MDA would be adopting special measures to keep 
information about the US BMD effort secret in order to help the programme proceed expeditiously 
and to prevent potential adversaries from learning how to overcome or evade the system once 
deployed.
122
  Although this new approach would allow the Pentagon to begin deploying some type 
of capability very quickly, many detractors and critics - particularly Democrats in Congress - 
warned that such an approach would seriously undermine and hinder any Congressional attempt at 
oversight of the programme.
123
 
 The move to exempt the BMD development programme from many of the normal oversight 
and testing practices conducted by the Pentagon, was part of the Bush administration’s decision to 
pursue a different kind of technological development model to that which had been used before.  
Instead of the fly before you buy approach used by the BMDO during the Clinton administration, 
the MDA was instructed to follow a “capabilities based approach with spiral development” 
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model.
124
  Under this strategy, a basic version of a weapon (in this case missile defence) could be 
developed and fielded with the intent of subsequently developing and deploying a more capable 
version in the future.  However, instead of being deployed once fully proven – as in the fly before 
you buy model – components would be developed, tested, deployed and modified in a cyclical 
process.
125
  Such an approach would allow the Pentagon to begin fielding assets before fully tested, 
and once these assets were deployed, add to them incrementally as either changes in threat or 
advances in technology necessitated.
126
  In part, this model was adopted because the Bush 
administration still did not know what type of BMD architecture it wanted or indeed needed, but it 
was also because it allowed planners to begin fielding rudimentary BMD assets within a very short 
space of time.  In order to fund the vast panoply of BMD programmes under development, the 
administration requested $7.8b for BMD, which would include $3.6b to develop and deploy the 
Clinton era “Midcourse Defense Segment” (which would be based on the Ground-Based Interceptor 
missile), still the most advanced programme under development.
127
  
 When Pentagon officials outlined the Bush administration’s missile defence development 
plan to Congress in early March 2002, it drew a mixed reception.  While the extensive proposals 
were warmly welcomed by the majority of Republicans, leading Democrats continued to question 
whether the large BMD budget request might actually be better spent on other more urgent 
programmes - such as defending against terrorism - and were particularly concerned by the new 
plans to limit oversight of the development process.
128
  Representative Marty Meehan (D-MA) 
suggested that the Pentagon was “short-changing the war on terror”, and was following a “buy first, 
think later” type of approach, while Senator Jack Reed (D-RI) accused the Pentagon of “dumbing 
down standards”.129  The Democrat leadership was equally concerned by a January 2002 report by 
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the Congressional Budget Office, which had been requested by former Senate Majority leader Tom 
Daschle (D-SD), suggesting that the relatively unspecified missile defence plan that the Bush 
administration was pursuing could potentially cost around $200b over the next two decades.
130
 
Nevertheless, in June 2002 after the mandatory six months notice had passed, and the ABM 
Treaty had expired, the Bush administration wasted little time in beginning construction of the first 
interceptor silos and assorted military facilities at Fort Greeley, Alaska (ostensibly for testing). 
Senator John Kyle (R-AZ) welcomed the passing of the Treaty by declaring that the US was “no 
longer handcuffed to a policy that intentionally leaves its own people defenseless to missile attack”, 
while Democrat Senator Jack Reed (D-RI) called the decision “unwarranted” because many of the 
concepts remained “many years away”.131  In the House, 30 Democrats and an Independent led by 
Representative Dennis Kucinich (D-OH) filed a claim to sue the Bush administration for its breach 
of the ABM Treaty.
132
  Nevertheless, by November, Democrats had to settle for a $400m cut and 
the inclusion of wording that would mandate the Pentagon to share more information about its 
missile defence plans with Congress, as part of the approval of $7.4b for missile defence in the 
annual budget.
133 
 As such, in the words of Robert Joseph, the ABM Treaty “went away with a 
whimper rather than a bang”.134  
Although reaction to the US withdrawal from the ABM Treaty was relatively muted – partly 
because Russia announced on the same day that it would reduce its own offensive nuclear forces, 
which in the words of Robert Joseph “put to bed the myth of the ABM Treaty”135 – the 
announcement in December 2002 that assets would begin being deployed by 2004 was far more 
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contentious.  In a speech accompanying National Security Directive (NSD) 23 which outlined the 
integrated BMD plan, Bush declared: 
 Today, I am pleased to announce that we will take another step in countering those [rogue 
 state missile] threats by beginning to field missile defense capabilities to protect the United 
 States as well as our friends and allies … the deployment of missile defenses is an essential 
 element of our broader efforts to transform our defense and deterrence policies and 
 capabilities to meet the new threats we face.
136
  
NSD 23 declared it the administration’s intention to deploy a BMD system as soon as possible, and 
began setting out the type of architecture that would be pursued: 10 interceptors were to be placed 
in Alaska and California by 2004, along with 10 more at Fort Greely (Alaska) by 2005, 15 Aegis 
ships with up to 20 Standard Missile 3 interceptors would be deployed, and the production of PAC-
3 Patriot BMD batteries would also be substantially increased.  The Ground-Based Midcourse 
Defence segment, begun under the Clinton administration, would remain the centrepiece of the 
system.
137
  
The first missile interceptor site in this plan was scheduled for completion by 30
th
 
September 2004, just weeks before the presidential election, leading Brookings Institution scholar 
James Lindsay to suggest that the plan was ultimately underpinned by a political rationale, and by 
the upcoming 2004 presidential election, because “once you deploy a system you’ve really stuck a 
stake in the ground and it makes it very hard for a new administration to undo it.  This is 
irreversible.”138  Although admitting that the 2004 deployment decision was a “high technological 
risk”, one Senior Congressional Official nevertheless remained convinced it was better to have 
“something rather than nothing” in order to “stay ahead of the threat”.139  Dean Wilkening 
described the move “primarily as a political ploy, designed to get something in the ground”, which 
as a result “would be a direct reason for all the problems the GBI would experience”,140 and even 
                                                          
136
 George W Bush, “Presidential directive to deploy missile defenses”, (17th December 2002) 
137
 Graham (2003) 387-8 
138
 James Lindsay quoted in Burns & Brune (2003) 210; Graham (2003) 382-3 
139
 Confidential Interview (D) 
140
 Interview with Dean Wilkening (9
th
 July 2010) 
George W. Bush, ABM Treaty abrogation and deployment 
 177 
Baker Spring – a foremost advocate of BMD - suggested that “there was a big opportunity cost of 
early deployment.”141 
   
With 9-11 still dominating public discourse, the 2002 Congressional midterm elections were fought 
over issues to do with defence and foreign policy, and this resulted in support for the president and 
the return to power in the Senate of the Republicans – giving them control of both Houses.  The 
new Republican controlled Congress remained committed, as they had been for nearly a decade, to 
rapid BMD deployment, and vowed not to stand in the way of the Bush administration.
142
  The 
result significantly eroded the power of the Democrats to influence BMD policy, and would leave 
them largely powerless for the next two years as the Bush administration pushed ahead with its 
plans.  Realising that the debate was essentially no longer about an ideological struggle over arms 
control, but about practicality, performance and cost of various missile defence programmes, the 
Democrats shifted strategy.
143
  Instead of trying to prevent or limit missile defence deployment, 
more emphasis would now be placed on writing language into the annual defence Bills that would 
require the Pentagon and the MDA to provide regular cost estimates, performance criterion and test 
schedules.
144
   
In summer 2003, the Missile Defense Agency outlined how the US missile defence system 
would be fielded.  The plan would include five incremental blocks to deal with certain threats that 
the MDA expected to face over in the near future.  (1) The first concern was to protect against a 
North Korean long-range missile threat, because Pyongyang was perceived to be moving fastest on 
WMD; (2) the second concern was to protect US forces in the region against North Korean short 
and medium range threats; (3) third, to protect against the growing threat from Iran; (4) fourth, to 
expand this coverage to Europe; and (5) to enhance overall coverage of both Europe and East 
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Asia.
145
  To achieve this aim Bush asked Congress for $9.1b in February 2003 for missile defence, 
$1.3b more than the previous year’s request, and $1.5b more than had been appropriated for FY 
2003.
146
   
According to Missile Defense Agency Director Henry Obering (July 2004 - November 
2008) the decision to begin fielding assets in summer 2004 – and to exempt the BMD programme 
from certain testing procedures and oversight – was justified because “when you don’t have 
anything there in the first place, it demands a different set of rules”.147  Obering pointed to three 
main reasons why the administration decided to begin fielding assets in 2004; (1) there was enough 
“testing successes under our belt to know we had a capability”; (2) “we didn’t have anything 
already”, and; (3) “we could make changes as and when we need to”.148  He went on to defend the 
spiral development model by saying “in a software intensive environment you couldn't use normal 
development processes because by the time you fielded a capability the requirements had changed, 
causing you to field obsolete stuff”.149  
However, evidence continued to suggest that the technology required for a comprehensive 
missile defence system remained developmental in nature.  In November 2001 for example, General 
John Holly, the Midcourse Defense programme manager, had announced that the Missile Defense 
Agency would be postponing testing of the Ground-Based Interceptor (GBI) missile until the 
autumn of 2003, so that more focus could be put on developing the launcher.
150
  The announcement 
also came just days after the GBI system had failed its latest developmental test, and meant that 
there would be no more tests of the integrated BMD system until the end of 2004, two years later, 
and after the system had already started to be deployed.
151
  In light of these developments, leading 
Democrats successfully managed to include legislation in the fiscal year 2004 Defence 
                                                          
145
 Interview with Henry Obering (9
th
 August 2010) 
146
 Hildreth (2004) 80-1 
147
 Interview with Henry Obering (9
th
 August 2010) 
148
 Ibid 
149
 Ibid 
150
 Graham (2003) 394 
151
 Burns & Brune (2003) 211 
George W. Bush, ABM Treaty abrogation and deployment 
 179 
Authorization Bill mandating that Thomas Christie, Director of the Pentagon Operation Test and 
Evaluation (OTE) oversight office, make regular assessments and reports to Congress on the BMD 
programme.
152
  Nevertheless, with the Republican Party now firmly in control of both Houses of 
Congress, the Bush administration’s $9.1b missile defence budget request for fiscal year 2004 
passed through Congress with little problem.
153
  By July 2003 both Houses had agreed to match 
Bush’s request, although emphasising funding for programmes that were more likely to be deployed 
in the near term, and in October just $5m less than had been requested for missile defence was 
authorised by Congress.
154
  
 
The Democrat leadership launched, in their own words, their “largest offensive against Bush’s 
missile defence plans” in the Senate in 2004, and endeavoured to press Bush to refocus spending 
away from the more exotic and infant BMD technologies towards more near-term and proven 
ones.
155
  In April 2004, it seemed that the Democrats might be aided in this push by realities on the 
ground, as a report from the US General Accounting Office strongly warned against early 
deployment: 
 Testing in 2003 did little to demonstrate the predicted effectiveness of the system’s 
 capability to defeat ballistic missiles as an integrated system … As a result of testing 
 shortfalls and the limited time available to test the BMDS being fielded, system 
 effectiveness will be largely unproven when the initial capability goes on alert at the end of 
 September 2004.
156
 
The GAO report was followed a month later by a report by the Union of Concerned Scientists 
(UCS) which voiced further concern:  
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 The ballistic missile defense system that the United States will deploy later this year will 
 have no demonstrated defensive capability and will be ineffective against a real attack by 
 long-range missiles.
157
 
The UCS Report went on to argue that “there is no technical justification for deployment of the 
system” and that “deployment should be halted and Congress should require that the system 
undergo operationally realistic testing before it is deployed”.158  The UCS also derided the Bush 
administration’s claims that the system would be reliable as “irresponsible exaggerations”.159 
Nevertheless, all three significant Democratic amendments to the administration’s BMD 
budget during 2004 would fail; first, Senator Barbara Boxer’s (D-CO) proposal to require that 
interceptors undergo operational testing before being fielded; second, Senator Jack Reed’s (D-RI) 
proposal that the Pentagon develop an operational testing plan and establish cost and performance 
baselines for the system, and thirdly, Senator Carl Levin’s (D-MI) proposal to cap deployment at 
the 20 interceptors already planned and to reallocate the funds to other non-proliferation and anti-
terrorism programmes.  Levin went on to argue that: “If we want a missile defense that works rather 
than one that sits on the ground and soaks up money, we should not shy away from realistic testing 
requirements”.160  As a result, the Democrats were unable to prevent the Bush Administration’s 
drive for deployment, and could not stop the Pentagon from placing the first GBI interceptor missile 
in its silo at the missile defence site at Fort Greely, Alaska on 22
nd
 July 2004.   
Democrats and Republicans would continue to fight over the future of the US ballistic 
missile defence programme during the summer’s presidential election race, with Senator John Kerry 
(D-MA) keen to limit the system, and Republican incumbent George W. Bush determined to push 
ahead.  By the time that Bush was declared the winner of the 2004 election, the US had already 
begun deploying assets of its proposed global missile defence system.  In fact, the deployment 
would rise to six interceptor missiles at Fort Greeley, Alaska as well as two at Vandenberg Air 
Force Base, California by December 2004.  As a result, by the end of this period the US possessed a 
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nascent missile defence system with the theoretical capability of combating a limited and 
rudimentary enemy missile attack.   
Between January 2002 and September 2004 the US ballistic missile defence programme 
evolved and expanded with great rapidity.  However, this rapid development and expansion had 
relatively little to do with major advances in technology or with developments in the ballistic 
missile threat.  Indeed, Lt General Obering later remarked that the programme was “not based 
solely on threat but on what we were actually able to do.”161  Instead, policy appeared to be driven 
by the worldview and policy priorities of the Bush administration, and by the new approach to 
BMD technology development, both of which were allowed to flourish under a Republican 
controlled Congress, and in the post-9-11 environment.  In sum, according to Steven Miller, the 
Bush administration: 
Wished to bequeath to the winner of the 2004 presidential election a world in which the 
ABM Treaty ha[d] been left behind … and initial missile defence deployments ha[d] 
occurred.
162
 
 
(3) Assessing the drivers of policy, 2001-2005 
Neither pressures arising from the international system, nor advances in technological capabilities 
can explain the great rapidity with which the Bush administration sought to forge ahead with BMD 
during this period.  Although the terrorist attacks of 9/11 were an important component of the story, 
to understand why policy evolved in the manner that it did, a fuller examination of the pressure 
brought to bear on policy by president and Congress must be included.  It is only by looking at the 
thinking and actions of the Bush administration in particular, that a full understanding of why the 
US abrogated the ABM Treaty, and had begun deploying assets of a national missile defence 
system by 2004, can be obtained. 
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International and technological factors 
International pressures on policymaking between 2001 and 2005 can to an extent explain why 
George W. Bush was able to push ahead so precipitously with missile defence.  North Korea’s 
decision to expel IAEA weapons inspectors, leave the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty and resume 
its uranium enrichment programme, combined with the revelation that Iran had been secretly 
developing its own nuclear weapons programme, certainly explain why policymakers became more 
concerned about the growing missile threat to US security.  Moreover, it is equally arguable that 
these concerns were compounded by the 9/11 terrorist attacks on New York and Washington DC. 
 However, most analysts continued to agree that a genuine new missile threat to the US 
homeland remained years away, and that the terrorist attacks of 9-11 appeared to suggest that more 
focus needed to be placed on combating terrorism, not ballistic missiles.
163
  Moreover, the types of 
BMD systems requested by the US military – in light of Operation Iraqi Freedom in 2003 – were 
predominantly weapons that had little if anything in common with the far more complex GBI 
system that the Bush administration was intent on deploying by 2004.  As such, international 
pressures and developments do not explain the particular decisions taken by the Bush 
administration during this period, especially the drive to deploy a system by 2004, and to exempt 
these assets from standard testing procedures. 
 Some of these questions can be addressed by looking at technology, or more specifically, by 
examining the technological development and deployment model adopted by the Bush 
administration in 2002.  While it is true that the technical capability of various systems under 
development increased during this period, in many respects the spiral development model 
essentially papered over the cracks in BMD technology.  The result was that commentators and 
lawmakers already sceptical of Bush’s plans, questioned whether what had been deployed would 
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actually work, and whether such deployments were really worth the political and financial costs.
164
  
A key reason for this was the lack of testing.  In fact, full testing of the system was suspended in 
2002, which meant that the programme came nowhere near the amount of tests recommended 
during the Clinton administration.  This scepticism was equally unaided by the decision to classify 
far more of the information arising from the testing programme, and by limiting Congressional 
oversight of the Missile Defense Agency.  A fuller understanding of why this strategy was pursued 
during this period can therefore only be obtained through an examination of the domestic political 
influences that underpinned it. 
 
Domestic factors 
In terms of domestic influences on policy, the most important driver of the US missile defence 
programme during this period was the Bush administration.  The actions, thinking and worldview of 
George W. Bush and those around him, explain why policy forged ahead so rapidly between 2001 
and 2005, despite the absence of any immediate strategic or technological reason to do so.  It was 
Bush’s more pessimistic understanding of the post Cold War world, combined with a belief – 
exacerbated by 9-11 – that the ABM Treaty was an anachronism which prevented the US from 
deploying the missile defences it needed, that provided the impetus to abrogate the Treaty.  
Moreover, it was this different view of the international environment, coupled with the abrogation 
of the ABM Treaty, which led to the rapid development and deployment of BMD assets during this 
period.  Finally, Bush and those around him placed such importance on BMD because they were far 
more sceptical of the continued validity of nuclear deterrence in the face of new rogue and terrorist 
threats, and because they were far less convinced about the wisdom of ensuring US security through 
mutual vulnerability and the ABM Treaty, than the Clinton administration.  While this represented 
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the central importance of the Bush administration as a domestic political actor, the desire to 
entrench the system politically through rapid deployments and to ensure its survival after 2005, 
were certainly driven in part by domestic political reasons. 
 However, to understand why policy stalled during much of 2001, and then expanded rapidly 
thereafter, such analysis must take into account the pressure brought to bear on policy by Congress. 
Congressional pressure essentially evolved in three distinct parts.  Firstly, between January and 
September 2001, Democrats appeared determined to fight against Bush’s BMD plans, and this was 
aided considerably by the defection of Senator Jim Jeffords in mid-summer.  Second, was the 
relaxation of pressure from Democrats following the terrorist strikes of September 11
th
 2001, which 
allowed Bush to push ahead and abrogate the ABM Treaty with relatively little resistance.  Lastly, 
was the period between 2002 and 2005 where Democrats were forced to shift policy following the 
abrogation of the ABM Treaty, and during which time Republican control of Congress essentially 
neutered Congressional pressure on policy.  This period then provides a clear example of how the 
evolution of the missile defence debate in Congress – driven and shaped to a large extent by the 
actions of the Bush administration – fundamentally altered the type of pressure Congress was able 
to exert on policy.  Consequently, although pressure remained bifurcated along partisan lines in 
2005, the parameters of the type of pressure Congress could exert had shifted fundamentally.  In 
this sense, the party in control of Congress was central to the ability of Bush to drive policy 
forward. 
Conclusion 
The US ballistic missile defence programme expanded considerably during George W. Bush’s first 
term in office; funding was doubled, the ABM Treaty was abrogated, and assets were deployed to 
defend the US homeland.  As a result, the contours of the US missile defence debate shifted 
considerably, leading Senator Carl Levin to declare in 2003 that: “the debate over whether to 
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deploy a nationwide antimissile system is over.  Bush has decided the matter.”165  Politically, the 
missile defence debate shifted from disagreements over how, what and whether to deploy, to a new 
basis around ensuring that what was deployed had been properly tested and was cost-effective.  The 
period 2001-2005 therefore represents a significant transition in the evolution of missile defence 
policy, but not one that is necessarily out-of-sync with what had gone before. 
 This shift in policy was primarily the result of the Bush administration, and in particular the 
determination of Bush and those around him to push ahead with BMD development and 
deployment.  But it was also facilitated by the 9/11 terrorist attacks – which created a political 
window of opportunity – and by the relatively muted pressure that Democratic lawmakers were able 
to exert on policy, especially after 2001.  It was the worldview and willpower of the Bush 
administration that led to the abrogation of the ABM Treaty and early deployment in 2004, rather 
than any specific international or technological push.  That said, both Iran and North Korea made 
progress in their respective WMD programmes during this period, and advances were made in the 
technology needed for deployment.  Nevertheless, the discord between these developments and 
policy must be understood as a product of the Bush administration, and especially the spiral 
development deployment plan adopted after 2002. 
 Bush’s successful bid for re-election in late 2004 suggested that the programme would 
continue to be driven forward, and that more assets would be deployed.  Moreover, although it 
appeared that the domestic debate would now shift to oversight and scrutiny of testing, it seemed 
likely that the programme would flourish during Bush’s second term, and make further significant 
strides towards entrenching BMD as a key component of US security.  However, even though the 
Missile Defense Agency had deployed eight long-range interceptor missiles by the end of Bush’s 
first term, debate continued to rage about the actual capability of the system. 
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Expanding and Integrating the US Missile Defence 
Programme, (2005-2009) 
 
George W. Bush began his second term, much as he had the first, determined to push ahead with 
ballistic missile defence.  Bush and those around him remained convinced that missile defences 
were an integral component of US security policy, and that assets should be deployed as soon as 
possible in order to address what they believed was the growing short, medium and long-range 
missile threat from Iran and North Korea.  In light of this, the Bush administration continued to 
favour the deployment of assets before they had been fully tested, maintained funding for the 
programme at around $10b per year, and appeared relatively unconcerned about the impact of such 
moves on Russia.  With Republicans in control of Congress during the first two years of this period, 
and both Iran and North Korea augmenting their WMD programmes, Bush looked set to firmly 
entrench BMD both tangibly and politically over the next four years. 
 Between 2005 and 2009, the Bush administration forged ahead with BMD, deploying more 
assets and retaining high levels of funding, and in 2006, began formal negotiations about expanding 
the system to Europe.  Debate about the Third Site in Europe would become one of the defining 
features of this period, as for two years Democrats and BMD sceptics strove to ensure that the 
deployments were based on proven technologies, and that they did not undermine wider US security 
interests, particularly relations with Russia.  While the US missile defence programme pushed 
ahead relatively unhindered during the first two years of this period, the return to power in Congress 
of the Democrats at mid-term ensured that the Bush administration would not be able to forge ahead 
entirely – especially with the proposed Third Site missile defence plan for Europe.  Nevertheless, as 
Bush left office, the US ballistic missile defence effort had been transformed, and appeared to be an 
accepted and entrenched component of national security policy. 
Expanding and integrating the US missile defence programme 
 187 
 The result is that missile defence policy during Bush’s second term in office raises several 
interesting questions.  First, why was Bush able to push ahead with deployments, and with 
negotiations about expanding the system to Europe, despite continuing problems with technology?    
Second, why did the Bush administration pay so little attention to Russian concerns and threats 
about US BMD plans?  Third, why were long-range and strategic missile defence systems 
apparently prioritised during this period, despite the prevailing trend in the missile threat towards 
regional and short-range WMD proliferation? 
 
(1) Competing pressures on BMD policy, 2005-2009 
As Bush began his second term in January 2005, BMD policy remained subjected to two key 
systemic pressures: the rogue state WMD threat from Iran and North Korea, and the growing 
anxiety in Russia about US BMD plans.  At the same time, and despite the spiral development and 
deployment model, BMD technology continued to be complicated by technological problems, and 
considerable debate remained about whether what had already been deployed would work.  
However, with Republicans retaining control of both Houses of Congress, Bush seemed well placed 
to push ahead with a variety of missile defence systems between 2005 and 2009.  
 
International pressures on policymaking 
In early 2005, international pressure on policy was split.  On one hand, neither North Korea nor Iran 
appeared to be relenting in their pursuit of WMD, but experts remained split over the trajectory, 
capability and extent of these programmes, and what they meant for US security.
677
  On the other, 
was the growing Russian concern about BMD plans, which would become more and more 
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vociferous during this period, especially as the US looked to push ahead with the Third Site plan 
after 2006. 
 The suspected WMD programmes in North Korea and Iran continued to dominate the BMD 
debate during this period.  In 2005, for example, newly elected Iranian President Mahmoud 
Amadinejad began a comprehensive programme of missile tests, and in 2006, announced that Iran 
had successfully enriched uranium.
678
  Equally troubling was the fact that North Korea also 
continued to augment its WMD programmes, especially after it conducted its first nuclear test in 
August 2006.
679
  Nevertheless, opinion remained divided about the extent of these programmes, 
especially after the National Intelligence Council released an estimate in November 2007 
suggesting that Iran had halted its nuclear weapons programmes in 2003, and was “less determined 
to develop nuclear weapons than we have been judging since 2005”.680  Mohamed ElBaradei – head 
of the IAEA – also publicly declared that he had not seen evidence of Iran developing nuclear 
weapons.
681
  Joseph Cirincione went as far as to argue that with large reductions in Russian and 
Chinese long-range weapons over the last decade, the missile threat to the US was actually 
decreasing.
682
   
The second important international dynamic during this period was the growing concern in 
Russia about US BMD plans, especially the proposed Third Site in Central and Eastern Europe.  In 
fact, in response to the announcement of the plan to deploy US missile defence assets in Europe in 
2007, Russian officials threatened to suspend compliance with the Conventional Forces Europe 
(CFE) Treaty, leave the 1987 Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF), target missiles at 
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Poland and the Czech Republic, and even to re-deploy Russian nuclear weapons in Cuba.
683
  
Although Bush administration officials attempted to engage and reassure Moscow about US plans, 
the rift caused by US missile defence looked likely to impact upon the wider US security agenda. 
Russian antagonism was exacerbated during this period by the gradual loss of post-9-11 sympathy 
for the US in the wake of the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. 
Nevertheless, abrogating the ABM Treaty and deploying BMD assets had not caused the 
international instability that many had feared it would.
684
  In fact, attitudes towards BMD amongst 
US allies became increasingly more favourable between 2005 and 2009.
685
  In April 2008, for 
example, NATO leaders agreed to endorse US plans for missile defence in Europe, and would begin 
discussions of how this could be integrated with current regional assets.  The same would be true 
for US allies in the Middle East and East Asia, who also appeared keen to work with the US to 
address their own growing regional missile concerns.  National Security Advisor Stephen Hadley 
later declared that NATO acceptance of the plan in April 2008 meant that: “the debate [over missile 
defence had] ended”.686 
 
Technological pressures on policymaking 
Questions about the technological capability of what was being developed and deployed continued 
to surround the US ballistic missile defence programme between 2005 and 2009.  In fact, many 
components of the nascent system deployed in 2004 continued to fail important development tests, 
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an even the better performing programmes under development continued to split opinion about their 
capability under “real world conditions”.687   
 While questions remained about many technologies under development, the main sources of 
concern were the Ground-Based Midcourse Defense Segment, and the spiral development 
deployment model.  As the General Accounting Office warned in 2006:  
Spiral development has allowed the GMD program to concurrently mature technology, 
 complete design activities, and produce and field assets before end-to-end testing of the 
 system – all at the expense of cost, quality, and performance goals.688 
And that: 
 Programs consistently move forward with unrealistic cost and schedule estimates, use 
 immature technologies in launching product development, and fail to solidify design and 
 manufacturing processes at appropriate points of development.
689
   
Concerns about the system were compounded by the fact that the new 2-stage interceptor missile to 
be deployed in Europe would be based on this design.  However, and although this report, and 
others, cast doubt on the capability of the system currently deployed in Alaska and California, 
Missile Defense Agency Director Henry Obering would later remark that “many leading figures in 
the Bush administration believed that the interceptors deployed in Alaska and California would 
have been able to intercept any missile that threatened the US homeland”.690    
 The result was that technological pressure on policy between 2005 and 2009 remained 
complicated, with many commentators and scientists questioning the efficacy of what was being 
deployed.  On one side, the Bush administration professed that the system they started deploying in 
2004 was capable of intercepting a rudimentary North Korean missile, while on the other, many 
sceptics suggested that the GBI had not even proven itself in developmental testing.  Although the 
MDA made great strides during this period on a number of different BMD technologies, whether 
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this progress was enough to justify deployment and expansion of the system to Europe therefore 
remained difficult to gage.
691
  
 
Presidential policy agenda 
At the start of his second term, Bush remained committed to deploying a comprehensive ballistic 
missile defence system, both in order to stay ahead of the threat and to ensure that BMD became 
established as a norm of US national security thinking.  The president and those around him 
continued to view BMD as a central response to the growing WMD threats from Iran and North 
Korea, and remained keen to pursue a significant expansion of US missile defence capabilities, 
despite strong concern from Moscow.
692
  Moreover, Bush also reaffirmed his commitment to the 
spiral development deployment process, and his belief that having something deployed was better 
than nothing. 
  The centrepiece of Bush’s second term BMD plan would be the determination to place 
further assets of the integrated BMD system in Europe, which the Bush administration declared was 
necessary to “provide a defense of Europe against a limited intermediate and long-range ballistic 
missile threat from the Middle East and providing additional capability to the US”.693  Missile 
Defense Agency Director Lt General Henry Obering elaborated: 
 We are concerned about threats that may emerge from the Middle East.  Having another 
 interceptor site in Europe would greatly [complicate] not only an attacker’s problem with 
 respect to the United States in terms of how many interceptor sites they have to deal with, 
 but it also primarily provides coverage to our allies and friends.
694
 
The Third Site plan would involve placing 10 new two-stage long-range interceptor missiles at the 
Rezikowo Air Force Base in Poland, and large radar in the Brdy Military Zone in the Czech 
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Republic.
695
  According to Undersecretary of Defense for Policy Eric Edelman, the Bush 
administration also saw the plan as able to compliment and offer a “bolt on capability” to a future 
NATO missile defence system.
696
 
The priority placed on expanding and integrating the US ballistic missile defence system 
remained driven in part by Bush’s worldview, and partly by the concern within the administration 
about Iran and North Korea.
697
  But it was also a product of the administration’s decision to pay 
more attention to rogue state threats, rather than to great power politics with nations like Russia, 
and thus continue to shift US national security thinking away from a Cold War mindset.  In addition 
to this, Bush’s desire for early deployment was undoubtedly driven by a strong desire to entrench 
the system politically, and therefore to ensure its status after he left office.
698
   
 
Congressional pressure on policymaking 
With the Republican Party retaining control of both Houses of Congress in the 2004 elections, it 
seemed unlikely that much pressure would be exerted on Bush’s BMD plans.  In fact, with 
Republicans controlling both the executive and legislature during 2005 and 2006, the Bush 
administration was able to push ahead and further entrench many of the programmes begun 
between 2001 and 2005.  The result was that by the end of 2006, the BMD debate had shifted 
considerably, and Democrats had little choice but to accept the fact that the debate could no longer 
be strictly about placing interceptors in silos.
699
   
 However, after the Democratic Party regained control of the Senate in late 2006, the stage 
was set for a new battle over expanding the system to Europe and augmenting the system already 
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deployed in Alaska and California.  Although Democrats were not against the idea of expanding the 
system to provide additional protection for the US and its allies in Europe against the threat from 
Iran, lawmakers strove to ensure that such decisions were based on credible technology.
700
  What is 
more, Democrats also pushed to synchronise deployments more directly with what was happening 
in Iran and North Korea, and to attempted to push BMD funding and development towards TMD 
and battlefield technologies and away from those considered more futuristic.
701
  As such, 
Democrats fought to include language in the annual appropriation Bill’s linking funding for BMD 
to more rigorous testing and oversight of the assets designated for deployment.
702
  In doing this, 
Congress was able to constrain the plans of the Bush administration during 2007 and 2008. 
 The return of Democratic control of Congress effectively put the brakes on the Bush 
administration’s BMD plans, especially the proposed deployments in Central and Eastern Europe.  
That said, by 2007 and 2008, the BMD debate had essentially moved to a position whereby 
disagreements in Congress were more about the most effective way of deploying, rather than about 
whether or not to deploy, and the debate was now shaped by the deployments that had already been 
made.  In this sense, Congressional pressure on policy was limited to the scale and timing of further 
BMD deployments, rather than whether or not the US should continue to augment the assets already 
deployed.  This was a direct reflection of how much the contours of the debate in Congress had 
changed during Bush’s presidency.  
 
(2) The evolution of policy, 2005-2009 
Great strides forward had been made in the US ballistic missile defence programme during Bush’s 
first term in office, and the BMD debate had shifted accordingly.  Although many commentators 
and scientists continued to question the technological development and deployment programme, by 
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2005 most interested parties had come to accept a role for BMD in US national security policy. 
With Bush determined to push ahead and to deploy more assets of this nascent integrated missile 
defence system both at home and abroad, the main debate looked likely to be fought over the pace 
and type of further deployments, and not over the notion of missile defence itself.  
 
2005 and 2006: Entrenchment and expansion 
At the beginning of 2004, all major presidential candidates held slightly different views about 
missile defence.
703
  Incumbent Republican President George W. Bush remained staunchly 
committed to deploying more components of his multi-layered BMD system, and made it clear 
during his re-election campaign that he considered the programme essential for US security.
704
  
Democrat candidates Senator John Kerry (D-MA) - who had opposed the decision the withdraw 
from the ABM treaty in late 2001 – and Senator John Edwards (D-NC), remained theoretically in 
favour of further missile defence testing and development, but did not consider the threat sufficient 
to warrant the type of plan Bush was proposing.
705
  Both referred to Bush’s BMD drive as “the 
wrong priority” during the election campaign, and together called for diverting money from the 
“untested missile defense system” to pay for other priorities such as expanding the US military.706  
As a result, it seemed likely that a Bush victory would mean that BMD would progress at a 
significant speed through the next four years, whereas if John Kerry or John Edwards won, funding 
would be slashed, no more “untested” interceptors would be placed in silos, and the system would 
not become operational until it was technologically proven.  Duncan Currie suggested at the time 
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that it was “no exaggeration to say the future of national missile defense hinges on November’s 
presidential election”.707  
 During the election, Bush strongly criticised “those who oppose this ballistic missile defense 
system” as people who “really don’t understand the threats of the 21st century” and who were 
“living in the past.”708  As a result, his election victory ensured that the BMD programme would 
remain at the forefront of US politics for the next four years as the president looked to spend the 
“political capital” he had gained from the election.709  In early 2005 Henry Obering reiterated and 
expanded upon the administration’s belief in a speech to Congress accompanying the annual BMD 
budget request: 
 The threat we face from proliferating and evolving ballistic missile systems and  
 associated technologies and expertise continues unabated.  There were nearly 100 foreign 
 ballistic missile launches around the world in 2004.  This is nearly double the number
 conducted in 2003 and slightly greater than the number of launches in 2002.  More than 60 
 launches last year involved short-range ballistic missiles, over ten involved medium-  
 range missiles, and nearly twenty involved land- and sea-based long-range ballistic
 missiles.
710 
As such, rather than developing BMD to address particular types of missile threat during this 
period, Bush’s BMD programme remained driven and underpinned by a more general desire to 
develop and deploy a substantial “missile defence capability” as soon as possible.  According to 
Obering: 
 The Missile Defense Agency’s mission remains one of developing and incrementally 
 fielding a joint, integrated, and multilayered Ballistic Missile Defense System to defend the 
 United States, our deployed forces, and our allies and friends against ballistic missiles of all 
 ranges by engaging them in the boost, midcourse, and terminal phases of flight.
711
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In March 2005, Obering commented that the programme remained “structured to balance the early 
fielding of elements of this system with its continued steady improvement through an evolutionary 
development and test approach”.712  The centrality to the Bush administration’s thinking was 
reflected in the fiscal year 2006 defence budget, in which the Missile Defense Agency requested 
$7.8b; a large percentage of which would be directed towards systems designed to counter the 
perceived growing Iranian and North Korean threats.  Of particular note, in a direct reflection of the 
administration’s concern about Iran, $10m was set aside to scout for a location for a Ground Based 
Interceptor site in Europe, while officials stepped up talks with the Czech Republic, Hungary and 
Poland about the possibility of housing the long-range interceptors on their territory.
713
   
 
Following a two-year hiatus, and after several missile defence interceptors had already been 
installed at Fort Greeley, Alaska and at Vandenberg Air Force Base, California, testing of the 
Ground-Based Midcourse Defense system resumed in December 2004.  The first test would result 
in a failure when the kill-vehicle and the booster missile failed to separate, and the second, 
conducted just a few days later, was also unsuccessful, owing to the interceptor failing to launch 
due to a software configuration problem.  Two months later in yet another test of the GBI, on the 
14
th
 February 2005, the interceptor again failed to launch, this time due to the silo support arm 
failing to retract.
714
  After the latest test failure, the Pentagon convened an independent review panel 
to look into these problems.
715
  The findings of the panel that were presented to the Director of the 
Missile Defense Agency in March 2005, recommended that the programme should enter a 
“performance and reliability verification phase” whereby mission assurance must become the 
highest priority.  It also candidly noted that  
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 With the focus on rapid deployment of the Ground-Based Midcourse Defense system, there 
 was not always adequate opportunity to fully ground test the system prior to each flight 
 attempt.
716
  
The authors also warned that the Missile Defense Agency had taken “dangerous shortcuts” in its 
attempts to get the system running, by “launching tests without even being sure that all parts were 
working”.717  Another panel commissioned by the Pentagon, concluded that the rush to deploy 
national anti-missile defences in 2004 had led to “shortfalls in quality controls and engineering 
procedures” because the Missile Defense Agency had been trying to meet a political deadline, 
which put “schedule ahead of performance and testing”.718  It also noted that the “decision to press 
ahead with the antimissile system in the face of production and testing delays had come at 
considerable costs in assurances of its reliability”.719  Senator Hillary Clinton (D-NY) quipped that 
it was “a little odd that we would deploy a system that hasn’t succeeded and expect that to serve as 
a deterrent”.720  Nevertheless, in March 2005 - as the Missile Defense Agency began installing a 
further 10 interceptors at Fort Greely, Alaska - General John Holly, head of the Ground-Based 
Missile Defense programme, publicly announced that despite the recent consecutive test failures, 
and while the system had not been officially declared operational, it did have “an emergency 
capability that could be switched on at any time that could stop a relatively unsophisticated attack 
from North Korea”.721  
 Although Democrats remained keen to scrutinise and curb what they perceived to be the 
excesses of Bush’s BMD programme, they were able to make only relatively little impact on the 
fiscal year 2006 budget.  A major reason for this was the developments in Iran and North Korea 
during 2005.  In February 2005 for example, Pyongyang publicly declared that it had acquired the 
technology required to produce nuclear weapons, while in August, the election of Mahmoud 
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Amadinejad in Iran, and his rejection of EU-led diplomatic efforts to curb the Iranian uranium 
enrichment programme, appeared equally troubling.
722
  The result was that both nations appeared to 
be moving inexorably closer to acquiring significant WMD capabilities, but not necessarily to 
acquiring Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBM’s) capable of striking the US homeland.  
 
Despite being in the minority, Democrats began 2006 determined to curb what they perceived to be 
the excesses of the Bush administration’s BMD programme, by cutting funding for “futuristic” 
programmes and by attempting to make sure anything deployed had been “properly tested.”723  
Democrats were especially concerned about reports from the Congressional Budget Office 
suggesting that missile defence funding would cost around $3b more per year than predicted, 
“peaking at about $19b in 2013”.724  Nevertheless, Bush’s fiscal year 2007 budget request reiterated 
his administration’s continued commitment to deploying an array of BMD systems, including to 
Europe.  The combined BMD request submitted to Congress in early February 2006 amounted to 
nearly $11.2b – the largest ever by the Bush administration.  Funding was also requested to begin 
deploying long-range interceptors in Europe to deal with the threat from Iran by 2010.
725
  Henry 
Obering explained that such funding was required because Iran has “not relented in their pursuit of 
longer-range ballistic missiles.  Our current and near-term missile defense fielding activities are a 
direct response to these dangers”.726    
Despite this, leading Democrats sponsored an amendment to the Defense Authorization Bill 
that would have cut $4.7b from the missile defence budget in spring 2006.  However, this would 
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fail along party lines 301-124,
727
 as would a proposal by Senator Carl Levin (D-MI) several months 
later to cut off funding for the Ground-Based Midcourse Defense system all together.
728
  Another 
amendment proposed by Congressman John Tierney (D-MA) in the House, which proposed cutting 
the Pentagon’s missile defence budget by more than half, was stymied when the House Republican 
leadership would not bring the motion up for a vote.
729
 
Efforts by the Democrats to impart limits and control on the BMD programme were further 
undermined on the 5
th
 July 2006, as North Korea test-fired six different ballistic missiles, including 
the long-range Taepodong-2.  Although the Taepodong-2 test was classified as a failure – the 
missile blew up just 40 seconds after launch, falling into the Sea of Japan, leading Senator Joseph 
Biden (D-DE) to refer to the missile tests as exposing the North Korean dictator as a “paper 
tiger”730 – it caused great concern in the White House and in Congress.731  Republicans lawmakers 
in particular reacted to the test firings by touting their party’s support for missile defence and 
praising the expansion of the programme’s budget and scope.732  Senator George Allen (R-VI) 
represented the views of many when he said that the launches were a reminder of “our need for an 
effective ballistic missile defense system”.733  The recognition that North Korea conducted a 
nuclear test on 9
th
 October 2006, therefore cementing its position as the eighth declared nuclear 
power, also gave the push for BMD added impetus and credibility.
734
  As a CRS Report warned: 
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 North Korea’s willingness to carry out a test in the face of significant opposition indicates 
 that it is willing to endure the potential consequences … analysts fear that the medium and 
 long-term implications could include a more potent nuclear threat from Pyongyang.
735
 
Although North Korea had agreed to rejoin the six-party talks by the end of the month, the nuclear 
test had shifted the debate considerably.
736
  
Nevertheless, Democrats were committed to rationalising Bush’s missile defence plans 
during 2006, primarily because they remained deeply sceptical of the technology.  In fact, even the 
Pentagon Director of Operational Test and Evaluation, Charles McQueary cautioned in early 2006 
that “flight tests still lack operational realism” and that “this will remain the case over the next 
year”.737  In light of these developments, on 29th August, several leading Democrats sent Secretary 
of Defense Rumsfeld a letter in which they questioned the administration’s approach to BMD.  
They argued: 
 Since the Strategic Defense Initiative was launched in the mid 1980s, the United States has 
 spent nearly $100bn on missile defense programs and studies with little to show for it …  As 
 supporters of fielding a limited missile defense capability that works, we would … like to 
 know when you believe that the American people can be sure that this system will truly 
 defend our country against a threat such as North Korea.
738
 
In fact, the GMD system did not achieve a successful test intercept until 1
st
 September 2006; nearly 
four years after Bush had ordered the system to be deployed, and two years after the first interceptor 
had been placed in its silo in Alaska.  While critics were quick to point out that the flight test fell 
short of representing a realistic scenario,
739
 Henry Obering declared that the test was a “huge 
success” and that the outcome gave him confidence that the system had a “good chance of 
destroying a missile in a real attack”.740  A few weeks later Bush announced that he believed the 
nascent missile defence system would have had a “reasonable chance” of shooting down a long-
range missile launched at the US by North Korea should it have threatened the US homeland, 
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although cautioning that the current assets were modest, and that it would be hard to give a 
“probability of success”.741  Both Henry Obering and Eric Edelman would later say that they 
believed that the system would have had a good chance to intercepting and destroying the North 
Korean missile should it have threatened the United States.  Obering also pointed out that having a 
BMD system deployed, stabilised the crisis and allowed the president time to think and respond 
correctly.
742
 
Despite the continuing concerns about testing and technology, Pyongyang’s actions 
significantly strengthened support for Bush’s missile defence plans, and virtually sunk the resurgent 
Democratic campaign before it had started.
743
  As a result, Congress appropriated $9.4b for BMD in 
2006, a 20% increase over funding in the previous fiscal year, but was cautious about funding for 
the plan to deploy Ground-Based Interceptors to Europe.
744
  Senator John Kyle (R-AZ) described 
the Democratic policy as “test forever, deploy never”, and warned that the 2006 midterm elections 
would be crucial to the system’s future.745 
After being at the forefront of the political debate for nearly a decade, thanks partly to the 
wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, BMD policy was a relatively peripheral political issue during 2005 
and 2006.  This also reflected the growing bipartisan consensus in Congress about deploying a 
limited and technologically proven BMD system.  But above all, it was because George W. Bush’s 
election victory, and the retention of Republican majorities in Congress, meant that the programme 
remained a central component of the administration’s policy agenda.  Although the Missile Defense 
Agency would continue to experience problems in its technology development programme, support 
in Congress, and a growing concern about North Korea and Iran, continued to drive the programme 
forward.   
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2007 and 2008: The battle over missile defence in Europe 
In the November 2006 general elections, Democrats won majorities in both the House (for the first 
time in 12 years) and the Senate, and looked set to begin a new domestic battle with the Bush 
administration over missile defence.
746
  One important result of the Democratic victory was that it 
put long-time missile defence sceptic Senator Carl Levin (D-MI) back in the influential position of 
Chairman of the Armed Services Committee.  The new Chairman had already made it clear that he 
thought it was a “mistake to purchase all of the [BMD] missiles before we know that they’re going 
to work”,747 and had told reporters at his confirmation hearing that the Pentagon had “not done the 
operational testing yet that convinces me that [the system] will work”.748  Consequently, much as 
they had done in both 2001 and 2004, the Democrats seemed determined to make proper oversight 
and more rigorous testing the basis of their plan of attack on the president’s BMD programme.  
Baker Spring, writing for The Heritage Foundation, warned missile defence advocates in Congress 
not to be complacent, because the debate over BMD, particularly in light of recent Congressional 
elections, remained “far from won”.749  
 Following the 2006 mid-term elections, Bush announced that former Director of Central 
Intelligence Robert Gates would replace Donald Rumsfeld as Secretary of Defense, in order to 
bring “a fresh perspective to the Pentagon”.750  However, any sign that the change in personnel 
would mean a scaling back for BMD was quashed during Gates’ acceptance speech in which he 
praised Rumsfeld for taking ballistic missile defence “from theory to reality”, and made it clear that 
he also supported operational testing of weapons after deployment, stating that “if something has 
some capability, it’s better than having no capability”.751  As a result, $10.8b would be requested 
for BMD in fiscal year 2008.
752
  Part of this funding would go towards a new plan to protect against 
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the growing threat from the Middle East, particularly the concern that Iran was moving towards 
constructing a nuclear weapon capable of hitting the United States, which the president, and 
especially those close to Bush, had become increasingly concerned about in early 2007.
753
  The US 
was also becoming impatient with the diplomatic approach to halt Iran’s missile and nuclear 
programmes - which the State Department and Lt General Henry Obering warned could materialise 
“inside eight years” - that was being led by the EU-3 and the IAEA.754   As a result, in early 2007 
Bush announced that the US would be formalising negotiations with Poland over housing 10 long-
range interceptor missiles at the Redzikowo Air Force Base, and with the Czech Republic over the 
deployment of a large X-band radar at the Brdy military zone.
755
  
  Almost immediately after the announcement that US BMD assets were to be deployed in 
Europe, Russian officials began floating the idea of leaving the 1987 Intermediate-range Nuclear 
Forces Treaty (INF), and spoke of targeting Russian ballistic missiles on Poland and the Czech 
Republic should the proposal go ahead.
756
  The head of Russian Strategic Forces Nikolai Solovstov, 
said that Russia might also consider deploying nuclear tipped ballistic missiles in Europe, and 
arming them with Manoeuvrable Re-Entry Vehicles.
757
  In addition to this, Russia began testing the 
Topol-M ICBM - capable of piercing any current proposed US missile shield - and announced that 
a Submarine version, potentially armed with manoeuvrable warheads was also being developed.
758
  
Vladimir Putin publicly dismissed the US rationale for the European system, citing the threat as 
non-existent, and arguing therefore that the deployment must be aimed at Russia.  In response to 
what he described as this “confrontational behaviour”, Putin declared that: 
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 If a part of the strategic nuclear potential of the United States appears in Europe and, in the 
 opinion of our military specialists will threaten us, then we will have to take appropriate 
 steps in response. What kind of steps? We will have to have new targets in Europe.
759
 
Russian concerns about the plan were met with only limited reaction by the Bush administration – 
essentially Bush and those around him were far more concerned about the growing threat from 
rogue states than that from Russia.  Moreover, US officials recognised the Russian statements as 
being primarily politically driven.  As Henry Obering later remarked: 
The Russians knew what was being built didn’t represent a technical threat.  It was purely 
 geopolitics.  You couldn’t catch a Russian ICBM from Poland, nor could the radar in the 
 Czech Republic pick up launches in Russia because its minimum elevation meant it could 
 not see into Russian airspace.
760
 
As such, the Bush administration refused to let the repeated threats from Moscow interfere with a 
plan that they continued to maintain “posed no threat to Russia”.761 
  
Throughout the second half of 2007, Bush rejected a number of proposals made by Russia to 
replace the Third Site plan with some type of joint missile defence cooperation.
762
  Bush also 
rejected a suggestion by Vladimir Putin that interceptor missiles might be placed somewhere in 
Southern Russia, Turkey, Iraq or even at sea.
763
  Although Robert Gates said that the US might 
delay activating the European sites until the Iranian (or other) threat had materialised, and that the 
US might make the installations more “transparent to Russia” by allowing for an exchange of 
observers, Putin responded by promising to strengthen “Russia’s military capability” and to 
“increase spying abroad”.764  In October 2007, at the close of a EU/Russia summit in Portugal, 
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Putin drew the analogy between the current situation regarding the emplacement of American BMD 
assets in Central and Eastern Europe and the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis.
765
   
As Bush’s 2007 BMD budget request passed through Congress, the Democratic leadership 
in both Houses sought to impose limits on what the Missile Defense Agency could do, and to 
impose more stringent oversight and more realistic testing.  In terms of the Third Site plan, the 
Senate Armed Services Committee, headed by Carl Levin, recommended limiting funding for the 
European BMD project until; (1) agreements with the Poles and Czechs had been completed; (2) 
Congress had received an independent assessment of options on European BMD, and; (3) the 
Secretary of Defense had certified that the proposed interceptors had been demonstrated to work.
766
  
Many Democrats in both Houses viewed the move to deploy assets in Europe as premature, 
especially because testing of the new two-stage interceptor designed for the European deployment – 
based on the current three-stage GBI deployed in Alaska and California – would not begin until at 
least 2010.  As a result, they pushed to cut funding for construction of the sites to be built in Poland 
and the Czech Republic.
767
  The House Armed Services Strategic Forces Chairwoman Ellen 
Tauscher (D-CA), told reporters on 8
th
 November 2007 that Democrats in the House were thinking 
of pushing the Bush administration to “NATO-ize” the US BMD efforts in Europe, with the longer-
range interceptors and radar becoming the long-range aspect of the current NATO BMD 
programme.
768
  Tauscher, a BMD advocate, had criticised the administration’s approach as 
“condescending and rash”, suggesting instead that the administration should “take a strategic pause, 
get the rhetoric right and NATO-ize it”.769  
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The debate over deploying further BMD assets in Europe was further complicated in late 
2007 by the release of a report by the US intelligence community into the Iranian nuclear 
programme: 
 This NIE does not assume that Iran intends to acquire nuclear weapons … we judge with 
 high confidence that in fall 2003, Tehran halted its nuclear weapons program … we judge 
 with high confidence that the halt, and Tehran’s announcement of its decision to suspend its 
 declared uranium enrichment program and sign an additional protocol to its NNP [Nuclear 
 Non-Proliferation] treaty safeguards agreement, was directed primarily in response to  
 increasing international scrutiny and pressure … we assess with moderate confidence 
 Tehran had not restarted its nuclear weapons program as of mid-2007 … [and our research] 
 suggests it [Iran] is less determined to develop nuclear weapons than we have been judging 
 since 2005.
770
 
This latest evidence made Democrats even more determined to rationalise the proposed 
deployments to Europe.  Nevertheless, Lt General Obering later commented: “We couldn’t wait 
until the Iranians launched a long-range missile and then start worrying about building out the site 
… if we had done that, we would have been way behind the curve”.771   
 Internationally, in response to these developments in late 2007, but particularly because of 
the haste with which the Bush administration appeared determined to push ahead, Russia declared 
itself no longer bound by the 1990 Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Treaty,
772
 and a few days 
later, announced that any launching of American interceptor missiles from the proposed site in 
Europe might cause a retaliatory Russian missile launch.
773
  Domestically, the result was that an 
unconvinced Congress voted in 2007 to cut Bush’s fiscal year 2008 appropriations for the European 
BMD plan by $85m, and eliminated funds to begin construction in Poland and the Czech 
Republic.
774
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In early 2008, the Democrats started where they had left off the previous year, and in the spring, the 
House Armed Services Committee voted to withhold authorisation for most of the requested funds 
for initial construction in Europe, and proposed language that would withhold funding to build the 
system until the Secretary of Defense certified that it had been properly tested.
775
  Democratic 
pressure was further boosted by a report from the General Accounting Office released in April, 
which although congratulating the Missile Defense Agency for “fielding additional and new assets, 
enhancing the capability of some existing assets, and achieving most test objectives”, was also 
quick to point out that the “MDA did not meet the stated goals it originally stated for the block”, in 
fact it “fielded fewer assets, increased costs by about $1billion, and conducted fewer tests” than it 
had originally planned.
776
  The report highlighted two other significant issues; (1) firstly that the 
GAO was unable to assess whether the Missile Defense Agency had met its overall system 
performance goals, or to assess the overall performance of the integrated ballistic missile defence 
system currently fielded, because there had not been enough flight tests; (2) and secondly that: 
 Tests of the GMD element have been of a developmental nature, and have not included 
 target suite dynamic features and intercept geometries representative of the operational 
 environment in which GMD will perform its mission.
777
 
A month later, on the 15
th
 May 2008, the Pentagon cancelled its latest GBI missile defence test - its 
first since the successful test of September 2007 - due to faulty telemetry on the kill vehicle.
778
  The 
abandoned test, and concerns about the technological viability of the GBI programme, continued to 
alarm Democrats in Congress, and in early August Representative Ellen Tauscher (D-CA) warned 
the administration: “Go ahead move on with the research and development … but as far as putting 
holes in the ground in Poland we [the Democrats] are saying no”.779 
Despite the threatening Russian rhetoric, Democratic pressure, technological problems and 
new intelligence, the Bush administration pushed ahead with the European BMD plan, and on 3
rd
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April 2008 signed an accord with the Czech Republic to deploy the proposed BMD radar site at the 
Brdy Military Base.  Acquiring a Polish agreement would be slightly more complicated, and at one 
point during early June, it was even rumoured that the Bush administration was seeking out 
Lithuania as a possible host of the 10 interceptors Washington intended to deploy.
780
  However, on 
30
th
 August, Poland signed an official agreement with the US over hosting the proposed 10 
interceptor missiles, and Prime Minister Lech Kaczynski expressed optimism that the Polish 
Parliament would approve.
781
  In response, a Russian newspaper reported that Russian bombers 
capable of carrying nuclear payloads could be deployed to Cuba.
782
  
 Although Iran had tested a range of ballistic missiles in July – including the Shabab-3, Fateh 
and Zelzel systems
783
, the actual signing of both deals had more to do with developments in Russia, 
than it did with developments in the Middle East.  In fact, the Democrats had looked set to make 
significant inroads into the budget request and to establish more oversight and stringent testing until 
the outbreak of the Russia-Georgia war in August 2008.
784
  According to Wade Boese, the war 
“made it virtually certain that Poland and the Czech Republic would ratify the agreements and that 
progress could begin on the European deployment plan”.785  The war also reignited BMD support 
within the Republican Party, with missile defence advocate Representative Trent Franks (R-AZ) 
commenting that: 
 It’s going to be easier to make our [BMD] case on Capitol Hill now … as this has reminded 
 Poland and some of the other nations formerly dominated by the Soviet Union that the 
 coercive Russia mind-set of militarily threatening your neighbours has not completely 
 disappeared.
786
 
However, as Bush left office both agreements had yet to be ratified by the host nation’s legislatures, 
leaving the prospect that the system could be changed or abandoned by the next president.  In the 
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final draft of the defence budget Bill, funding for the European BMD system was slashed by almost 
one third to $467m for fiscal year 2009, and it was agreed that funds would not be released until 
both the Polish and Czech legislatures had ratified the deal.
787
  The Bill also mandated that the 
Secretary of Defense review US BMD policy and submit a comprehensive report to Congress by 
31
st
 Jan 2010, and redirected substantial amounts of money away from the more exotic and 
futuristic programmes such as the space-based interceptor and the Airborne Laser.
788
  Nevertheless, 
in an attempt to continue the push for the European BMD site, Bush requested just over $1b in 
fiscal year 2009 for the proposed deployments in Poland and the Czech Republic.
789
  
 The return to power of Democrats in Congress certainly curtailed what Bush was able to do 
with missile defence policy during the last two years of his presidency, but this did not stop further 
BMD deployments being made, or stop agreements being reached and signed with the Czech 
Republic and Poland.  What the Democrats were able to do was practice more oversight of the 
programme by linking further deployments and funding to testing and technological development.  
Crucially however, the Democrats were limited in what they could achieve by the impact of the 
Russia-Georgia war, and by the high priority that continued to be placed on the programme by 
Bush.  The result was that the US BMD programme became further normalised and entrenched, 
which meant the next US president would inherit a rudimentary global missile defence system. 
 
(3) Assessing the drivers of policy, 2005-2009 
The US ballistic missile debate between 2005 and 2009 was shaped by a growing concern about 
North Korean and Iranian WMD programmes, and by gradual developments in BMD technology. 
Neither pressure however can fully explain the alacrity or specifics of the programme pursued by 
the Bush administration during this period, or indeed the apparent rush to deploy additional 
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interceptors in Europe.  In this sense, it was the actions and thinking of the Bush administration – 
namely the desire to deploy assets as quickly as possible, and with little regard to Russia – 
combined with a Republican controlled Congress in 2005 and 2006, and then a Democratically 
controlled Congress in 2007 and 2008, that explains the particular rhythms of the debate during this 
period.    
 
International and technological factors 
While it was generally accepted that both Iranian and North Korean WMD programmes represented 
a growing concern during Bush’s second term, there was little consensus about the scale, extent and 
shape of these threats, and analysts and commentators remained split by how quickly each state 
could acquire a capacity to hit the US with a nuclear weapon.  Specifically, developments in Iran – 
and information from the US intelligence community - cannot fully explain the haste with which the 
Bush administration attempted to push ahead further missile defence deployments in Europe.  
Neither does this explain the apparent preference for strategic deployments apparently at the 
expense of defences against short-range and regional threats – despite the latter remaining the key 
threat facing the US.  Moreover, and while the apparent willingness on the part of the Bush 
administration to ignore repeated threats from Russia over US BMD plans had much to do with the 
changing US-Russian relationship after the Cold War, the fact that Bush and those around him paid 
so little attention to these threats had much to do with national security thinking within the 
administration. 
 Missile defence technologies undoubtedly matured during this period, but politics remained 
largely out-of-sync with technology.  In particular, continuing problems with the GBI cast doubt on 
the technological efficacy of deploying more assets in Alaska and California, and especially over 
agreeing to deploy assets in Europe based on these interceptors that had not even begun testing. 
Missile Defense Director Henry Obering would later suggest that long-range BMD systems 
Expanding and integrating the US missile defence programme 
 211 
appeared to be privileged during this period because “other short and medium range system were 
taking longer to develop, and were intended to come online after 2008.”790  But this does not 
explain the haste and alacrity with which the administration sought to push ahead.  In the words of 
Richard Burns,  
At the end of George W Bush’s presidency, there appeared to be little public discussion 
 about the operational reliability of the various BMD projects or the costs involved in their 
 research and deployment.  Despite optimistic and often exaggerated official claims to the 
 contrary, there was considerable room for scepticism about the reliability of the 
 administration’s missile defense system.  Indeed, few BMD projects could claim to have 
 been tested in a realistic setting, that is, tested in a real-world environment, without scripted 
 tests, fending off realistic countermeasures, and manned by regular military units rather than 
 civilian specialists.
791
 
 
Domestic factors 
As had largely been the case between 2001 and 2005, President Bush remained the key driver of 
BMD policy during between 2005 and 2009.  Primarily, it was the worldview and thinking of Bush 
– and of those around him – that underpinned the strong desire to push rapidly ahead with 
development and deployment of a variety of BMD systems.  Essentially it was the fact that the 
administration was fully prepared to pay a diplomatic price in angering Russia, and to deploy assets 
before fully tested, in order to address the threats from Iran and North Korea, that drove policy 
forward.  In this sense, Bush was deliberately pushing policy beyond what either the threat appeared 
to justify, or indeed, what technology could achieve.  For Bush, getting something deployed was 
better than nothing primarily so that the US could stay ahead of the perceived threat, but also so that 
the system would survive his presidency.  It was because of this that additional interceptors 
continued to be deployed in Alaska and California throughout this period – despite problems with 
the GBI programme – and why Bush was so keen to reach agreement on deploying further assets to 
Europe during 2007 and 2008.  
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 However, the particular pressure brought to bear on policy by Congress is also an important 
factor in understanding policy during this period.  In particular, Republican control of Congress 
during 2005 and 2006 ensured that Bush was essentially able to push ahead unhindered, allowing 
the president to rapidly expand and entrench his BMD plans.  However, the return to power of the 
Democrats for the last two years of Bush’s presidency ensured a far higher level of Congressional 
scrutiny and oversight on policy during 2007 and 2008.  The direct result of this was Bush’s 
inability to finalise deals with Poland and Czech Republic over the Third Site plan, and the 
curtailment of several of the more futuristic plans under development at the Missile Defense 
Agency.  Consequently, Congressional pressure on policy was split during this period, which in turn 
would have important implications for both policy and the BMD debate. 
 As a result, the ballistic missile debate, and its particular evolution during this period, 
remained shaped by domestic political actors as much as by technology or by the international 
system, and by the interaction of these factors.  Bush and the Republicans remained determined to 
push ahead with BMD, while Democrats favoured restraint.  But by 2009, both had essentially 
come to accept the reality of missile defence as a component of US security policy.  To an extent, 
the debate was also shaped by these actors acting for domestic political reasons; Bush was certainly 
determined to ensure the longevity of the programme by deploying lots of assets before he left 
office, while Republicans in 2005, and Democrats in 2007, would use BMD for party political 
reasons.  The result was a policy that would appear slightly out-of-sync with systemic trends and 
technological capabilities. 
 
Conclusion 
Under the stewardship of George W. Bush, the US BMD programme evolved with great rapidity 
between 2005 and 2009.  During these years more assets were deployed to protect the US homeland 
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in Alaska and California, agreements were reached about expanding the system to Europe, and over 
$40b was spent on the US BMD effort.  The direct result was that the missile defence debate shifted 
further towards acceptance, whereby disagreements became largely confined to the periphery, and 
over how and what to deploy, rather than about whether to deploy or not.  As such, ballistic missile 
defence would become politically and strategically entrenched in US national security thinking and 
policy during Bush’s second term.  In fact, as a sign of this new permanence, in November 2008, 
the Pentagon began building a new multi-million dollar missile defence “Headquarters Command 
Centre” at Fort Belvoir in Virginia.792 
 While the growing concern about Iranian and North Korean WMD programmes can partly 
explain why Bush was so keen to push ahead, the fact that the president remained determined to 
continue deploying assets despite the anxiety it was causing in Moscow, and despite continued 
technological problems, suggests that the prime driver of policy the Bush administration itself.  
Bush prioritised the rogue state missile threat over better and more stable relations with Russia, and 
saw deployment of missile defences as paramount to US security.  At the same time, Bush pursued 
this path with questionable technological justification, for while there was an argument for the 
spiral development model being used, this did not mean that technology was driving policy 
forward.  In fact, the only real pressure on policy came after 2006, as Democratic lawmakers sought 
to increase scrutiny and oversight, and to rationalise the proposed deployments to Europe.  
Nevertheless, without the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, it is likely that even more money would 
have been spent on BMD, and even more progress may have been made during this period. 
 As George W. Bush left office, the US had a rudimentary ballistic missile defence system 
deployed and theoretically capable of defending the US homeland against a limited and 
unsophisticated missile attack.  In addition to this, the US military was taking control of an 
expanding inventory of battlefield missile defence systems, and great strides were being made at 
implementing various other theatre missile defence systems and plans, notably the Aegis and SM-3 
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programmes.  The result was a burgeoning global missile defence capacity, a further shift in the 
debate towards acceptance of BMD, and a considerable structural legacy for any future 
administration.   
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The reluctant convert – Barack Obama, 2009-2010 
 
Barack Obama took office in January 2009, much like the previous Democratic president, Bill 
Clinton, determined to reduce the defence budget, refresh US foreign policy, and concentrate his 
time and energy on his expansive domestic agenda.  Obama looked set to decrease funding for 
BMD, recalibrate the programme and relegate it in importance, in order to pursue a more diplomatic 
approach to world affairs.  With Democrats in control of Congress, questions remaining about the 
efficacy of various BMD technologies, and with Russian antagonism about US BMD plans 
mounting, it appeared that Obama might be able to rationalise the programme that he had inherited 
from George W. Bush, in order to fulfil his wider policy agenda.  
 However, and despite his determination to downgrade the BMD programme, during 2009 
and 2010 Barack Obama oversaw what amounted to considerable continuity in US missile defence 
plans and capabilities.  The replacement of the Third Site with the Phased Adaptive Approach 
(PAA) for missile defence in Europe looked set to be a far more comprehensive system than that 
envisaged by the Bush administration.  The February 2010 Ballistic Missile Defence Review 
(BMDR) outlined a plan whereby US BMD assets could be deployed all over the world in ever 
increasing numbers, and in coordination with US allies.  BMD budget requests were retained at 
levels just below those requested under George W Bush, and more than double those under Ronald 
Reagan, George H. W. Bush and Bill Clinton.  Lastly, the Obama administration refused to accept 
any limits on US BMD plans as part of the negotiations over New START – a key administration 
priority – and the centrepiece of the US-Russian “re-set”.  As such, President Obama essentially 
presided over a continuation, and in some cases expansion, of the BMD programme that he had 
inherited, despite it appearing to undermine wider policy agendas. 
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 The evolution of policy under Obama raises a number of interesting questions.  First, why 
did Obama continue to spend vast sums of money on BMD despite campaign pledges to cut 
funding, rein the programme in, and focus on other means of addressing the threat from 
proliferation?  Second, why did Obama refuse to use BMD as a bargaining chip with Russia, even 
though US BMD plans were seen as one of the main impediments to the “re-set” and reaching 
agreement on New START?  Finally, why did Obama appear to outline a bigger BMD plan for 
Europe than the Bush administration, and commit his own administration to deploying even more 
components of this system throughout the globe?  At least part of the answer to these questions was 
the importance of the domestic political pressures brought to bear on policy during this period.  
 
(1) Competing pressures on BMD policy, 2009-2010 
Barack Obama took office at a time when concern was mounting about Iran and North Korea; 
Russia was becoming more antagonised by US BMD plans; technology was slowly moving 
forward, and most lawmakers in Congress had largely accepted the necessity of missile defence as a 
component of US security.  Obama was also the only US president looked at in this thesis to inherit 
a deployed national missile defence system theoretically able to defend against a limited missile 
attack on the US homeland.  As a result, one of the main pressures on policy as Obama took office 
was the structural inheritance from the Bush administration.  It was in this context that Obama set 
about trying to normalise and rationalise the US missile defence programme as part of his wider 
agenda of change. 
 
International pressures on policymaking 
International pressure would again be bifurcated during this period between the demands of 
retaining good and stable relations with strategic competitors such as Russia, and the need to 
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address the growing WMD threats from Iran and North Korea.  In this sense, apart from the 
recognition that Iran and North Korea were augmenting their WMD capabilities, and that Russia 
was becoming more concerned about US BMD plans, the international pressures on policymaking 
remained essentially the same as they had done for the last few years of the Bush administration. 
 Russian president Dmitri Medvedev wasted little time after the 2008 presidential election in 
applying pressure on Obama over the missile defence issue, and Moscow’s concerns and possible 
reactions to US BMD plans would be a key influence on policy during this period.  In a speech on 
5
th
 November 2008 for example, Medvedev announced that:  
If US interceptors were deployed in Poland, Russia would target them with new 
 deployments of Iskander ballistic missiles in the Kaliningrad enclave, and plans to 
 decommission three regiments of nuclear-armed long-range missiles in Western Russia 
 would be scrapped.
793
   
Later in this period, Russian leaders would strive to link the New START nuclear arms reduction 
treaty with limits on missile defence, and failing that, make clear their intention to leave the Treaty 
should US BMD plans go ahead as scheduled.
794
  The result was that Russia – and to a lesser extent 
China – would exert significant pressure on Obama’s BMD plans and on the US missile defence 
debate during 2009 and 2010.  
 Concern also continued to grow about Iran and North Korea.  Specifically, the diplomatic 
approaches to both nations, but particularly Iran, were not achieving the success that Obama had 
hoped.  This period saw a gradual realisation that Teheran had resumed its nuclear weapons 
programme and was getting ever closer to being able to acquire such a capability, and that the 
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preferred diplomatic approach to Iran simply wasn’t working.795  At the same time, a renewed 
diplomatic approach to North Korea also showed little evidence of bearing fruit, as Pyongyang test 
fired a three-stage rocket over the Sea of Japan, ejected IAEA weapons inspectors, and in May 2009 
conducted its second underground nuclear test.  However, while concern was growing about Iran 
and North Korea, new assessments from the US Intelligence Community suggested that the growth 
in North Korean, and particularly Iranian WMD capabilities remained primarily in short and 
medium-range missiles, and not ICBMs able to hit the US homeland.
796
  A direct result of these 
developments would be increased pressure from US allies in Europe, the Greater Middle East and 
East Asia to address these concerns. 
  
Technological pressures on policymaking 
Despite the large sums of money spent and the advances made under the Bush administration, 
assessing the actual capability of various BMD technologies remained complicated.  On the one 
hand, the Bush administration had begun deploying systems such as the Ground Based Interceptor 
in 2004, but on the other, many of these assets had not undergone full testing.  At the same time, 
many specific details about the performance of the GBI, and indeed several other programmes, 
remained classified.  Consequently, as Barack Obama entered office, he was faced with a number of 
BMD systems in various states of development, and with various levels of proven effectiveness. 
 Within this milieu, one of the most important technological dynamics influencing BMD 
during 2009 and 2010 was the decision to abandon the spiral development deployment process, and 
terminate the approach whereby assets could be deployed before fully tested.  This change of policy 
would allow the administration to more clearly gage the performance of specific BMD programmes 
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before deployment, and therefore to prioritise and deploy programmes with better testing records.
797
  
This would manifest in a move away from the Ground-Based Interceptor programme – which 
Pentagon Director of Operational Test and Evaluation Charles McQueary admitted that he could not 
“say with high confidence … was operationally effective”798, and which would fail two operational 
tests in January and December 2009 – towards a more flexible, capable and cost-effective 
architecture offered by the SM-3 and Aegis systems.  By April 2011, the SM-3/ Aegis system had 
achieved 16 out of 18 operationally configured tests, and cost nearly six times less than the much 
larger GBI.
799
  Rigorous scrutiny and oversight of technology would also lead to the cancellation of 
a number of lesser performing and futuristic technologies that had enjoyed considerable patronage 
under the Bush administration.  This change of strategy would be codified in the February 2010 
Ballistic Missile Defense Review, which outlined the administration’s desire to shift the 
technological development programme towards theatre missile defence systems, and towards 
systems with the best testing track records.
800
  Nevertheless, Obama and Secretary of Defense 
Robert Gates would insist during this period that the 30 GBIs already deployed were sufficient to 
protect the US against any new near-term long-range missile threat.
801
  
 
Presidential policy agenda 
Unlike his Republican predecessor, President Obama did not see ballistic missile defence as a 
policy priority for his administration during the 2008 presidential campaign.  In fact, John Isaacs 
suggested that “Obama was neither for nor against BMD”, and that his administration’s approach to 
the issue would be “pragmatic”, and depend upon balancing other priorities.802  The Obama 
administration made it clear that it favoured a diplomatic approach to North Korea and Iran, and 
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would place a “re-set” of relations with Russia at the top of its agenda.  As part of this, Obama 
entered office keen to recalibrate the BMD programme to reflect the most pressing threats and the 
most advanced technologies.   
 The first key presidential pressure on BMD policy was Obama’s much-publicised desire for 
change in the way that the US approached the world, and his determination to prioritise his 
expansive domestic agenda.  Obama had made it clear in 2008 in response to a series of missile 
tests by Iran that he saw “direct and aggressive diplomacy” not missile defence as the primarily 
means to deal with “rogue states”,803 and in a later interview with Arms Control Today, went on to 
declare that he believed that “the real 21st century threats [were not] rogue states lashing out with 
ballistic missiles, but a terrorist smuggling a crude nuclear device across our borders”.804   
 The second dynamic was the determination to reset relations with Russia, and to push hard 
for a new strategic arms reduction agreement.  As well as seeking to repair the perceived damage 
caused during the previous administration, and in order to enlist support for key US foreign policy 
objectives, Obama was also determined that a new and substantial arms reductions deal with 
Moscow would be the springboard needed to reinvigorate the nuclear disarmament agenda.  Shortly 
after being elected, Obama declared: 
 The United States and Russia should seek real, verifiable reductions in all US and Russian 
 nuclear weapons … I am committed to working with Russia and other nuclear weapon states 
 to make deep cuts in global stockpiles by the end of my first term.
805
 
In fact, Obama’s so called “Prague speech”806 on nuclear disarmament would become a centrepiece 
of the US approach to world affairs during 2009 and 2010. 
 Finally, Obama’s approach to BMD was governed by his desire to prioritise what he 
perceived to be near-term threats and proven technologies.  Essentially, the president believed that 
the focus of the BMD programme should be shifted from homeland defence towards a greater 
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concentration on battlefield and theatre missile defences, and away from the problematic GBI 
programme towards the Aegis SM-3 system.  Obama had earlier declared: “as president I will make 
sure any missile defense, including the one proposed for Europe, has been proven to work and has 
our allies’ support before we deploy it.”807  This approach to BMD would be reflected in both the 
decision to alter the missile defence plan for Europe, and in the administration’s Ballistic Missile 
Defense Review. 
 In sum, Barack Obama did not appear to see ballistic missile defence as a priority as he 
entered office, and it some respects it seemed to represent a stumbling block in achieving many of 
his administration’s other policy priorities.  Obama did not want BMD to undermine his attempts to 
negotiate a new arms control deal with Moscow, or his wider goal of nuclear reductions, and 
therefore seemed destined to cut the US ballistic missile defence budget and deal with the economic 
recession.  Although this was a sign of things to come, Obama would retain the services of Robert 
Gates as Secretary of Defense, which suggested a certain amount of continuity with the previous 
administration in the field of BMD. 
 
Congressional pressure on policymaking 
The elections for the 111
th
 Congress in 2008 saw the Democrats increase their majorities in both the 
House and the Senate.  As a result, the Democratic Party controlled both the presidency and 
Congress for the first time since 1993, which suggested that Congressional pressure on Obama’s 
BMD policy would be relatively limited.  Although Democrats had come to accept ballistic missile 
defence as a component of US national security policy, they nevertheless remained keen to ensure 
that anything that was deployed had been properly tested, and that any US missile defence plans 
would not get in the way of wider foreign policy goals.  As a result, in early 2009, Dean Wilkening 
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suggested that “the era of partisan support for BMD is over”, and that debate in Congress would 
now predominantly concern the limits of the US missile defence programme.
808
 
 Despite being in the minority in both Houses, Republican lawmakers would seek to bring 
considerable pressure to bear on policy during 2009 and 2010.  Although both parties tacitly 
accepted a role for BMD, they remained divided over exactly how the US should develop this 
capability.  According to one Congressional official, by 2009: 
Democrats sought to deploy technologically proven systems against the most pressing 
 threats, while Republicans sought to deploy missile defences against a range of threats that 
 they believed to be real and growing.
809
 
A direct reflection of this would be the Democratic tendency to prioritise development and 
deployment of battlefield and theatre missile defences to ensure protection of US troops and US 
freedom of action overseas, and the Republican desire to explore and deploy more advanced 
technologies to protect the US homeland from new and emerging strategic threats.
810
   
Republican pressure on policy would be driven by a mixture of political and ideological 
dynamics; partly by their genuine support for BMD, and partly by the desire to apply significant 
political pressure to the new president, which would see lawmakers taking issue with Obama’s first 
budget request, the decision to change the BMD plan for Europe, and in particular, the New START 
agreement.  Much as had been the case during the 1990s, Republicans appeared determined to paint 
a Democratic president as being “weak on defence” and as undervaluing the importance of BMD to 
US security.  The result was a fiercely partisan Congress that saw strong divisions and debate on 
almost every aspect of the president’s policy agenda.   
 Despite the fact that most lawmakers had either embraced or resigned themselves to 
accepting BMD by 2009, Congress continued to be divided over the issue.  Rather than debate the 
relative merits of missile defence, however, the main lines of argument were now about the extent 
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and shape of such a programme, and which technologies should be prioritised.  Even though the 
debate about BMD had moved very much to the periphery, it remained a vehicle for political battles 
in Congress and a way of attacking the president. 
 
(2) The evolution of policy, 2009-2010 
As Barack Obama took office, there was a feeling that a degree of normality would return to the US 
missile defence effort, and that more time and energy would be spent on ensuring that various 
programmes were properly tested before being deployed.  It was also felt that deployments would 
form part of a more balanced US approach to world affairs.  Obama himself had made it clear that 
he saw BMD as only one of a range of tools with which to address the threat of proliferation, and 
that a “reset” with Russia and a broader “change” in US foreign policy would be central to his 
agenda.  With an economic recession demanding full attention at home, it appeared that Obama 
would strive to rationalise the programme that he had inherited from George W. Bush, in order to 
focus his time on other key priorities. 
 
2009: A world free from nuclear weapons and the end of the Third Site in Europe  
In late 2008, Wade Boese, of the Washington DC-based Arms Control Association, suggested that 
the election of Barack Obama as president had “triggered great uncertainty about the future of US 
anti-missile projects, particularly the disputed plan to deploy long-range interceptors in Europe”.811  
Although Obama and his Republican rival John McCain – a supporter of BMD – did not directly 
debate missile defence during the election, it was assumed that he would move quickly to 
rationalise and limit the expansive BMD agenda of his predecessor.  Although it appeared unlikely 
that Obama would reverse the missile defence deployments that had been made under Bush, as had 
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been done with Safeguard in the 1970s
812
, the future of the programme in early 2009 looked 
uncertain. 
The first real hint of Obama’s missile defence strategy was given during an interview with 
Arms Control Today shortly after the 2008 election.  In the interview, Obama made it clear that 
BMD could be a significant part of a plan to reduce the threats from ballistic missiles armed with 
weapons of mass destruction, but that they “must be proven to work and pursued as part of an 
integrated approach that uses the full range of non-proliferation policy tools in response to the full 
range of threats we face.”813  As the Missile Defense Agency would announce several months later, 
particular emphasis would also placed on the thorough testing of assets before deployment: 
 [We have] Restructured our test program to improve confidence in the missile defense 
 capabilities under development and ensure that the capabilities transferred to the war-fighter 
 are operationally effective, suitable and survivable.
814
 
By cancelling the spiral development model, the Obama administration made it clear that various 
missile defence assets would only be deployed when proven technologically; irrespective of 
developments in threat.  Moreover, emphasis would now be placed on the “development of low and 
medium risk systems” at the expense of systems perceived to be more costly and futuristic 
entertained under Bush.
815
 
 In addition to a renewed approach to technological development and deployment strategy, 
the Obama administration also made more direct changes to the way in which the BMD programme 
was funded and structured.  The greatest example of this came in the administration’s first BMD 
budget request, which as well as representing a £1.2b cut from the previous year’s appropriation, 
clearly outlined the administration’s change of focus for what the programme should do.  The $7.8b 
request for BMD by Obama for FY2010 would, in the words of Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, 
primarily “focus on the rogue state and theatre missile threat” by shifting funding away from the 
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Ground-Based Interceptor programme designed to protect the US homeland, and other futuristic 
programmes such as the Kinetic Energy Interceptor (KEI) and Multiple Kill Vehicle (MKV), and 
towards Aegis, THAAD and Patriot, designed primarily for the defence of US forces, allies and 
friends in unsecure regions overseas.
816
   
The budget also made it clear that the cut in funding was primarily because the Obama 
administration felt that the 30 Ground-Based Interceptors already deployed in Alaska and California 
were sufficient to protect the US against a limited rouge state missile threat.  Executive Director of 
the MDA David Altwegg proclaimed that he had “high confidence in … the ability [of the system] 
to take on the known ballistic missile threat posed by the rogue countries Iran and North Korean 
today.”817  While, Robert Gates remarked: “the US has the defenses it needed for now to protect 
from a long-range ballistic missile of the type [being tested by] North Korea”.818  Because of this, 
the Missile Defense Agency pointed out: 
 The mission of the MDA continues to be one of developing and fielding an integrated, 
 layered ballistic missile defense system (BMDS) to defend the United States, our deployed 
 forces, allies and friends against all ranges of enemy ballistic missiles in all parts of the 
 world.
819
 
As a result, during the first few months of his presidency Obama appeared determined to alter the 
trajectory of the BMD programme and refocus it towards near–term threats and proven 
technologies.  Nevertheless, these plans were met with a mixed reaction.  In March 2009, for 
example, a bipartisan group of Senators including Jeff Sessions (R-AL), Joe Liberman (I-CC) and 
Mark Begich (D-AK) sent the president a letter warning him that cutting funding for BMD would 
leave the US vulnerable to the growing ballistic missile threat.
820
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Obama was keen to put his “change” agenda into action as soon as possible, and the result would be 
two interlinked policy developments.  The first was a renewed diplomatic effort aimed at solving 
the ongoing impasse over Iran’s suspected WMD programmes (which if successful might negate 
the need to deploy a BMD system in Europe).  The second was the desire to reset relations with 
Russia, enlist Moscow’s support in dealing with Iran, and begin thinking about a new bilateral 
nuclear arms reduction agreement.  Underlying these aims appeared to be the president’s desire to 
scale down the US BMD effort and place more emphasis on other foreign policy tools. 
 In March 2009, Obama announced a new diplomatic opening to Iran, and stressed his 
administration’s commitment to begin a new phase of relations with Teheran.  Obama made it clear 
that US strategy would put emphasis on diplomacy and negotiation, and for the moment this would 
mean that further punitive sanctions imposed because of Iran’s suspected nuclear programme would 
be dropped.
821
  What is more, by referring to the current regime as the “Islamic Republic”, the 
president made it clear that he was willing to deal with the current clerical government in 
Teheran.
822
  Obama declared: 
 My administration is now committed to diplomacy that addresses the full range of issues 
 before us, and to pursuing constructive ties among the US, Iran and the international 
 community.  This process will not be advanced by threats.
823
 
This opening to Iran represented a significant break from what had been pursued by the Bush 
administration, and immediately called into question the future of the proposed Third Site BMD 
system in Europe.  More broadly, it seemed to suggest that multilateralism and diplomacy would 
now be elevated to a more central role in US national security policy, partly, it seemed, at the 
expense of BMD.  While the new approach reflected Obama’s ideals and values, it was also 
underpinned by the president’s desire to accentuate the political cleavages in Iran before the 
summer’s election, and to complement the wider agenda of resetting relations with Russia.   
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The Obama administration hoped that the Iranian WMD programme could be controlled 
through diplomacy and that certain missile defences may not therefore be needed.  Missile Defense 
Agency Executive Director David Altwegg made this clear: 
 As long as the threat from Iran persists, we intend to go forward with a missile defense 
 system that is cost-effective and proven.  If the Iranian threat is eliminated then the driving 
 force for missile defense construction in Europe at this time will be removed.
824
   
In fact, in early March the New York Times revealed that President Obama had sent Russian 
President Dmitri Medvedev a secret letter in which it was suggested that the US would “back off” 
deploying a new missile defence system in Eastern Europe if Moscow would help to prevent Iran 
from developing long-range nuclear weapons.
825
  Although the letter did not contain any specific 
proposals or mutually binding initiatives, it did represent a strategic quid-pro-quo, and reiterated 
comments made by Robert Gates on 20
th
 February 2009 that “if there were no Iranian missile 
program, there would be no need for the missile defense sites.”826  However, following the 
diplomatic opening in the spring, little progress was made towards curtailing the Iranian WMD 
programme, a problem exacerbated by the messy “re-election” of Mahmoud Amadinejad in June 
2009.  To complicate matters more, a few months later Amadinejad declared: “Iran will never give 
up its nuclear program to appease Western critics.”827  Consequently, the pressure for some type of 
BMD system in Europe mounted. 
The final component of Obama’s agenda was his desire to place nuclear arms reductions and 
the goal of nuclear disarmament back at the centre of US foreign policy.  To this end, the president 
unveiled two significant policy initiatives in April 2009.  The first was a speech given by the 
president in Czech capital, Prague, where he stated “America's commitment to seek the peace and 
security of a world without nuclear weapons”.828  The second component was the decision to begin 
discussions with Russia over a new strategic nuclear arms reduction treaty to replace START I 
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(which was due to expire in December 2009).  Obama would meet with Russian president Dmitri 
Medvedev on 26
th
 April 2009 in London to begin discussions on how the US and Russia might 
make further cuts to their nuclear arsenals. 
 During the summer, developments in North Korea and Iran continued to make Obama’s 
planned cuts less politically tenable, as Republicans in Congress bombarded the administration with 
amendments to restore BMD funding.  The main cause of this concern had been the launch of North 
Korea’s Unha-2 rocket (widely believed to be a modified version of its long-range Taepo Dong-2 
ballistic missile) in February 2009, and the declaration shortly afterwards that Pyongyang would be 
withdrawing from the Six-Party Talks, and expelling International Atomic Energy Agency and US 
weapons inspectors.
829
  Pressure on the president was further increased in May 2009 as North Korea 
proclaimed that it had conducted its second underground nuclear test, with an estimated yield of 2 
to 8 kilotons, and two months later test fired seven different ballistic missiles.
830
  Nevertheless, in 
Congress, Democrats successfully rejected the restoration of $120m for the GMD programme to 
field the 44 interceptor missiles planned by the Bush administration, and the $1.2b to fully fund all 
other programmes.
831
  Representative Trent Franks (R-AZ) remarked that: 
 Democrats have once again rejected valuable amendments today that would have restored 
 the critical funding needed for a robust ballistic missile defense … they have shown an 
 unbelievably dangerous disregard for reality … such short lived so called political victories 
 have no place in the public forum when they hold such potentially grave consequences for 
 America’s national security.832 
Although domestic pressure would later lead the president to announce that the Pentagon would 
complete the construction of the 14 GBI silos at Ft Greely that the original budget request had cut, 
these would not be filled with interceptor missiles.
833
  Consequently, and despite strong Republican 
pressure, Democratic control of Congress allowed Obama’s BMD budget request to pass through 
largely unscathed.   
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On 17
th
 September 2009, rather short-sightedly on the 70
th
 anniversary of the Soviet invasion of 
Poland, the Obama administration announced that it would be cancelling the Third Site plan for 
BMD in Europe and replacing it with a Phased Adaptive Approach (PAA).  In a low-key 
announcement at the White House Barack Obama declared: 
 The new approach will provide capabilities sooner, build on proven systems, and offer 
 greater defenses against the threat of missile attack than the 2007 European missile defense 
 programme … It is more comprehensive than the previous programme; it deploys 
 capabilities that are proven and cost-effective; and it sustains and builds upon our 
 commitment to protect the US homeland against long-range ballistic missile threats.
834
 
Perhaps the key dynamic underpinning the new plan was that while the WMD threat from Iran was 
seen to be increasing, the actual specifics of the threat seemed to be changing.  The shape of the 
new BMD plan for Europe was also therefore fundamentally driven by new evidence from the 
intelligence community.  Robert Gates explained: 
 The intelligence community now assess that the threat from Iran’s short and medium-range 
 ballistic missiles, such as the Shahab-3, is developing more rapidly than previously 
 projected [while] the threat of potential Iranian ICBM capabilities has been slower to 
 develop than was previously estimated in 2006.
835
 
The change in plan was also driven by technological assessments from the ongoing Ballistic Missile 
Defense Review, which made it clear that better performing, near-term systems should be 
prioritised over those with a less promising record, and those that were considered more 
futuristic.
836
  The PAA was also a reflection of the fact that the preferred diplomatic approach to 
Iran simply was not working.  In the words of Mark Fitzpatrick, analyst at the International Institute 
for Strategic Studies, the PAA “replaces a system that had experienced serious operational and 
developmental problems with radars and interceptors that are much more capable and are likely to 
be better in the future.”837   
                                                          
834
 Barack Obama, “Remarks by the president on strengthening missile defense in Europe”, (17th September 2009) 
835
 Harvey (October 2009) 
836
 “Ballistic Missile Defense Review Report” (February 2010) 
837
 Mark Fitzpatrick, “A prudent decision on missile defence”, Survival, 51:6 (2009), pp5-12: 5 
The reluctant convert 
 
 230 
The PAA was designed to proceed in four stages beginning in 2011, and culminating in 
2020 with a comprehensive missile defence system able to protect against a wide range of threats: 
 (1) Field by 2011 the Aegis sea-based BMD system armed with SM-3 (Ia) interceptor 
missiles to protect US troops and parts of South-eastern Europe against short-range missile 
attack. 
 (2) Field by 2015 new SM-3 (Ib) interceptor missiles both at sea and on land (at bases in 
Northern and Southern Europe), allowing for protection of a wider area against short and 
medium range ballistic missiles. 
 (3) By 2018 deploy even more powerful SM-3 (IIa) interceptor missiles, in addition to 
previous deployments, that could be used against short, medium or intermediate-range 
attacks against the entire European landmass. 
 (4) By 2020 deploy the SM-3 (IIb) interceptor missile against all types of threats giving the 
system the capacity to protect all of Europe and the United States against ICBM threats.
838
 
As such, the plan envisaged deploying BMD assets, notably the Aegis and SM-3 systems, in Europe 
during 2011 to counteract the most basic and short range-threats to the South Eastern 
Mediterranean, seven years before the Third Site plan might have been operational.  By 2020, the 
plan could potentially outstrip anything the Bush administration had proposed and could 
incorporate hundreds of interceptor missiles on land and at sea, that could protect Europe and the 
United States against the whole gamut of Iranian missile threats.  Missile Defense Agency Director 
Lt General Patrick O’Reilly (2008-) was quick to point out that the MDA was “not scrapping or 
diminishing missile defense – rather we are strengthening it and delivering more capability.”839  
However, David Berteau of the Center for Strategic and International Studies warned that this was 
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“an ambitious timeline”, and raised his concern about the lack of a serious “developmental 
programme to support this” effort.840  
The announcement was met with a strong reaction from Republicans and missile defence 
advocates.  Howard McKeon (R-CA) stressed his concern that “the administration is heading down 
a path where it is willing to undercut our allies and cave in to Russian demands on vital national 
security matters”.841  John Boehner (R-OH) remarked that the decision “shows wilful determination 
to continue ignoring the threat posed by some of the most dangerous regimes in the world”,842 and 
Mitch McConnell (R-KY) that it was “short-sighted and harmful to our long term security 
interests”.843  In addition to this, many Republicans were unhappy with how the decision was 
handled.  In particular, they believed that the timing of the decision, which could have been 
announced as part of the Ballistic Missile Defense Review (in February 2010), was politically 
driven by a desire to downgrade US BMD plans in order to enlist Russian help in dealing with 
Iran.
844
 
 By the end of Obama’s first year in office, the new president had been forced to rethink 
many of the changes he had hoped to instigate a year earlier.  In this sense, the Phased Adaptive 
Approach to BMD in Europe was a direct result of the failure of the Obama administration’s 
diplomatic approach to resolving the threat from the suspected Iranian WMD programmes.  It was 
also a reflection of a compromise between Obama’s wider agenda and the strong desire on the part 
of the administration not to appear to be baying to Russian pressure, and the perceived need to 
retain credibility in the face of the growing threat from Iran.   
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2010: The Ballistic Missile Defense Review and New START 
At the start of 2010, two interesting developments seemed to suggest contradictory dynamics for the 
future of BMD policy under Obama.  The first was the nomination of long-term missile defence 
sceptic and critic, Phillip Coyle to become a top White House Senior Science Advisor, and the 
second was the release of the Ballistic Missile Defence Review (BMDR), which one former official 
from the George W Bush administration would later describe as “the most pro-missile defense 
document by a Democrat since Lyndon Johnson.”845  Compounding this uncertainty was the central 
role of US missile defence plans as a major potential stumbling block in the nuclear arms reduction 
talks with Russia. 
 Despite being unable to restructure the BMD programme as much as he might have liked in 
2009, the decision to appoint Phillip Coyle as White House Science Adviser for National Security 
and International Affairs, suggested that Obama remained keen to rationalise and scrutinise the 
programme.  In fact, Coyle made his thoughts on BMD clear in February 2010, in a statement to the 
House Armed Forces Subcommittee on Strategic Forces:   
 In my view Iran is not so suicidal as to attack Europe or the United States with missiles … 
 but if you believe that Iran is bound and determined to attack Europe or America,  no matter 
 what, the I think you also have to assume that Iran would do whatever it takes to overwhelm 
 out missile defenses, including using decoys to fool the defenses, launching stealthy 
 warheads, and launching many missiles, not one or two.
846
 
John Noonan claimed that Coyle viewed missile defence as “theology, not a technology”,847 and 
concerns about the implications for US missile defence plans would mean that Coyle’s appointment 
would be strongly opposed by Republicans.
848
  BMD supporters were particularly concerned that 
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Coyle would cut funding for the GBI system – which failed its first test under the Obama 
administration on 31
st
 January 2010, marking the eighth time (out of 15) that such a test had failed 
since October 1999
849
 – or decide not to develop the later versions of the SM-3 missile needed for 
the Phased Adaptive Approach in Europe. 
 However, in February 2010 the administration released the Ballistic Missile Defense 
Review (BMDR) Report.  When taken together with the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), and 
Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) Reports, the BMDR seemed to suggest that BMD would become an 
even bigger component of US national security thinking throughout the rest of Obama’s presidency. 
The two most important components of the BMDR were the reaffirmation that the Ground-Based 
Interceptor missiles currently deployed were sufficient to combat the long-range missile threat, and 
the announcement that the administration would focus its efforts on deploying Phased Adaptive 
Approaches to missile defence in different regions throughout the world.
850
  The BMDR also 
revealed the importance placed by the Obama administration on multilateral and bilateral BMD 
cooperation internationally as one of the six main goals of the US BMD programme: 
 (1) Continue to defend the homeland against limited ballistic missile threats 
 (2) Defend against regional missile threats to US forces, allies and regional partners 
 (3) Deploy capabilities only when proven through testing 
 (4) Ensure commitment to new capabilities is fiscally sustainable over the long run 
 (5) Ensure the programme is flexible enough to adapt as threats change 
 (6) Seek to lead expanded international efforts on missile defence.
851
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The Report declared that the “United States possesses the capability to counter the projected threat 
from North Korea and Iran for the foreseeable future” and because of this “the United States will 
pursue a Phased, Adaptive Approach to missile defense with each region that is tailored to the 
threats and circumstances unique to that region.”852  These approaches would then be: 
 Tailored to the unique deterrence and defense requirements of each region that varies 
 considerably in geography, in the history and character of the threat, and in the military-to-
 military relationship on which to build cooperative missile defenses.
853
 
As such, the administration would seek to pursue incremental BMD policies in Europe, the Greater 
Middle East and in East Asia, which would be achieved partly by building upon current cooperative 
BMD relationships with countries like Japan, Israel and Australia, but also by a substantial 
expansion of the US programme.  The idea would then be to have a “surge capacity” that could be 
used to address problems across the globe whenever and wherever they arose.
854
   In order to fund 
these plans, the administration requested $8.4b for the Missile Defense Agency for fiscal year 2011, 
including $1.6b for the Aegis system, $859m for THAAD and $1.3b for the GBI.
855
 
  The BMDR, the first official and public review of US missile defence policy, provided a 
detailed overview of what the Obama administration was trying to do with BMD and why.  It 
reiterated the administration’s commitment to maintain and improve (but not expand) protection of 
the homeland, and to focus on regional and short-range missile threats.  Perhaps most importantly, 
it made it clear that such deployments would only be made once the technology had proven itself 
and with the consent of US allies.   
 
The negotiation of a new wide-reaching strategic arms reductions agreement with Russia had been a 
central component of Obama’s foreign policy agenda right from the start of his presidency, and was 
one of the reasons why the president decided to cancel the Bush administration’s Third Site BMD 
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plan in Europe.  However, despite continued pressure from Moscow, Obama had gone to great 
lengths to ensure that the new Treaty would not limit US missile defence plans.  Michael McFaul, 
Special Assistant for Russian and Eurasian Affairs commented: “we are not going to reassure, give 
or trade anything with the Russians regarding NATO expansion or missile defence”.856   
When the New START Treaty was signed on 8
th
 April 2010 in Prague, it would limit both 
the US and Russia to 1,550 deployed nuclear warheads and 800 delivery vehicles; nearly two-thirds 
less than the original START and 30% lower than the 2002 SORT Treaty, and most importantly did 
not directly mention BMD.  Moreover, according to one senior official, “the only limit on missile 
defense in the Treaty is a good one.  That is not having ICBMs in BMD silos and vice versa … as 
this could create huge confusion”.857  Although Russian President Dmitri Medvedev continued to 
warn that missile defence remained a point of contention, and reserved the right to leave the Treaty 
should Russia feel threatened strategically by US BMD plans, Obama made it clear that the Treaty 
would not impinge upon freedom of action in the US missile defence programme.
858
    
Nevertheless, in Congress, Republicans remained suspicious of the administration’s motives 
and concerned about Obama’s BMD plans, and Senators John McCain (R-AZ) and John Kyl (R-
AZ) warned that Russia’s unilateral statement on the Treaty, “had the potential to constrain 
improvements to US missile defenses.”859  Baker Spring suggested that Obama was tacitly trying to 
recreate the ABM Treaty by re-linking arms control and BMD.
860
  However, one senior official 
commented that “the Republican challenge is purely political … it is a deliberate ploy to attack the 
president in an election year and not allow him a big foreign policy success … if this had been done 
by a Republican president it would have already passed.”861 
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While negotiations were evolving over New START, the Pentagon wasted little time in 
pursuing the BMD strategy outlined in the Ballistic Missile Defense Review, and consequently just 
a few weeks after the Report was released, it was confirmed that in Europe, Romania would host 
the first deployment of land-based “Aegis ashore” SM-3 interceptor missiles in 2015, and that 
Poland would host the next site in 2018.  Moreover, according to Undersecretary of State for Arms 
Control and International Security Ellen Tauscher, both sites would also get upgrades in 2020.
862
  A 
few weeks later, in East Asia, South Korea announced that it was willing to participate in a regional 
response to North Korea’s missile threat,863 while in the Middle East, it was announced that the US 
would be fielding additional Patriot missile interceptor batteries in nations neighbouring Iran.
864
  
The administration also sent Aegis warships to begin maintaining a continuous presence in the 
Persian Gulf waters to provide a buffer against potential Iranian retaliation resulting from the 
imposition of new economic penalties relating to Teheran’s nuclear programme.865   
On 15
th
 April, Bradley Roberts, Deputy Assistant Defense Secretary for Nuclear and Missile 
Defense Policy, told members of the House Armed Services subcommittee that the Obama 
administration intended to provide full missile defence coverage of Europe against possible missile 
attack from Iran, within eight years.
866
  At the same hearing, Lt Gen Patrick O’Reilly told Congress 
that the new START Treaty “actually reduces constraints on the development of the US missile 
defence program” as they would allow tests prohibited under the 1991 agreements.867  
  
With the international and diplomatic aspects of the agreement successfully completed, attention 
now turned to the domestic debate over treaty ratification in the US.  President Obama submitted 
the Treaty for the Senate’s consideration on 13th May 2010.  Anticipating that Republican 
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lawmakers might try to attack the administration and undermine the Treaty, Secretary of Defense 
Robert Gates unequivocally declared in a May 2010 Wall St Journal op-ed that: 
The Treaty will not constrain the U.S. from developing and deploying defenses against 
ballistic missiles, as we have made clear to the Russian government. The US will continue 
to deploy and improve the interceptors that defend our homeland – those based in California 
and Alaska.  We are also moving forward with plans to field missile defense systems to 
protect our troops and partners in Europe, the Middle East, and Northeast Asia against the 
dangerous threats posed by rogue nations like North Korea and Iran.
868 
Gates, Secretary of State Hilary Clinton, other senior Obama Administration officials, as well as 
numerous other foreign policy specialists, would continue to firmly reject claims that the Treaty in 
any way limited US missile defence plans.
869
  
 Nevertheless, leading Republicans would spend most of the summer questioning the Treaty, 
focussing their attacks on the implications for US missile defence plans, and on ensuring that 
investments would still be made in the US nuclear stockpile.
870
  Despite this political pressure, on 
16
th
 September 2010 the Treaty passed the Senate Foreign Relations Committee by 14 votes to four.  
After a prolonged battle between the president and the Republican Party leadership – during which 
several amendments were agreed; such as ensuring that all four phases of the Phased Adaptive 
Approach would be deployed, and that future money for the US nuclear weapons complex would be 
guaranteed, the full Senate gave its advice and consent to the Treaty by 71 votes to 26 on 22
nd
 
December 2010.   
Despite refusing to use BMD as a bargaining chip in negotiations over New START, and 
despite plans to push ahead with a variety of different missile defence systems, Republicans and 
other missile defence advocates remained sceptical and concerned about where the programme was 
heading as the US approached the mid-term elections of 2010.  Obama’s BMD plan remained 
inherently flexible and highly dependent on developments in threat and technology, and thus liable 
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to change in the future.  Nevertheless, it looked likely that policy would continue on a general 
upward trajectory as the threat from Iran and North Korea continued to mount. 
 
(3) Assessing the drivers of policy, 2009-2010 
Advances in particular technologies and the mounting threats from Iran and North Korea broadly 
explain why the US BMD programme continued to move forward during this period.  However, 
they do not explain many of the policy decisions made during 2009 and 2010.  In particular, they do 
not explain why Obama did not downgrade BMD in order to allow for better relations and nuclear 
reductions with Russia.  Neither do they explain why Obama committed the US to comprehensive 
future deployments before some of the technologies had even begun testing.  Much of the 
explanation for these decisions can be found in domestic politics.  
 
International and technological factors 
The inability to successfully counter, stop or reverse the suspected Iranian and North Korean WMD 
programmes were important reasons why missile defence was retained as a key component of 
national security strategy during 2009 and 2010.  The growing threat from these sources made it 
much more difficult to make significant inroads into BMD spending, or in particular, for Obama 
and his Democratic allies in Congress to cancel entirely the proposed expansion of the system to 
Europe.  These systemic dynamics also largely explain the renewed focus of the missile defence 
plan for Europe, the central tenets of the Ballistic Missile Defense Review, and the apparent need to 
focus on short-range missile threats to troops and allies in unstable regions across the globe.  
However, international pressures do not explain why Obama continued to pursue a policy that 
appeared to make resetting relations with Russia that much more difficult.   
The reluctant convert 
 
 239 
 To some extent, these developments can be explained by technology.  For example, 
Obama’s desire to rely more upon and prioritise the Aegis and SM-3 systems was certainly driven 
by the fact that they were proving more successful than the GBI.  This was also arguably the reason 
why these systems would become the centrepiece of the Phased Adaptive Approach for Europe.  
What is more, according to the Obama administration, the focus of the programme was shifted 
towards battlefield and theatre defences precisely because the assets that had been deployed by the 
Bush administration were believed to be currently sufficient to combat any new near-term threat.  
Nevertheless, technological advances do not explain why Obama unveiled a new comprehensive 
missile defence plan for Europe before many of the assets had been tested, or why he was so 
determined not to limit US BMD in order to secure Russian agreement on the New START Treaty.  
Above all, neither international developments nor significant technological advances explain the 
considerable shifted in Obama’s BMD thinking during these two years. 
 
Domestic factors 
In order to understand why policy evolved in the manner in which it did during this period, 
examination must be made of the interplay between the often competing presidential and 
Congressional policy agendas.  In particular, it is only through a more detailed understanding of 
domestic influences, particularly the pressure from the Republicans in Congress, that Barack 
Obama’s policy decisions can be understood.  Essentially, Obama’s decision to replace rather than 
cancel the BMD plan for Europe, and the choice not to use BMD as a bargaining chip in the New 
START negotiations, owe much to the perceived domestic pressure on the his administration.  
 The first key explanatory variable for policy during this period was the thinking and strategy 
of Barack Obama.  In particular, it was Obama’s plan to reorient the US BMD programme towards 
prioritising the best-performing technologies in order to address the most pressing threats.  
Consequently, it would be this thinking that would underpin both the Phased Adaptive Approach 
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for Europe through the use the SM-3 and Aegis rather than GBI systems, and the Ballistic Missile 
Defense Review, which would see strategy largely redirected toward addressing regional threats 
through multilateral BMD architectures.  A secondary result would be the cancellation of the spiral 
development deployment programme and the termination of several programmes classified as being 
too futuristic.  To an extent, Obama was helped in this quest by Democratic control of Congress, 
although the Republican Party fought hard against this change of plans. 
The fact that Obama was unable to make the changes to BMD that he had advocated during 
the election was also a direct result of domestic pressures.  As he entered office, it appeared that the 
president did not want to use up political capital fighting battles over missile defence – especially 
when his wider programme included many other politically divisive policies.  As such, and even 
though Democrats would retain control of both Houses of Congress during this period, pressure 
from Republican lawmakers remained a key shaper of policy.  As mentioned above, the perceived 
need not to look weak domestically, or indeed appear to be bending to Russian pressure, 
underpinned the decision to replace rather than cancel missile defence in Europe, and to ensure that 
US BMD plans were not hampered by the New START Treaty.  In this sense, it was both the 
centrality of domestic political actors, namely Obama’s missile defence agenda, and the actions of 
the Republican Party – for largely domestic political reasons – that shaped policy during this 
period. 
 
Conclusion 
Although Barack Obama was the first US president to enter office with a national missile defence 
system already in place, the first two years of his presidency saw a return to the highly partisan 
debates that had surrounded BMD during much of the previous two decades.  It was in this context 
that the US ballistic missile defence programme would again expand and appear to become even 
more central to US national security thinking.  As such, what makes this period particularly 
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interesting is the apparent inability of the president to rationalise and relegate the importance of 
BMD, despite the fact that missile defence often appeared inconsistent with his wider foreign policy 
agenda.  The reason for this – much as it was with President Clinton a decade earlier – was the 
considerable political pressure brought to bear on policy by Republicans in Congress, but it was 
also a reflection on how far the debate had transformed since 1989.  Effectively, Obama settled on a 
policy in order to disarm attacks from Republicans in Congress, but also because he believed that a 
revamped BMD plan for Europe could be combined with US-Russian nuclear reductions.  
 While Obama’s missile defence plans were driven by strategic pragmatism, they were also a 
reflection of the domestic political context within which he was acting.  The perceived need to 
neuter Republican led attacks on his policy decisions – which themselves were at least partly 
inspired by domestic party political dynamics – was a key reason why Obama retained a missile 
defence plan for Europe, and did not use BMD as a bargaining chip in New START negotiations.  
However, these decisions were also a direct reflection of the president’s inherent flexibility with 
missile defence, as – much like George H. W. Bush – he gradually adopted a policy that was as 
much a reflection of other domestic and international priorities as it was about missile defence.  In 
this sense, it was both awareness of the domestic political context within which he was acting and 
of what type of BMD plan would not hamper the relationship with Russia, which underpinned 
Obama’s BMD thinking.  The fact that Obama felt under enough pressure from Republicans to 
condition his plans on the domestic debate, despite Democratic control of Congress, was a direct 
reflection of how Obama – like Clinton a decade before him – was determined to depoliticise an 
issue that the Republican Party appeared keen to use against him.  Although Pavel Podvig of the 
Bulletin of Atomic Scientists would describe this policy of balancing Republican and Russian 
criticisms as one of “appeasement”,871 the balance struck between missile defence and New START 
ensured that Obama would have the types of defences he wanted, achieve nuclear cuts with Russia, 
and avoid Republican opposition, all at the same time.  
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 At the 2010 mid-term elections, it appeared that the US BMD programme was alive, well, 
and thriving.  Much – such as agreements to multilateralise the system in Europe within NATO, and 
the defeats suffered by Democrats in Congress – suggested that the pace of deployment would 
continue throughout the rest of Obama’s presidency.  Despite this, it remained unclear as to the 
actual capability of many of the systems that had been deployed, particularly the national missile 
defence system, while no new ballistic missile threat to the US homeland had appeared in 20 years.  
Nevertheless, as David Burns remarked, the debate had shifted considerably, and BMD had become 
a normalised part of US national security thinking: 
 Ironic as it seems, it may be that the first year[s] of the Obama administration did more to 
 make missile defense politically acceptable than eight years of efforts by the Bush 
 administration.
872
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Conclusion 
 
Since the end of the Cold War American policy and thinking on ballistic missile defence has been 
completely overturned.  During this period, the domestic debate about BMD progressed from the 
zero-sum political battles over the Strategic Defense Initiative between 1983 and 1989, through 
attempts first to fundamentally downgrade the quest for national missile defence and then resurrect 
it during the 1990s, before the ABM Treaty was abrogated and deployments began being made in 
the 2000s.  As such, domestic political thinking about BMD moved from fierce disagreements over 
the necessity and feasibility of constructing a nationwide missile defence system during the 
presidency of George H. W. Bush, towards a position whereby differences of opinion about the 
programme had essentially moved to the margins, and focused on the pace, shape and capabilities 
of particular deployments under Barack Obama.   
This thesis has presented a comparison of thinking and policies of George H. W. Bush, Bill 
Clinton, George W Bush and Barack Obama on BMD.  It demonstrates how thinking and strategy 
has varied between presidential administrations and between Democratic and Republican 
presidents.  George H. W Bush was pragmatic, and saw the Strategic Defense Initiative as a useful 
policy both internationally and domestically, but did not see missile defence as a top priority.  It 
was for this reason that the programme faltered between 1989 and 1993.  Bill Clinton entered office 
with very little interest in BMD beyond developing battlefield defences for US troops overseas, and 
remained firmly committed to the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty as the cornerstone of US-Russian 
relations and thus international stability.  These dynamics remained central to Clinton’s thinking 
during his second term as he strove to find a balance between BMD, the ABM Treaty and perceived 
domestic and international political requirements between 1997 and 2001.  George W. Bush had 
very different ideas, and was determined from the start to push ahead with an integrated missile 
defence programme, regardless of international opinion.  Consequently, Bush would drive the 
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programme forward and ensure that BMD became a central and largely accepted component of US 
security policy by the time he left office in 2009.  Faced with this legacy, Barack Obama strove to 
normalise policy and place more emphasis on theatre missile defence systems, but oversaw 
considerable continuity of what had gone before.   
While policy was certainly a reflection of each president’s particular political agenda, it was 
also the result of the shifting political space within which policy was conducted during this period.  
For example, George H. W. Bush was hampered in what he could accomplish by the zero-sum 
nature of the debate in 1989, while Barack Obama was limited in what he could achieve by the fact 
that BMD deployment had essentially become accepted or even normalised by 2010.  In between 
this, Bill Clinton was forced to change his plans because of shifts in the contours of the debate 
during the 1990s, while George W. Bush actively altered the political context within which the 
policy was debated by pushing the programme forward during the 2000s.  It was the gradually 
changing confines of this political context – fashioned by systemic, technological, and at times, 
domestic factors – that progressively shaped the political space within which policy was debated 
and formulated. 
In terms of Congress, there were two broad schools of thought on ballistic missile defence in 
1989.  One group firmly believed that the US should seek to develop and deploy all types of 
ballistic missile defences as soon as possible, and that agreements such as the ABM Treaty were 
inhibiting the ability of policymakers to ensure US security.  The centre of gravity for this group 
was in the Republican Party and a few conservative think tanks in Washington DC, such as The 
Heritage Foundation and The Center for Security Policy.  The second group were far more sceptical 
of the feasibility, desirability and strategic wisdom of deploying missile defences, although were 
not necessarily against the deployment of theatre missile defences, or defences commensurate with 
the ABM Treaty, which they regarded as the cornerstone of international stability.  The centre of 
gravity for this group was in the Democratic Party and within the “arms control” community, and 
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included; The Union of Concerned Scientists, The Federation of American Scientists, The Council 
for a Livable World, The Center for Defense Information and the Arms Control Association. 
 While this highly partisan split never went away between 1989 and 2010, the two poles of 
the BMD debate did gradually converge, with both parties moving towards a rough position of 
consensus around the need for both tactical and national defence by 2010.  In this sense, the years 
between 1989 and 2010 would see a gradual convergence in political and strategic thinking to the 
point whereby only limited and peripheral disagreements existed about US ballistic missile defence 
plans.  Nevertheless, the development in policy and thinking over this period has been nuanced.  In 
particular, it is important to point out that a bipartisan agreement over the need for battlefield 
missile defences has been present throughout each of the six administrations since the end of the 
Cold War.  It is also important to note that both the technology required for such a task – due to the 
lesser demands placed upon such systems, and the diplomatic aspects of deploying them
873
 – have 
been far less controversial than national missile defence.  In addition to this, the evolution of policy 
has shown that the missile defence debate has arguably been as much about the ABM Treaty and 
the changing nature of the relationship with Russia after the Cold War, and about balancing these 
pressures with the growth in new sources of threat to US security, than is has been about BMD.  
The result is that most of the debate during this period has been about national missile defence, and 
whether either threat or technology justify the financial, political and strategic costs of deployment. 
 
This thesis makes two central and important contributions to the literature on US ballistic missile 
defence policy.  First, it contributes a systematic explanation of why US BMD policy evolved as it 
did between 1989 and 2010, to the rich tradition of analysing domestic political determinants of 
security policy.  Second, it provides a nuanced analysis of the impact of domestic political 
dynamics able to differentiate the impact of domestic political actors, such as the president and 
                                                          
873
 This was because they were legal under the ABM Treaty and were therefore not considered a threat to the stability of 
nuclear deterrence.  After the Treaty was abrogated in 2002, the US was free to develop and deploy whatever type of 
systems it wished. 
Conclusion 
 
 246 
Congress, from actions taken for domestic political reasons, and explores the interaction of 
domestic variables with broader changes in the international system and technological capability.  
By doing this, the thesis bridges the gap between the literature on the domestic determinants of 
security policy and the evolution of the contemporary US ballistic missile defence debate, and 
provides a systematic analysis of a phenomenon which has so far escaped a comprehensive 
explanation.  
This thesis makes two central and important contributions to our understanding of US 
ballistic missile defence policy.  First, that domestic political actors – referring to the president and 
Congress – often but not always acting for domestic political reasons, have been central to the 
evolution of policy between 1989 and 2010.  Second, that the confines of the missile defence debate 
shifted over time due to gradual improvements in technology and changes in international systemic 
pressures, and because of the interaction of domestic, international and technological influences.  
As such, the transition from the zero-sum debates that surrounded the programme in 1989 to the 
general acceptance of BMD amongst the US policy community by 2010 can be understood as a 
product of day-to-day domestic political influences, but also of the shifting domestic political space 
within which this debate occurred.   
The key argument of this thesis is that domestic political influences have been far more 
important to the evolution of US missile defence policy than has previously been acknowledged.  
There are two main components to this.  Firstly, that domestic political actors have been central to 
the missile defence story, and secondly, that these actors have often made policy decisions for 
domestic political reasons.  In this sense, it is the importance of the actions of both the president 
and Congress in their own right, as well as the underlying motivations for these policy choices, that 
are important to understanding US missile defence policy at any given time between 1989 and 
2010.  By doing this, the thesis moves beyond the limitations of current policy-orientated and 
academic research on contemporary US missile defence policy, and provides a significant 
contribution to the literature. 
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 In terms of domestic political actors, the political policy choices of the president, the party 
in control of Congress, and the political balance between the executive and legislature, was central 
to the day-to-day rhythms of policy.  The thesis has shown that Democratic presidents and 
lawmakers have generally tended to favour restraint, while Republican presidents and lawmakers 
have been far keener to push ahead with ballistic missile defence.  This has generally held true 
throughout the period under study, with Bill Clinton and Barack Obama appearing to be far less 
enamoured by BMD than George H. W. and George W. Bush.   
The institutional balance between president and Congress has also been important.  The 
thesis shows how particular president’s BMD plans have been constrained or enabled by a 
sometimes compliant but other times hostile Congress.  Again, the thesis shows that Republican 
president’s faced with a Democratic Congress – such as George H. W. Bush between 1989 and 
1993, and George W. Bush during early 2001 and between 2007 and 2009 – have found it much 
harder to push ahead with their particular policies than in times when the Republican Party has 
controlled Congress.  Likewise, Democratic president’s faced with Republican controlled 
Congresses – such as Bill Clinton between 1995 and 2001 – have found their attempts to rein in and 
limit BMD policy considerably more difficult than when the Democrats have controlled the 
legislature.  That said, the thesis suggests that Republican president’s and lawmakers have been 
more successful in altering BMD policy than their Democratic Party counterparts – a dynamic that 
has much to do with the changing nature of the debate during this period – but also to the enduring 
nature of the ballistic missile defence programme.   
The second key component of this argument is that each of the presidents looked at in this 
thesis often made BMD policy decisions for domestic political reasons.  George H. W. Bush 
undoubtedly wanted to retain a comprehensive ballistic missile defence programme to placate 
conservative members of the Republican Party between 1989 and 1993; Bill Clinton unveiled a 
national missile defence deployment plan in 1996 in an attempt to neuter pressure from the 
Republican Party, and would continue to drift towards deployment between 1997 and 2001 at least 
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partly because of these perceived domestic requirements.  George W Bush pushed ahead with BMD 
deployments in order to ensure that they would survive his presidency and could not be undone by 
any future Democratic president less convinced of the benefits of BMD; while Barack Obama did 
not cancel the plan to deploy missile defences in Europe in part because he wished to avoid 
confrontation with a Republican controlled Congress.  In this sense, presidential decision-making 
on BMD has often reflected the perceived necessity of political positioning both within the 
president’s own party, and relative to the specifics of the domestic political debate at any given 
time.  
Domestic political reasons have also been central to the particular stance taken on BMD by 
Republicans and Democrats in Congress during the period looked at in this thesis.  Broadly 
speaking, the Republican and Democratic Parties have provided the intellectual home of two 
separate schools of thought on BMD, with Democrats largely opposed to BMD, and Republicans 
largely all for.  While the polarisation of opinion within each political party can be explained in part 
by the particular beliefs of Congressman regarding their sincere assessment of the need and 
desirability of missile defences, the issue has often been driven by primarily party political 
dynamics.  For example, Democrats went along with the 1991 Missile Defense Act partly because 
they were concerned about being attacked as weak on defence following their reluctance to support 
the 1991 Gulf War; similarly, in 1994 many Republicans went along with the pledge to deploy 
national missile defences in the Contract with America because it was seen as a way of attacking 
president Clinton.  This rationale would continue to play an important role in Republican thinking 
throughout the 1990s, notably in Bob Dole’s 1996 presidential election campaign, and following the 
Monica Lewinski scandal in 1998.  Equally, the Democratic leadership attempted to use the issue of 
BMD (with limited success) as a means to rally the party against President George W Bush in 2001, 
2004 and 2006.  Finally, the commotion caused by Republican Congressman over President 
Obama’s decision to end the Third Site plan for Europe, and negotiation of the New START Treaty, 
owe much to the desire of Republican lawmakers to prevent Obama from achieving a foreign policy 
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success.  In fact, one official later claimed that if a Republican president had taken these actions 
they would have passed through the Senate with little debate.
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The impact of “domestic politics” on the missile defence debate has therefore been nuanced, 
with considerable pressure being generated by domestic political actors, quite often, but not always, 
for domestic political reasons.  Consequently, to understand why policy was as it was at any 
particular point between 1989 and 2010, it is fundamental to understand the particular balance of 
domestic forces and dynamics at that time.  By demonstrating the centrality of domestic political 
dynamics to the evolution of the US BMD policy, this thesis moves beyond the literature that has 
either overlooked or downplayed the role of domestic influences in analyses of why presidents have 
often appeared to pursue policies not of their own making. 
 
The second central argument of this thesis is that the day-to-day domestic political debate over 
BMD has altered fundamentally during this period due to developments in technology and changes 
in the international system, and because of the interaction of these factors with domestic political 
dynamics.  It shows how a gradual and punctuated convergence between the requirements for a US 
missile defence system and the technology to achieve such a defence, progressively altered the 
political space within which BMD policy was being fought over.  While the evolution of these 
factors was neither linear nor smooth between 1989 and 2010, the BMD debate shifted considerably 
from a position in 1989 whereby the technology did not exist to justify any deployment – let alone 
to counteract a large scale nuclear strike by the Soviet Union, to a point in 2010 whereby various 
systems had been deployed to counteract a rogue state attack on the US homeland, and missile 
threats to troops on the battlefield.  In this sense, and because of these developments, there was a 
distinct evolution in the US political context towards acceptance and enactment.  
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 In 1989, the gap between missile defence capability and the requirements of such a system 
was vast – the US did not have the technological ability to counteract a large Soviet strike, or 
indeed to protect troops on the battlefield.  As a result, as George H. W. Bush took office the debate 
was essentially zero-sum, with only a small group of Republican lawmakers and their allies in a few 
conservative think tanks fervently pushing for the system, and with Democrats, and their allies in 
the “arms control” community, staunchly opposed to funding BMD, let alone thinking about 
deployment.  By 1993, with the demise of the Soviet Union and the growing acceptance of a new 
regional and battlefield missile threat from rogue states, the debate had shifted.  However, and 
while these developments cemented a bipartisan consensus over the need for battlefield missile 
defences that would remain throughout this period, the gap between requirements and capability 
remained large.  Specifically, as the debate over the performance of the Patriot missile defence 
system during the 1991 Gulf War would later highlight, the technology required to meet even the 
new rogue state battlefield missile threat did not exist.  By 1996, this had essentially changed little, 
and the gap between requirements – which were still limited at this time – and capability, remained 
substantial.  In fact, until 1996 the Clinton administration did not even have an NMD deployment 
plan, partly because the technology to do so appeared so far away.  The gulf between these factors 
was a key reason why the Republican Party would find it difficult to force President Clinton to 
commit his administration to a national missile defence deployment decision during the 1990s.   
 By 2001, the contours of the debate had altered further.  The North Korean missile launch 
and Rumsfeld Report in 1998 heightened the sense of threat – and the perception of its proximity in 
both Congress and the White House – and paved the way for more attention and funding for BMD.  
Moreover, while various missile defence technologies continued to experience problems, the 
growing awareness of Iranian, Iraqi and North Korean WMD programmes essentially transformed 
the central tenets of US national security thinking.  Politically, these developments lessened 
Democratic opposition, and brought about a loose agreement over the need for some type of 
national missile defence deployment in the future.  Strategically, they helped tip the focus of US 
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policy away from Russia, MAD and the ABM Treaty, and towards missile defence and the rogue 
state missile threat.   
 As George W. Bush began his second term in office in 2005, the debate had shifted further.  
Primarily this was because the terrorist attacks of 9-11 – building on the shifting nature of the threat 
during the 1990s – had provided the opportunity for Bush to abrogate the ABM Treaty and begin 
deployment, and thus establish a structural legacy that any future administration would find it 
difficult to reverse.  Abrogating the ABM Treaty also paved the way for more comprehensive BMD 
testing and development; the integration of different BMD technologies into one ballistic missile 
defence system, and in 2006 negotiations about expanding the system to Europe.  The result was 
that the debate shifted away from disagreements focussed on whether to push ahead with 
deployment, towards less heated discussions about which assets to deploy and how to deploy them.  
Consequently, by 2010, President Obama had essentially accepted that the US both needed a BMD 
system to counter a growing range of threats from Iran and North Korea, and that the technology to 
achieve this goal was largely available, as was reflected in the 2010 Ballistic Missile Defense 
Review.  As a result, and while debate remained at the margins at the end of this period, a majority 
bipartisan consensus existed around the need for both national and battlefield missile defence by 
late 2010. 
Fundamentally it was the changing nature of what a US ballistic missile defence system 
must be able to do – in terms of the threat it was designed to counteract – and the gradual 
improvements in the ability to achieve this – through developments in BMD technology and 
engineering – that explain the general trajectory and day-to-day context of the missile defence 
debate between 1989 and 2010.  In terms of politics, changes in these factors altered the parameters 
of the domestic dispute over BMD by moving the Democratic/ sceptical position closer to 
acceptance.  In short, the fact that the threats to be addressed had become smaller (i.e. it was no 
longer about Russia), while the technology had become more capable, had persuaded most of the 
sceptics who had been staunchly opposed to the SDI in 1989 to support limited versions of BMD by 
Conclusion 
 
 252 
2010.  At the same time, the centre of gravity within the Republican Party and amongst BMD 
enthusiasts had shifted to a position whereby very few continued to openly advocate a 
comprehensive space-based defence such as envisaged in the Strategic Defense Initiative.  As such, 
Barack Obama’s first term in office arguably represented the culmination and convergence of these 
two dynamics, which was a direct reason why Obama, a Democratic president, appeared to embrace 
BMD, and in some respects even expand the programme during 2009 and 2010.  By doing this, the 
thesis makes a second important contribution to the literature on ballistic missile defence. 
 
The story of the US ballistic missile defence debate between 1989 and 2010 is also a co-constitutive 
reflection of wider changes in US security thinking after the Cold War, especially as regards the 
relationship with Russia, international stability and nuclear deterrence.  It is the story of how 
different domestic actors sought to control and react to the enduring legacy of the Cold War, and to 
the new international pressures that arose from new sources during this period.  Fundamentally, the 
missile defence debate was a direct reflection of a gradual move away from Cold War doctrines of 
Mutual Assured Destruction and a Manichaean stand off with the Soviet Union, towards a new 
strategy based upon a balance of nuclear weapons and missile defences to meet new deterrence 
requirements in an ever-changing post-Cold War world.   
 The punctuated evolution of the US missile defence debate was essentially a reflection of 
the transition from a world in which Russia was seen as the main threat to, and focus for, US 
security, to one that was characterised by a very different type of threat from rogue states.  This in 
turn meant a conversion from a world in which Mutual Assured Destruction and the ABM Treaty 
represented the centrepiece of US national security thinking, to one in which certain flexibility and 
a new balance of both offensive and defensive weaponry had become the new accepted wisdom of 
US national security thinking.  This adaptation would take the best part of two decades, and it 
would be within this broader international context that the ballistic missile defence debate would be 
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played out.  Essentially, in 1989, the Russian nuclear threat was considered the primary US security 
concern, and therefore adherence to the ABM Treaty and not upsetting Russia were considered 
central priorities, and more important than missile defence.  Only once the Cold War was over and 
its central logic had faded as a strategic reality, and the perceived Russian threat receded, was a 
move towards utilising BMD against other threats possible.  As such, deploying missile defences 
against rogue state threats only became possible after the central strategic nuclear relationship with 
Russia faded sufficiently as a component of US security thinking.  Therefore, the story of BMD 
between 1989 and 2010 is about the equilibrium between these two competing logics and 
rationales; Cold War MAD and its hang over and post cold war, post MAD world.  Only time and 
generational change of the leadership made this transition possible.  Only US confidence that 
Russia wouldn’t mind, could live with it, or didn’t matter, facilitated this. 
 Linked in with this transition from the Cold War relationship with Russia towards a position 
where the main threats to US security had changed considerably, was the ongoing debate about the 
best way to reduce US and Russian nuclear weapons.  All four US presidents since the end of the 
Cold War entered office determined to make cuts in strategic nuclear weapons, and all but Bill 
Clinton achieved this.  Although each president had slightly different ideas about how this could 
best be best achieved; George H. W. Bush and Bill Clinton considered the retention of the ABM 
Treaty central to bilateral arms control agreements, while George W Bush was fully prepared to 
make unilateral cuts in US nuclear forces in a world without the ABM Treaty, the central dynamic 
was the way Russia was viewed in US foreign policy and whether or not American policymakers 
could risk transitioning from a MAD paradigm with Russia and a return to a pre MAD nuclear 
predicament.  George H. W. Bush, Bill Clinton, and to an extent Barack Obama, through 
negotiations over New START and rhetorically in his Prague speech, decided that this risk was not 
worth the cost, while George W. Bush, as a way of signalling that the world had moved on, decided 
that the cost was worth the risk.   
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The evolution of US missile defence thinking between 1989 and 2010 is also a reflection of 
a nuanced internal debate about the way in which technology drove and influenced policy.  Two 
technological dynamics in particular stand out.  The first is the top-down pressure from the 1983 
Strategic Defense Initiative – whereby thinking gradually transitioned from comprehensive space-
based BMD to a more limited conception based on assets deployed in silos on the ground.  The 
second is the bottom-up route from battlefield missile defence systems, whereby the US BMD 
programme in 2010 was essentially a reflection of the steady increases in TMD technology that can 
be traced back to the Patriot missile defence system used in the 1991 Persian Gulf War.  This 
bifurcation also reflected the debate about what any US BMD system should be designed to do, and 
it was the gradual harmonisation of these pressures by 2010 that suggested that while international 
systemic requirements for US security and technology had converged, the downward slope of the 
SDI and the upward pressure from TMD had also finally been harmonised.  Evidence of this could 
be found in the reliance that the Obama administration had placed on the Aegis and SM-3 systems 
by 2010, rather than on the 30 Ground-Based Interceptors already deployed in Alaska and 
California by this point. 
 Finally, while ballistic missile defence has proved an enduring logic in American politics 
because of the changes in threat and technology that have developed since the end of the Cold War, 
it has endured because of the simple logic of missile defence.  Defending the nation against enemy 
attack through ballistic missile defences appears far simpler than the complicated intellectual 
argument that Mutual Assured Destruction is the best way to manage nuclear competition.  In this 
sense, it has been very difficult for members of the US public to understand why their government 
would not want to build missile defences if such defences could keep them safe.  This dynamic has 
been exacerbated considerably by the fact that the number of policymakers with genuine knowledge 
of what is fundamentally an “elite issue” has decreased considerably during the two decades after 
the end of the Cold War.   
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 The simple logic of missile defence is perhaps nowhere better outlined than in a 1983 
speech by the father of the modern US missile defence effort, President Ronald Reagan: 
 What if people could live secure in the knowledge that their security did not rest on the 
 threat of instant US retaliation … that we could intercept and destroy strategic ballistic 
 missiles before they reached our soil or that of our allies?
875
  
The simplicity of the missile defence argument ensured that the programme retained popular appeal 
and thus could be played for domestic political advantage throughout this period.  This logic never 
entirely disappeared between 1989 and 2010, and would come back stronger as newer threats and 
potential threats started to rise, and as ballistic missile defence in general got to be more politically 
popular domestically, and politically trouble free internationally.   
 Lawrence Freedman has argued that, “From the start of the nuclear age it has been almost a 
moral imperative to develop some system that would make it possible to defend against an 
incoming bomber or missile attack”.876  Despite this fact, it has taken nearly six decades of research, 
billions of dollars in funding, and numerous different conceptions of how this could be achieved, 
before a political consensus would emerge behind a US ballistic missile defence system in 2010.  
While this is certainly a product of the perceived requirements of the international system and of 
developments in technology and engineering, it is also predominantly because of politics, and the 
inherently political nature of the US ballistic missile defence debate. 
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